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Abstract 
Donaghy, Maureen M. (Ph.D., Political Science, Department of Political Science) 
Seats at the Table: Civil Society and Participatory Governance in Brazilian Housing Policy 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor David S. Brown 
 Can democratic institutions be created to address social challenges? Democratic 
institutions should promote accountability of government officials to the needs of citizens. Civil 
society then plays a role in exposing corruption as well as in communicating the needs of low-
income residents to officials. Neither the institutions of representative democracy nor the 
presence of civil society, however, appears to automatically guarantee adoption of social benefits 
for the poor. Scholars, development practitioners, donors, and activists propose participatory 
governance institutions as mechanisms to create accountability and responsiveness through a 
public forum incorporating civil society. To date, however, little comparative research exists to 
confirm whether these institutions do influence adoption of social policies. I seek to fill this gap 
by assessing the impact of Brazil’s municipal housing councils. Housing represents an issue of 
critical importance in Brazil and other developing countries where large populations reside in 
informal settlements in unsafe and insecure conditions. This dissertation seeks to provide 
evidence to confirm whether participatory governance institutions are effective mechanisms to 
coordinate government officials and civil society to alter policy-making.    
 Using a mixed method approach based on fieldwork in Brazilian cities and government 
data, I argue that municipal housing councils should affect policy adoption at the municipal 
level. I find that in the aggregate municipal housing councils are associated with greater 
likelihood of program adoption. Contrary to expectations, the depth of civil society does not 
increase the probability of program adoption where municipal housing councils exist. Looking 
further into case studies, civil society-state dynamics strongly influence the policy process within 
municipal housing councils. The responsibilities afforded to municipal housing councils also 
 iv
make a significant difference in the likelihood that councils are associated with housing 
programs. Finally, I find that actors working through municipal housing councils created in 
response to local demand rather than to a new federal mandate are more committed to the 
process. This commitment matters for the policy outcomes the councils produce. In sum, based 
on the case of municipal housing councils in Brazil, I conclude that participatory governance 
institutions do generate responsiveness and accountability, resulting in policy shifts to address 
social challenges. 
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11. Introduction  
“Democracy does not serve as an automatic remedy of ailments as quinine works to remedy 
malaria. The opportunity it opens up has to be positively grabbed in order to achieve the desired 
effect.” – Amartya Sen (1999; p. 155) 
 
Can democracy remedy social challenges? As Amartya Sen makes clear, democracy on its 
own cannot solve all problems. More is required to capture the benefits of democratic 
governance to meet the needs of citizens. The question is how the benefits of democracy may be 
capitalized on in order to create progress in solving deep-rooted social problems. Does 
democracy’s ability to foster development depend on the strength of civil society or can 
institutions be created to address social challenges? In this dissertation I examine the impact 
newly formed participatory councils have on housing policy in Brazil. The goal is to understand 
whether institutional innovation produces change for the poor as a subset of society often left at a 
political disadvantage. Despite the impressive growth of democracy in developing countries over 
the last two decades, there remain reasons to think that elections and associated democratic 
institutions fail to engage important segments of the population. While democratic institutions 
seem to be thoroughly entrenched, there are reasons to suspect more work lies ahead. The 
following story motivates my dissertation. 
On a rainy Saturday I was invited by leaders of two housing rights organizations to visit a 
recent land occupation not far from Curitiba’s city center. Plywood shelters and plastic-sheeted 
tents housing 1,400 families lined the street and extended far back into the woods. It was the day 
before municipal elections, and Luiz, a long-time activist in the urban reform movement, was 
campaigning for city council on a platform to create a municipal level housing secretariat and 
extend special zones for social housing. Luiz trudged along with us in the mud, wearing a suit 
2with only a laminated campaign poster for cover, occasionally handing out campaign material to 
residents. That day an overflowing creek flooded numerous shelters with raw sewage, and 
families scrambled to keep their children and limited possessions dry. Seeing the situation, Luiz 
called the municipal Ministerio Público1 (Public Ministry) office and a local media outlet to alert 
them to the health emergency. Several hours later we left the occupation without any government 
official or media member arriving on the scene. In the interim, however, we did witness several 
other candidates for city council delivering soda and food supplies to the community. The next 
day Luiz came in 553rd place out of 797 candidates for city council. Several weeks later, all the 
residents of the occupation were evicted in a violent clash with police, during which one person 
was killed.  
In this instance neither the mechanism of elections nor the presence of civil society 
served to hold the local government accountable to this community’s needs. Clientelism, in 
which politicians promise favors in exchange for votes, often prevents candidates with ideas for 
broad policy reform from winning elections. In an atmosphere of intense electoral competition, 
short-term promises win votes from the poor, but long-term solutions to entrenched problems, 
such as homelessness and property rights, may remain unaddressed. In addition, even where an 
active civil society exists to represent the interests of the poor, there is no guarantee that those 
organizations have any influence with government officials. Though scholars often cite the 
media and the judicial system as mechanisms for civil society influence, this case demonstrates 
that neither mechanism necessarily guarantees civil society access to redress. A free media may 
promote transparency of government, but the media may find everyday instances of poverty 

1 The Ministerio Público is an independent branch of government charged by the Brazilian Constitution with 
defending “diffuse and collective interests”. Housing rights organizations often use the Ministerio Público to fight 
evictions.   
3mundane and be unresponsive to calls from civil society organizations (CSOs) looking to 
publicize perceived injustices. Civil society may also lack the capacity and the time to access the 
judicial system. Moreover, the judiciary cannot enact social programs to assist large segments of 
the population.  
Can institutional solutions be designed to address these problems? Political scientists are 
still working to identify the kinds of democratic institutions that best promote accountability to 
the poor. In addition, literature on civil society does not concretely identify how civil society best 
holds governments accountable for the provision of social welfare. In this dissertation I evaluate 
participatory governance institutions as a particular type of democratic institution, which 
incorporates civil society into policy making to promote accountability to the poor. In addition to 
accountability, participatory governance institutions should also ensure greater responsiveness to 
heterogeneous needs at the local level based on the direct input of civil society into policy 
making. Participatory governance institutions should fill the gap between democracy and civil 
society by guaranteeing regular access to government officials, providing a forum for debate 
among actors, increasing transparency, and regulating social programs, in the end creating 
policies that better reflect the interests of the poor.  
Through the case of Brazil’s municipal housing councils I analyze the effect of 
participatory governance institutions on pro-poor policy adoption and ask an important question: 
Can governments create institutions to promote greater responsiveness and accountability to the 
poor? Are participatory governance institutions effective democratic institutions to incorporate 
civil society demands and elicit action from governments? Here I test whether civil society 
incorporation in decision-making through municipal housing councils effects the provision of 
resources. If municipal housing councils are associated with an increase in social housing 
4programs, participatory governance institutions may in fact provide an answer to how democratic 
institutions and civil society may encourage adoption of social benefits.  
Political Institutions and the Poor 
Can institutional solutions be designed to benefit the poor? Previous studies find that 
democracies produce more benefits for the poor than non-democracies (Boone 1996; Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003; Dasgupta 1993; Franco, Alvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz 2004; Lake and Baum 
2001; McGuire 2001; Moon and Dixon 1985; Przeworski et al. 2000; Sen 1981, 1999; Siegle, 
Weinstein, and Halperin 2004; Zweifel and Navia 2000). Quantitative evidence also appears to 
support the claim that democracies spend more than non-democracies on social programs, 
particularly for education and healthcare (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Brown and Hunter 
2004; Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2005; Kaufman and Segura- Ubiergo 2001; Lake and Baum 
2001; McGuire 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000; Stasavage 2005a; Tavares and Wacziarg 2001). 
Further, recent evidence suggests that where non-democracies do have high levels of social 
spending, programs may be targeted at narrow groups of citizens whose support aids in 
maintaining the status quo (Haber 2007; Mares and Carnes 2009). In sum, democratic 
institutions appear to strongly influence the quality of life for citizens and the depth of social 
spending.  
 Scholars suggest several mechanisms by which democracy benefits the poor. First, 
because elections allow citizens to punish officials for governance failures, politicians act 
strategically to prevent these failures from occurring. For instance, Sen (1981, 1999) finds that 
famines are less likely to occur in democracies because officials have strategic incentives to 
prevent famines from ever happening in the first place. Freedom of the press in democracies aids 
in spreading information among citizens when failures do occur (Sen 1981, 1999). Competition 
5among candidates should also lead to increasing promises for social programs (Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008; Mares and Carnes 2009). Future elections then compel politicians to spend more 
on public goods once in office in order to retain support (Deacon 2009; Lake and Baum 2001; 
McGuire and Olson 1996; Niskanen 1997).  
These studies all point to electoral competition as the key to governmental accountability. 
Elections, however, appear to only go so far in producing benefits for the poor. Several scholars 
challenge the fundamental usefulness of elections as mechanisms for translating the interests of 
voters into policy action (Manin et al. 1999). As mentioned in the story from Curitiba, 
clientelism may actually lead the poor to vote for candidates who provide immediate relief, 
prioritizing the present over potential future benefits. Moreover, once in office officials may 
have little contact with citizens and may not be directly concerned with the needs of low-income 
residents until it is time to campaign again. Elections may be a loose mechanism for 
accountability, thereby conferring broad benefits to the poor across countries and across time, 
but in the near term, the poor need action by governments to resolve pressing problems. In 
addition, as democracies experience higher economic growth rates, providing social assistance to 
the poor may become less broadly politically popular, decreasing the electoral incentive to enact 
social programs. While elections are certainly important for accountability, they are not perfect 
mechanisms for securing benefits for the poor.  
Beyond elections, scholars cite the roles of legislatures, executives and courts, and the 
inclusion of sub-national governments in shaping political struggles and resource allocation (see 
for example, Banting 1987; Immergut 1992; Skocpol 1992; Weir et al. 1988). For example, 
where more veto players exist, such as in federalist systems with strong separation of powers, the 
possibilities for welfare state development may be limited (Tsebelis 2002). However, other 
6scholars have called into question the effectiveness of controls over public officials, including 
courts and oversight bodies, which are supposed to ensure the functioning of representative 
democracy (O’Donnell et al. 1999; Mainwaring and Welna 2003; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 
2006). Neither the separation of powers nor specific mechanisms set up to promote 
accountability of politicians appears to effectively engender responsiveness to low-income 
citizens.  
Recent research from the developing world in particular is beginning to uncover how 
federalism and decentralization may affect social policy. As Judith Tendler sums up the 
argument for decentralization, “greater proximity makes government more vulnerable to citizen 
pressures, and makes it easier for citizens to become more informed and hence more demanding 
of good service” (Tendler 1997; p. 144). Research shows that decentralization does not 
automatically lead to better outcomes for the poor (e.g., Ackerman 2004; Adhikari et al. 2004; 
Crook 2003; Ostrom 2005; Steiner 2007). But, when local stakeholders are involved and 
sufficient resources and power are given to the local level, decentralization does show promise 
for increasing accountability (e.g, Asante and Ayee 2004; Blair 2000; Crook and Manor 1998; 
Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Manor 1999). These studies suggest the need for further research 
into when decentralization leads to policies benefiting the poor and the type of decentralized 
institutions that enable inclusion of stakeholders.    
  Finally, civil society is also thought to be crucial to promoting accountability of the 
government to its citizens. Alexis de Tocqueville recognized the importance of a vibrant culture 
of associationalism to form a counterbalance to the weight of the state (Tocqueville 1835). 
Through associationalism citizens would build connections with each other to help in times of 
crisis. Similar to de Tocqueville’s notion of associationalism, Putnam (1993) found that social 
7capital unifies citizens to make claims on the government and demand a response. Putnam 
argued that a strong civil society is needed to counter the tendency of the state to protect elite 
interests and ensure that institutions function in the interests of residents. This ideal of civil 
society as protector of citizens’ interests continues to drive much of the research on government 
accountability. As John Gaventa (2006) writes,  
“Based on long standing ideas of the importance of ‘associationalism’ in democracy, a 
robust civil society can serve as an additional check and balance on government behaviour 
[sic], through mobilising claims, advocating for special interests, playing a watchdog role, 
and generally exercising countervailing power against the state” (p. 14). 
 
The literature on social capital and associationalism, however, lacks specific details about how 
civil society actually reaches governments to enforce accountability. To some extent, social 
movement scholars have picked up this question. They cite shifts in the political opportunity 
structure as explaining when social movements are able to influence policy change (see for 
example, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). The mechanisms by which civil society 
traditionally influences policy making are through direct action, such as protest, public 
campaigns, and bilateral negotiations with government officials. Public officials respond to CSO 
demands made through direct action often out of fear of the economic and political impact of 
disruption (Giugni, Tarrow and Tilly 1999). Distribution of social benefits in response to these 
demands may then be targeted to specific claims rather than broad social policies. Second, public 
campaigns either in support or opposition of public officials and their activities, may lead to 
policy changes where electoral fortunes are at stake. CSOs use the media and their own networks 
to spread information, which may lead to public shame or to swaying voter’s decisions. For 
instance, in South Korea, the growth in NGOs led to awareness of the inequities in coverage, 
which ultimately led to more universal programs (H.J. Kwon 2002; S. Kwon 2002). Finally, 
8CSOs are often invited by government officials to meet or they request meetings in order to 
inform officials of specific citizen needs. Government officials may respond to CSO requests 
once they are made aware of the need to act and are offered specific solutions. One claim against 
civil society is that organizations often act in the interests of their own members without 
considering the broader social impact of their demands. To date, however, more comparative 
research is needed to evaluate the contexts in which CSOs most effectively persuade 
governments to adopt social programs. We still need systematic research to understand exactly 
how CSOs are able to hold governments accountable to the needs of the poor. 
In sum, though we have good evidence that democracies produce better outcomes for the 
poor, we still need more information about how democratic institutions and civil society within 
democracies best hold governments accountable for improving the lives of citizens. Elections 
and decentralized institutions do produce some level of accountability to the needs of low-
income citizens, but these two factors alone do not appear to solve entrenched social problems. 
Civil society may also be key for making democracy work for the poor, but the means by which 
scholars have identified civil society influence over government decision making are vague. We 
need to further identify the institutions through which civil society reaches government officials 
to affect change.   
Participatory Governance Institutions 
Participatory governance institutions may be innovative democratic mechanisms, 
capturing the benefits of decentralization and civil society. These institutions theoretically 
provide an answer to questions of how to increase accountability to the poor and incorporate 
civil society more closely into policy making. Support for participatory governance institutions 
derives from the notion that various participatory approaches promote “good governance”. 
9Scholars often cite good governance as the reason behind government’s willingness to invest in 
programs that benefit the poor specifically. The World Bank defines governance as the way in 
which states exercise power to manage economic and social resources (World Bank 1994). Good 
governance is measured by the capacity of governments to provide public services, ensure 
transparency, promote well-being, and enable economic development (Huther and Shah 1998). 
Though many authors are vague about which kinds of institutions promote good governance, 
participatory institutions in general are argued to contribute to “pro-poor” policy making. 
Participatory governance involves the inclusion of civil society to work with the state in 
managing resources to benefit the poor directly. The problem is that we still know very little 
about how these institutions work across contexts and whether they achieve the ultimate goal of 
shaping policies to benefit all citizens. We still need to understand whether participatory 
governance institutions can create responsiveness and accountability where other democratic 
mechanisms and civil society involvement alone have failed. 
Participatory governance institutions cement the role of civil society as “co-governor” with 
the state (Ackerman 2004; Carothers 1999; Gaventa 2006). They are defined as forums in which 
citizens and government officials discuss problems and deliberate together to generate solutions 
(Avritzer 2002; Fung and Wright 2003). No longer can government officials selectively listen to 
certain civil society groups or individuals. Instead, both sides enter into a more formal, and 
ideally inclusive, mechanism for cooperation. Participatory governance institutions include a 
broad range of approaches, involving budgeting, policymaking, service delivery, development 
planning, monitoring of public services, and oversight bodies (Malena 2009). All of these 
approaches undertake a different mode of incorporating civil society and the state based on 
different objectives, permanency of the process, and rules governing cooperation of actors. But 
10
all participatory governance institutions emerge based on the idea that traditional institutions of 
representative democracy do not adequately include the voices of the poor or respond to their 
needs (Selee and Peruzzotti 2009). Participatory governance institutions expand decision-making 
beyond the bureaucracy with the aim of balancing elite interests with the demands of civil 
society. 
Several scholars question why elites would give up control by implementing participatory 
governance institutions. Not only do participatory governance institutions decrease officials’ 
relative power, but it can be expensive to set up the financial, operational and legal capacity to 
implement the results (Abers 2003). The most common explanation for creation of these 
institutions involves the influence of left-leaning parties, particularly in Latin America, who 
adopted participatory governance into their party platforms and seek now to implement 
participatory institutions since they have gained office (Baiocchi 2001; Houtzager 2003; Abers 
2003). A second argument involves modernization and a changing political culture: as citizens 
become wealthier they become more politically aware and favor greater civic engagement 
(Fukuyama 1996; Inglehart 1989; Lipset 1959). Greater decentralization of resources and power 
also facilitates the creation of participatory governance institutions. Lastly, government officials 
will create participatory governance institutions when it suits their social, political, and financial 
interests. Civil society demands for participatory governance increases the positive incentives for 
local officials to create the institutions (Andersson and van Laerhoven 2007).  
But do participatory governance institutions in reality act as effective democratic 
institutions to benefit the poor? Theoretically, participatory governance institutions should lead 
to increasing social benefits for the poor based on the basic mechanisms of responsiveness and 
accountability. As mentioned above, studies by development scholars find that decentralization 
11
of responsibilities and resources to local officials often leads to improved responsiveness and 
accountability of local governments to citizens’ concerns (World Bank 1996; Fizbein 1997; Blair 
2000). Participatory governance institutions formally involve civil society in the process of 
decentralization. When civil society has the opportunity to present the specific needs of the 
community, governments may respond directly to those needs rather than implementing 
programs that do not address the real problems. By increasing information sharing among and 
between CSOs, government officials, and the public at large, scholars argue that CSOs hold 
governments accountable within the forum and within the municipality by generating public 
scrutiny (Gaventa 2006; Goldfrank 2007).  
Accountability has also been defined in terms of reduction in corruption and clientelism. 
Ackerman (2004) claims that participatory governance institutions reduce possibilities and 
incentives for corruption, the political use of funds, and the capture of state institutions by elites. 
Participatory institutions that allow civil society to scrutinize public spending should reduce 
corruption where governments are held liable through elections (Hardjono and Teggemann 
2003). Participatory governance institutions, therefore, complement the institutions of 
representative democracy in eliciting accountability.  
Though current evidence suggests that participatory governance institutions do generate 
responsiveness and accountability (see for example, Baiocchi 2003; UNDP 2002) little 
comparative research exists to confirm whether these institutions produce benefits to the poor. 
Where scholars have focused on the question of outcomes, studies have been limited by 
empirical evidence and comparison across contexts. Non-generalizable case studies do not 
provide clear evidence that participatory governance institutions incorporating CSO actors 
generate measurable differences in the type of policies adopted. Participatory governance 
12
institutions may promote responsiveness and accountability, but we need to know when and how 
they make a difference rather than making blanket proclamations regarding the broad benefits of 
participation for the poor. To date scholars have focused too heavily on one type of intervention 
– participatory budgeting – and have not conducted broadly comparative studies to judge the 
impact of institutions in diverse contexts. If participatory governance institutions do lead to 
increasing benefits to the poor, this suggests that institutions may be created to enhance the 
performance of governments in responding to the needs of citizens. In this dissertation, I test this 
claim based on the following broad hypothesis: 
Where participatory governance institutions exist, municipal governments will adopt a 
greater number of social programs to address the needs of the poor.  
The Brazilian Case 
Though Brazil has experienced fast-paced economic growth and international praise, 
domestically the government must address social challenges in order to alleviate persistent 
poverty and inequality. Brazil has been classified as a “social democracy” based on their ability 
to manage economic growth while expanding social, political, and economic rights (Sandbrook 
et al. 2007). President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva from the Worker’s Party (PT) promised 
redistribution and economic growth within the market economy. But poverty, inequality, and 
social spending are far from uniform across Brazil’s 5,564 municipalities. This leads to the 
question, then, of whether democracy functions differently across this one country to produce 
such large variation.  
Brazil’s municipal councils for housing offer an opportunity to assess whether 
participatory governance institutions, as democratic institutions incorporating civil society into 
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decision making, matter for the variation in social policy across the country. In Brazil, 
developing participatory governance institutions has gone hand in hand with the process of 
democratization. CSOs lobbied for the inclusion of participatory governance institutions in the 
Constitution of 1988. As Brazilian scholars Schatten et al. explain: 
“Hundreds of thousands of interest groups worked throughout the country as the constitution was 
being drafted and collected half a million signatures to demand the creation of participatory 
democratic mechanisms. Underpinning such demand was the belief that by opening spaces for 
citizens to participate, the policymaking process would become more transparent and 
accountable and social policies would better reflect the needs of citizens” (Schatten et al. 2005; 
p. 174). 
Participatory governance institutions in Brazil have been at the heart of civil society strategy to 
press the federal, state, and municipal governments to address the needs of the poor. CSOs, 
including non-governmental organizations and social movements, continue now to demand the 
implementation of participatory governance institutions and the release of resources from the 
federal to the municipal level.  
The creation of participatory governance institutions has also been intertwined with the 
path of the PT in Brazil. The PT, which emerged out of the labor movements of the 1970s, was 
formed around a philosophy of participation that sought to involve the lower classes in politics 
(Jacobi 1999). Since its founding, the PT has been closely associated with a broad range of social 
movements calling for a more equitable society, less political corruption and more effective 
service delivery. When the PT won the municipal elections in Porto Alegre in 1988, one of their 
primary initiatives was the introduction of participatory budgeting. According to Pedro Jacobi, 
the impetus for focusing on the budget specifically was that “the budget becomes the incentive 
for all popular debates, and the definition of priorities is an extremely important instrument in 
mobilizing community practices” (1999; pg. 7). The process of negotiating the budget, therefore, 
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becomes a mechanism for collectivizing preferences across a range of actors and a means for 
both sides to understand more about the other’s needs and restrictions.  
Though participatory budgeting initiatives, particularly those in Porto Alegre, have 
received the most international attention as examples of institutions demonstrating the potential 
benefits of collaboration between citizens and government, numerous other types of municipal-
level councils exist throughout Brazil, tasked with both policy and programmatic responsibilities. 
These councils generally allocate half of the seats for government officials and half for 
representatives of civil society. While informative case study research exists to suggest these 
municipal councils and other types of participatory governance institutions provide a voice for 
previously marginalized citizens, questions remain regarding the extent of resulting benefits for 
the poor and the context in which these institutions have the greatest impact.2 
In this dissertation I assess the effect of municipal housing councils on social housing 
policy. Housing is an issue of vital importance to the poor in developing countries, particularly in 
urban areas. It presents a key social benefit for which governments provide direct assistance, 
financing, and indirect support through community improvements. Municipal housing councils 
in Brazil incorporate members from civil society and local government officials to deliberate on 
programs and policies to benefit low-income residents. Many municipal housing councils formed 
in the early 2000’s at the initiative of mayors from the PT. Since then, however, municipal 
housing councils have been created by mayors from diverse parties and in response to the 
creation of the National System for Housing in the Social Interest (Sìstema Nacional de 

2 Though see Wampler, Brian, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007) and Andersson, Krister and Frank van 
Laerhoven, “From Local Strongman to Facilitator: Institutional Incentives for Participatory Municipal Governance 
in Latin America,” Comparative Political Studies, 40 (September 2007), 1085-1111.  
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Habitação de Interesse Social - SNHIS). Under this new decentralized housing system, every 
municipality wishing to receive funds for social housing from the federal level must have created 
a municipal housing council by the end of 2009. The variation in municipalities adopting 
housing councils both before and after the mandate provides for comparison across the country.  
My goal in this dissertation is to assess whether municipal housing councils are 
associated with an increase in social housing benefits. Further, I seek to determine when and how 
these participatory governance institutions lead to policy change. My hypothesis is that 
municipal housing councils may be key to the variation in housing policy across municipalities. 
Where participatory governance institutions exist, municipal governments should be more 
responsive and accountable to citizens’ needs. Here I seek to provide concrete evidence to an 
important question for Brazil and other developing countries: Can participatory governance 
institutions generate responsiveness and accountability to social needs across diverse contexts? 
Research Design  
For this study I employ a mixed methods approach. I use both case studies and large-N 
quantitative methods to test the hypotheses and to understand the causal mechanisms by which 
municipal housing councils influence housing policy in Brazil. The benefit to this type of mixed-
method approach is that the two parts inform each other to strengthen overall confidence in the 
findings (Lieberman 2005). I begin with a survey of Brazilian municipalities, which contained 
questions regarding housing programs and institutions in both 2005 and 2008 (IBGE 2005, 
2008). I use these data first to evaluate the claim that municipal housing councils are associated 
with an increase in adoption of housing programs. In conjunction with several other Brazilian 
government sources, I also use these data to test whether a strong civil society enhances the 
effect of municipal housing councils in eliciting social housing programs. 
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Based on a review of the data, out of the 20 largest cities in the country I selected my 
initial case studies based on the depth of civil society and whether a council for housing existed 
in the municipality. From this I selected four cases in diverse regions of the country. Table 1 
below displays the results of this analysis.  
Table 1.1: Initial Case Study Selection Criteria 
 No Housing Council Housing Council 
Low Civil Society Curitiba – South Salvador – Northeast 
High Civil Society Recife - Northeast São Paulo – Southeast 
 
Like most field studies, however, the picture became more complex once I landed on the ground 
and began talking to government officials and civil society leaders in each city. While according 
to the survey data and online information Recife and Curitiba did not have municipal housing 
councils, in the Fall of 2008 it turned out that both had recently passed laws to create housing 
councils in response to the federal mandate, requiring that all municipalities receiving federal 
funds create a council by the end of 2009. This enabled me to look more closely into the question 
of how the reason behind creation of participatory governance institutions influences the 
commitment of actors and the eventual outcomes. In addition, once on the ground I decided to 
investigate the case of Santo André on the outskirts of São Paulo because I heard repeatedly that 
they had a model municipal housing council operated by a long-term PT government. Compared 
to São Paulo and Salvador where changing political administrations seemed to shift the dynamics 
of the municipal housing councils, I wanted to see how the presence of a stable, leftist 
administration affected the participatory governance process.  
Within each of the five case cities, to the extent possible I interviewed all government 
officials involved with the housing councils. In Santo André and Salvador, which have relatively 
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small housing departments, this involved interviews with a few key officials. In São Paulo, 
where an extensive bureaucracy exists to manage social housing programs, I interviewed 
approximately 10 relevant officials. In Curitiba and Recife I interviewed the few officials who 
were involved in the initial creation of the housing councils. To find my interviewees, I called or 
emailed housing departments and requested meetings or made contact with officials during 
housing council meetings I attended.  
I also spoke with leaders from all four of Brazil’s major housing organizations in addition 
to the National Forum for Urban Reform (FNRU) to gauge their perceptions of the councils and 
their effectiveness in bringing about greater prioritization of housing interventions at the 
municipal level. My contact with CSOs began in São Paulo and snowballed across the country. 
By attending several meetings of the União Nacional dos Movimentos de Moradia Popular 
(UNMP) I met many of the most influential leaders in the Brazilian housing movement. From 
these meetings, I received contacts from the UNMP and the other three major movements for 
housing around the country. In each city I was hosted by affiliates of the UNMP, though I also 
met with leaders from the other major movements, NGOs, and locally based associations. 
Through these interviews I gained an enormous respect for the daily struggles of these activists 
and lengthy process they have gone through to negotiate the creation of participatory governance 
institutions. In addition, I also interviewed private sector interests in each city, though with a 
particular emphasis on the real estate sector in São Paulo. By speaking with a diverse group of 
actors, I hope to have received a well-rounded view of the municipal councils, including the 
benefits and pitfalls of participatory governance. 
Throughout this dissertation, information from the case studies informs the hypotheses 
and interpretation of results. Based on the results from the preliminary statistical analysis in 
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Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 I review the case studies to provide evidence as to how the policy-
making process works in municipal housing councils. This review informs the statistical analysis 
regarding how the policy process affects outcomes in municipal housing councils. When the 
statistical analysis provides results contrary to my expectations, another look at the case studies 
helps to explain why. Chapter 5 then relies on the case studies and quantitative evidence to 
assess how the reason behind creation of municipal housing councils leads to variance in 
outcomes.   
Main Findings 
 The main finding of this dissertation is that participatory governance institutions do 
matter for adoption of policies benefitting the poor. Where municipal councils for housing exist, 
municipalities are more likely to adopt a variety of social housing programs. Participatory 
governance institutions can create greater responsiveness and accountability to citizens’ needs. 
More than the depth of civil society, these institutions have the ability to shift government 
decision-making. In fact, I find that municipal housing councils are associated with greater 
adoption of social housing programs regardless of the depth of civil society within a 
municipality. This suggests that the institution is more important than the depth of civil society 
and that the institution may have a strong effect on redistribution across contexts in Brazil. 
 Second, I find that the rules of participatory governance institutions matter for the 
outcomes they produce. In the case studies, civil society-state dynamics significantly alter the 
policy-making process within municipal housing councils, but in the aggregate the institutional 
rules appear to strongly influence program adoption. Civil society-state dynamics, including the 
party in power, the role of the private sector, and the strategies of civil society, do determine the 
level of transparency, the scope of who is involved, and the nature of deliberation within 
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municipal housing councils. All these factors influence the details of housing programs, where 
projects are located, and the depth of municipal resources allocated to housing. Across cases, 
however, the transparency generated by oversight responsibilities allocated to municipal housing 
councils appears to significantly alter program adoption.  
 Finally, I find that the impetus for creation matters for the commitment of actors to 
participatory governance institutions. Whether municipal housing councils are initiated from the 
bottom-up rather than the top-down, plays a role in how committed government officials and 
CSOs are to the process. In turn, the commitment of government officials and civil society 
matters for the outcomes municipal housing councils produce. Participatory governance 
institutions mandated at the municipal level by the federal level, therefore, may not have the 
same impact on generating benefits for the poor.      
Implications 
In a democracy everyone should have the opportunity to have his or her voice heard. But 
the institutions of representative democracy—elections in particular—may not be enough to hold 
governments accountable to the needs of the poor and promote adoption of social benefit 
regimes. Traditional tactics of civil society—protest, bilateral negotiation, advocacy campaigns, 
etc.—may also not be enough for civil society to change the priorities of government officials to 
respond to the needs of low-income residents. Instead, the formal incorporation of civil society 
into decision-making through participatory governance institutions may provide a critical seat at 
the table leading to changing policy outcomes that benefit the poor. Rather than the depth of civil 
society alone, the institutionalization of participation is pivotal to generating responsiveness and 
accountability.          
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Scholars, development practitioners, and donors hail participatory governance institutions 
as a means towards achieving “good governance”, in which civil society provides an active voice 
in managing state resources. These institutions incorporate civil society into policy making in a 
new way, providing CSOs with unprecedented information, access, and opportunities for input. 
When civil society is involved in decision-making, outcomes should better reflect the interests of 
the poor. While this appears to be a reasonable proposition, little comparative evidence exists to 
support this claim. This dissertation attempts to remedy this gap by testing whether one type of 
participatory governance institution—municipal housing councils—are associated with greater 
adoption of benefits to assist the poor. That housing represents a key social challenge in the 
developing world adds to our understanding of what leads to the provision of social benefits in 
the developing country context.  
The findings of this study have implications for designing institutions that meet 
redistributive goals and for the strategies of social policy advocates. Statistical evidence 
demonstrates that there are broad patterns in policy outcomes, while highlighting the contextual 
nature of the impact of participatory governance institutions. This has implications for whether 
policy makers – both domestic and international – continue to call for participatory governance 
institutions to be implemented broadly as a means of bringing about greater redistribution of 
resources. Most of the studies on participatory democracy have come from a few cases – Brazil, 
the Philippines, India and South Africa. While this study continues the trend by focusing on 
Brazil, the results are more generalizable through the comparisons of contexts across the country, 
helping to pinpoint representative cases for replication of results. 
Housing is representative of poverty in the conception outlined by Amartya Sen (1999) in 
his landmark study of the deprivations that impede individuals in enjoying basic opportunities 
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and developing capabilities. Though Sen and others theorize that democracy is vital to the 
creation of good governance and pro-poor policy, this study provides empirical evidence to the 
debate about how a new kind of democratic institution influences policy adoption through 
careful, systematic comparison. It also offers evidence as to whether participatory governance 
institutions are worth further investment to meet goals of poverty reduction.  
Democracy may be better for the poor than authoritarian regimes, but traditional 
representative institutions may not provide sufficient channels for the voices of the poor to 
translate into policy outcomes that specifically address their needs. This study provides an 
answer to the question of whether a new type of institution can generate responsiveness and 
accountability to enhance the benefits of democracy.  
Overview of Chapters 
In this dissertation I test a general theoretical proposition regarding participatory 
governance institutions as mechanisms for responsiveness and accountability while also 
exploring the current civil society and policy environment for housing in Brazil. I begin with a 
discussion of housing policy as a critical issue for democracy and development both in 
developing countries worldwide and in Brazil. I then turn to the basic empirical question 
regarding the effect of participatory governance institutions on the adoption of social programs. 
In addition, based on existing literature and my observations in the field, I identify several 
variables, which may alter the effect of participatory governance institutions on policy outcomes: 
the depth of civil society, civil society-state dynamics, institutional rules, and the reason for 
creation. The following provides an outline for each chapter of the dissertation. 
Housing Policy 
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Scholars of democracy and social policy often overlook housing policy. However, 
housing as an issue of physical shelter, community development, and infrastructure provision, is 
increasingly important in developing countries where large slum populations and underserved 
rural communities demand benefits from the state to improve their basic quality of life. In 
defining housing policy, I follow the logic of Brazilian scholars Cymbalista and Santoro: “A 
housing policy assumes a wide variety of objectives—from provision of new units, slum 
reurbanization, emission of ownership waivers, intervention in tenements, to rent subsidies” 
(2008; p. 48). The objectives of housing policy aim to reduce homelessness and provide more 
secure shelter for citizens. These objectives translate into locally and nationally devised 
programs to provide individual families with units in which to live and programs to improve 
existing communities. In Chapter 2 I discuss housing policy in more detail, illustrating the 
similarities and differences between Brazil and developing countries around the world.  
The Effect of Municipal Housing Councils 
In Chapter 3 I present the main theoretical argument for the effect of participatory 
governance institutions on policy outcomes. I then test the hypothesis that municipal housing 
councils should increase the probability of municipalities adopting social housing programs. 
Positive findings suggest that governments can create democratic institutions to improve 
responsiveness and accountability to the needs of the poor.  
The Depth of Civil Society 
Within Chapter 3 I also test the claim that the depth of civil society matters for the 
outcomes participatory governance institutions produce. Building on Putnam, scholars studying 
participatory governance institutions argue specifically that low levels of social capital impede 
23
the impact of participatory institutions (Avritzer 2006; Houtzager and Moore 2003). In a cross-
municipal study of participatory budgeting councils in Brazil, Avritzer (2006) found that the 
councils did not provide the intended forum for deliberation where there was not already a 
significant community of organizations to participate. Participation may be predicated on 
whether organized networks of civil society exist, and further, outcomes may be a product of 
how those networks are able to control the discussion (Baiocchi 2003). Without considerable 
mobilization of demands, participatory institutions may be easily co-opted by elites and have no 
effect on democratic deepening or policy outcomes (Cooke and Kothari 2001). Using statistical 
analysis, I hypothesize that the greater the number of CSOs per capita in a municipality, the 
stronger the effect of participatory governance institutions in eliciting social policies.  
Dynamics between Civil Society and the State 
The relationship between civil society and the state should influence the policy process in 
participatory governance institutions (Wampler 2007). In chapter 4 I argue that the party of the 
administration in power, the strength of the private sector, and the strategies of CSOs may 
influence the dynamic between civil society and the local government. Baiocchi, Heller, and 
Silva (2008) argue that participatory governance institutions expand the traditional political 
opportunity structure through which civil society influences government action. The ideological 
predisposition of the government leadership may make a difference for their enthusiasm for 
participatory institutions and their inclination to include civil society in decision-making. 
Previous research shows that the political context in which CSOs operate either encourages or 
impedes their ability to reach policy makers throughout the stages of the policy process (Grugel 
1999). Whether policy makers’ ideological predispositions and interests align with CSOs leads to 
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strained or mutually beneficial relationships and communication between CSOs and policy 
makers (Edwards 2004).  
Participatory governance institutions may either exacerbate tensions among actors or 
facilitate cooperation. In addition, the strength of private sector interests and their alliances with 
government officials and civil society also matter for the direction of policy-making. 
Government officials have to balance demands for economic opportunities with the demands of 
CSOs to provide benefits to the poor. Finally, the strategies by which local CSOs traditionally 
reach government officials matter for whether CSOs are viewed as partners or adversaries. If 
CSOs continue to rely on direct action, including land occupations, or bilateral negotiations with 
government officials, participatory governance institutions may have little effect on policy. I 
evaluate the effect of civil society-state dynamics on the policy process and outcomes of 
participatory governance institutions in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
Institutional Rules 
As Avritzer (2009) argues, institutional design is critical to how citizens and government 
engage in decision-making. How participatory institutions are devised should matter for whose 
voices are included and the outcomes they produce. The structure of the institution, in terms of 
rules governing composition and responsibilities afforded to members, may then determine the 
policy process and outcomes of participatory governance institutions. In order to create the 
synergistic process that scholars and development practitioners have idealized, institutional 
design must be taken into account (Ostrom 1996; Kumar 2002; Agrawal and Gupta 2005; 
Fagatto and Fung 2006).  I examine this question regarding the influence of civil society-state 
dynamics and institutional rules in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
25
The Reason for Creation 
Whether participatory governance institutions are created by ideologically inclined 
mayors or imposed by federal mandate may matter for the commitment of government officials 
and CSOs to the process. Scholars have found that the commitment of the local and central 
governments to the process is critical for the effectiveness of participatory governance 
institutions (Kumar 2002; Fagatto and Fung 2006; Ackerman 2004; Ostrom 1996). Inclusion of 
civil society and the responsibilities accorded to participatory governance institutions 
demonstrate the commitment of the government to making the process work. In addition, the 
commitment of civil society is also critical to the effectiveness of institutions, which by 
definition rely on the input of community members outside of government. In Chapter 5 I assess 
how the reason for creation effects the commitment of government officials and civil society 
members, and further how this commitment affects the outcomes of participatory governance 
institutions.  
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Chapter 2: Housing Policy as Critical Challenge for Development and Democracy 
 
“The quality of the [council] process is very important for the creation of an idea of citizenship. 
Most people believe that there is quite a difference between being a city dweller and being a 
citizen. People living in the periphery and in favelas are not seen as having full rights, first of all 
because they are illegal and informal. Having the councils is a matter of having inclusion and 
creating citizenship.” Raquel Rolnik, Special Rapporteur for Housing to the UN  
 
 
Housing policy presents a test for how democratic governance may address social 
challenges. In developing countries, governments face enormous challenges in fast-growing 
cities and in rural areas where millions of residents reside in informal and often unsafe and 
unsanitary conditions. Citizens need shelter to live productive and healthy lives, improving their 
own quality of life while also contributing to local and national development. In Brazil and 
elsewhere housing is about more than the provision of shelter. In Brazil, CSOs involved in 
housing policy generally use the term “moradia” to define their claims. Though “moradia” does 
not have a precise translation in English, it generally refers more to a quality living space than 
solely a physical structure.3 The use of “moradia” instead of the more directly translatable term 
“habitação” (housing) emphasizes the importance of not just having a roof and four walls to call 
one’s own, but the need for safety, security, and dignity associated with a home.  
Housing involves the improvement of communities and quality of life as well as the 
benefits of citizenship and inclusion within democratic institutions. The quote above from 
Raquel Rolnik illustrates the difficulty that low-income residents face in demanding citizenship 
and inclusion. Municipal councils for housing provide the poor with unprecedented access to 
policy making, but the challenges remain daunting in Brazil and developing countries around the 
world. Traditionally politicians who need to provide tangible benefits to voters use housing as a 

3 Moradia is often translated as “dwelling” in English, but this does not really capture the meaning as used by CSOs 
in Brazil.  
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political symbol. As such, housing often falls prey to clientelistic behavior between elected 
officials and the poor.  
In this chapter I examine the importance of housing as a policy issue in developing 
countries. Housing is an important issue for democracy and development as a human right and as 
a means to reducing poverty and inequality. In addition, housing is critical to improving security 
and promoting environmental sustainability. As a tangible political issue, politicians are also 
motivated by elections to address housing needs. Policy makers, scholars, and donors throughout 
the world struggle to create policies and programs to address the diverse needs of the poor in 
terms of creating new housing, improving existing shelter, upgrading infrastructure and 
providing land titles. Though housing is not always part of the traditional definition of welfare 
policies, in the developing world where a significant portion of the population lives in informal 
settlements without proper infrastructure or property rights, the importance of housing to 
citizens’ welfare cannot be denied.  
In Brazil, housing policy has evolved since democratization into a decentralized system 
of resources and policy control. Civil society struggles to define the needs of the poor and 
maintain pressure on policy makers and donors to meet these needs. Housing policy is also 
perceived by civil society as key to asserting the right to participatory governance. Civil society 
has been heavily involved in creating the new system, which seeks to decentralize resources and 
more closely integrate the poor and all levels of government into policy planning. I argue that 
Brazil is both an outlier and representative of developing countries around the world. Given the 
high level of decentralization, Brazil is an outlier in terms of the structure of policy making and 
the diversity of programs adopted by municipalities across the country. However, Brazil has 
followed similar trends in approaches to housing policy as other developing countries. The 
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challenges in Brazil are representative of those faced by governments, civil society, and the poor 
living in undignified conditions throughout the world.  
Policy Challenges in Developing Countries 
The scope of housing challenges around the world remains staggering. According to the 
United Nations, one in three people in the world will live in “slums” by 2030 (UN Habitat 2003). 
Currently, 940 million people or one in six people on the planet live in areas without access to 
basic services or land security. A “slum” household, according to UN Habitat, is lacking in at 
least one of the following: access to improved water, access to improved sanitation, sufficient 
living area, structural quality, or security of tenure or title. “Housing” challenges worldwide, 
therefore, include much more than the quality of a single physical shelter, but rather involve the 
entire surroundings in which people live.  
Scholars and policy makers often link housing challenges to urban development and 
politics. For the first time in history, more than half of the world’s population now lives in urban 
areas (UN Habitat 2008). Rapid increases in the urban population—over 5% per year in parts of 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia—place stress on the urban infrastructure and lead to increasing 
number of residents living in slums across the globe. In developing countries, 36.5% of the urban 
population lives in slums. In Sub-Saharan Africa 62.2% of urban residents live in slums, while in 
Latin America and the Caribbean 27% of residents live in slums (UN Habitat 2008). Density is a 
particular problem in urban areas where people flock to central areas of the city in search of 
work (Mitlin 2007). In their volume on squatter settlements, Satterthwaite and Mitlin justify 
focusing on urban areas in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean by the immense 
scale of urban populations, the scale of deprivation among these populations, and the potential 
for urban poverty reduction due to the presence of local civil society organizations (2004; p. 5). 
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For housing, specifically, the UN estimates the needs in urban areas of developing countries as 
the following: 
“The annual need for housing in urban areas of developing countries alone is estimated at around 
35 million units (during 2000-2010). The bulk of these, some 21 million units, are required to 
cater for the needs of the increasing number of households. The rest is needed to meet the 
requirements of people who are homeless or living in inadequate housing. In other words, some 
95,000 new urban housing units have to be constructed each day in developing countries to 
improve housing conditions to acceptable levels.” (UN Habitat)  
While these figures are astounding, they more than likely vastly underestimate the problem given 
that the housing deficit for Brazil alone is approximately 16 million, according to the numbers 
provided below, or a little under a half of the UN’s world total.   
In looking at trends for the future, the growth of cities indicates growth in the slum 
population as well. The UN predicts that all of the population growth in the next 25-30 years will 
be in urban areas. Already in 2000, three-quarters of the population in Latin America and the 
Caribbean lived in urban areas and two-fifths of the population in Africa and Asia lived in urban 
areas (UN 2002). In 2007, the top four cities by population were Tokyo, Mexico City, New York 
and São Paulo, respectively (UN Habitat 2008). But by 2025, the UN predicts that the top four 
cities by population will be Tokyo, Mumbai, Delhi, and Dhaka, with São Paulo in fifth place. 
This shows the changing demographics of megacities around the world, which underscores the 
importance of tackling urban challenges, including housing, in the coming years.  
This is not to say that housing is purely an urban issue. The need for adequate housing 
and infrastructure exists in both rural and urban areas. Regardless of population density, citizens 
face resource constraints to building and purchasing shelter with secure land tenure. The nature 
of the intervention to housing challenges, however, may differ across rural and urban areas. 
Housing programs in urban areas are generally defined by construction of large public housing 
30
units, subsidies for financing, land titling, and slum improvement schemes, while in rural areas 
residents may prefer construction materials to build their own homes in addition to land titling 
programs for security.  
The problems of informality exist across the rural-urban divide. Residents of informal 
settlements risk eviction and the government can legitimize not providing services to areas that 
are not legally registered (Mitlin 2007). Collective action may then be important for attaining 
land security and public investments in infrastructure. Addressing the need for additional 
housing units, basic infrastructure, sanitary conditions, and land titles in developing countries 
worldwide poses a tremendous challenge to governments and international donors for the 
foreseeable future.   
Housing Challenges in Brazil 
Housing statistics in Brazil are divided by the “housing deficit,” or the gap between 
people who need housing and the existing stock, and “inadequate” housing, characterized by lack 
of access to basic services, land titles, and sufficient infrastructure. In 2008, the official housing 
deficit in Brazil, according to the Ministry of Cities, stood at 5.6 million, down from 6.3 million 
in 2007 (Ministry of Cities 2010). The good news in Brazil, then, is that the official number of 
housing units needed throughout the country is falling. Still, significant challenges remain. 
Across years, 83% of the housing deficit was located in urban areas, and 90% of those in need of 
housing earned between 0 and 3 minimum salaries4 (Fundação João Pinheiro, 2009). For all of 
Brazil, 39.3% of the deficit is attributed to citizens forced to live with family, 32.2% to excessive 

4 President Getúlio Vargas established the minimum salary (e.g. minimum wage) for Brazil in 1936. Today, the 
amount needed to “attend to the basic necessities of workers and their families, including housing, food, education, 
health, leisure, hygiene, transportation, and social welfare” as guaranteed by the Constitution equals approximately 4 
to 5 times the minimum salary (DIESSE -  Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Socioeconômicos; 
http://www.dieese.org.br/).  
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rent burden, 23% to precarious housing, and 5.5% to excessive density in rental housing. In rural 
areas 60% of the deficit is for precarious housing, while in urban areas it is only around 10%. 
Housing needs as part of the deficit, therefore, differ across the rural-urban divide.  
In addition, about 10.5 million homes across the country are counted as “inadequate” 
(Fundação João Pinheiro, 2009). Of these, one million houses did not have a bathroom and two 
million did not have proper land titles. Two million more are located in “subnormal settlements,” 
in which residents may have land title, but do not have access to basic services, such as 
electricity, piped water, sewage, or trash collection. Of the 80% of the population living in urban 
areas, about 40% are counted as living in inadequate and/or insecure housing (Rodrigues and 
Rolnik 2007). In Brazil, and in other growing cities in the developing world, rising incomes have 
improved affordability of housing, but speculative investment and density have also increased 
prices in many cities (Mitlin, 2007). Government interventions to improve inadequate housing 
units and provide new units to decrease the deficit are therefore still critical to addressing 
Brazil’s housing challenges.  
The very poor in Brazil—defined as those earning below 3 minimum salaries—generally 
have three options: 1) occupy unused land, 2) rent accommodation, which is often expensive and 
may require sharing with other families, or 3) purchase land on an illegal subdivision, which 
generally does not have basic infrastructure and sanitation (Cavalcanti, Marques, and Costa 
2004). Brazil’s favelas are mainly the result of land occupations by citizens squatting on any 
piece of land available. In addition, social movements often organize members to occupy land 
before negotiating with the municipal government either to build on the land or to be relocated to 
housing elsewhere. Cortiços, or tenement buildings, in which multiple families live together in 
often crowded and unsanitary conditions, are a particular phenomenon in the country’s largest 
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city, São Paulo. Though the city passed a law to hold landlords responsible for the miserable 
conditions in the cortiços, many city residents who desire to live close to employment in the city 
center continue to pay high rents for substandard living conditions. Finally, residents who can 
afford it often purchase land in subdivisions, called loteamentos, in which owners sell off plots 
of land without respecting city codes to provide sidewalks, roads, electricity, and other basic 
infrastructure. According to civil society leaders, housing policy in Brazil has never responded 
adequately to the needs of the very poor currently living in these three types of situations, either 
with subsidized financing, public housing, or infrastructure investment. Civil society demands, 
therefore, often focus on meeting the needs of the lowest-income citizens. 
 
Housing as a Policy Priority 
 Though statistics indicate the severity of housing problems, given competing social 
challenges, it is crucial to understand the benefits governments may gain by prioritizing housing 
interventions. First, the right to adequate housing is enshrined in international law as a basic 
human right of all citizens. Governments concerned with reputational effects and pleasing their 
own citizens may be concerned with fulfilling the promises of human rights. Second, addressing 
housing needs is a critical part of economic growth: when people have access to housing as an 
asset, they may be able to invest in their businesses. In addition, the real estate and construction 
industries in the developing world are increasingly viewed as engines for growth. Further, 
improving communities through physical shelter and infrastructure may reduce violence and 
crime within poor neighborhoods and improve environmental sustainability in cities and in rural 
areas. Finally, as I argue throughout this dissertation, governments make housing a priority 
because it is politically popular. Governments respond to citizen demands through a variety of 
incentives, which generally boil down to a desire to win at election time.  
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The Right to Adequate Housing 
The right to housing is enshrined in international law along with other basic rights to 
ensure a decent quality of life. The Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
calls for state parties to "recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions" (OHCHR 1991). The right to adequate housing is conceived 
of as central to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and is both a positive and a 
negative human right: governments are both responsible for ensuring acquisition of adequate 
housing and removing obstacles to its attainment. “Adequate” housing is defined by legal 
security of tenure, availability of services, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location, and 
cultural adequacy.  
The right to adequate housing is also reflected in the Millennium Development Goals, 
which call for “significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers”. 
Towards the goal of ensuring the right to adequate housing, UN Habitat and the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) began the United Nations 
Housing Rights Programme (UNHRP) in 2002. The Programme focuses on issues of forced 
evictions and the rights of indigenous peoples, in particular. Though the force of international 
law may be disputed, the fact that adequate housing is viewed as a basic human right by the UN 
and governments around the world provides legitimacy to the claims made by CSOs for housing 
interventions and places some degree of opprobrium on those governments unwilling to respond.  
Social movements throughout Brazil use the language of rights as justification for their 
demands. For example, following the occupation of several buildings in São Paulo’s city center, 
in an open letter to municipal, state and federal government officials, the Frente de Luta Moradia 
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(Front for Housing Struggles, FLM), called on the government to renovate three buildings for 
low income residents. The movement stated that the government “has the obligation to provide 
dignified housing to those that have none, as they should guarantee health, education, 
transportation, security…”  (Forum Centro Vivo, April 26, 2010). When negotiations with the 
municipal government broke down, the movement sought to file a petition with the Ministério 
Público (Public Ministry) claiming that the human rights of protestors had been violated because 
they were forced to live in subhuman conditions (O Globo, April 27, 2010). Also in SƗo Paulo, 
during a meeting to engage new members a leader of the UniƗo dos Movimentos da Moradia 
(Union of Housing Movements - UMM) urged a packed room of attendees to fight for the 
fundamental right to dignified housing. In his words, housing is a right of democracy, but 
citizens must be informed and continuously pressure the government to secure their rights. The 
National Forum for Urban Reform (FNRU) in Brazil also calls on citizens to challenge the 
government to ensure the right to dignified housing. In March 2010, the right to adequate 
housing was reaffirmed in the final declaration of the United Nations sponsored World Urban 
Forum in Rio de Janeiro, in which CSOs, including the FNRU, successfully lobbied for a strong 
statement defining the goals of the conference theme, “the right to the city” (FNRU 2010). In 
Brazil, then, civil society calls on the federal, state, and municipal governments to comply with 
human rights principles guaranteeing the right to “adequate” housing. To the extent that 
governments comply, they gain reputational benefits.  
Housing as Source of Economic Growth 
 In his highly acclaimed book Mystery of Capital (2000), Hernando de Soto argues that 
the poor’s homes are significant assets, but without formal titles these houses are “dead capital”. 
Based on a study in Peru, his work led international and domestic leaders to call for increasing 
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property rights in developing countries worldwide. With secure property rights, the poor can use 
their homes as collateral in order to access business loans, which may enable incorporation into 
the formal market and increase the size of small enterprises. Property rights, then, are key to 
economic growth: if the poor have the means to access loans, businesses should be more 
productive and add to overall economic gains.  
 In addition, the construction and real estate industry are drivers of economic growth in 
the developing and industrialized world. Investment in housing not only benefits individual 
households, but provides employment for construction and profits from sales. Broader benefits 
from infrastructure investment also contribute to economic growth. Research has found a 
positive association between infrastructure investment and economic growth in developing 
countries (de la Fuente and Estache, 2004). To increase profits in the construction and real estate 
industries, governments often enter into public-private partnerships for building or upgrading of 
communities. Rather than managing construction themselves, private contracts enable market 
growth with externalities beyond the families who benefit from new homes and basic service 
provision.    
Improving Security 
 Governments may also be incentivized to respond to housing challenges based on the real 
and perceived benefits to security. Much has been written about the dangers of favelas in Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo (see for example Arias 2006, Caldeira 2001; Perlman 2010). Several 
theories offer explanations linking insecurity in housing to violence, particularly in urban 
communities. First, informal communities create a feeling of inferiority among residents and a 
stigma of crime (Henry-Lee 2005; Lall, Suri, and Deichmann 2006). Regardless of the actual 
level of violence within an informal settlement, wealthier residents stereotype favelados, as they 
are known in Brazil, as criminals. This perception of the favelas as dangerous places leads to 
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isolation and further marginalization of residents. Second, slums may embody low levels of 
social capital. Though studies find that people living in cities have high levels of community 
participation, residents in slums tend to have very low levels of trust (UN Habitat 2008). Very 
generally, with low levels of social trust, residents may be less likely to look after one another 
and more likely to engage in criminal acts against their neighbors. In Latin America, Rosero-
Bixby (2006) also finds that existing crime and fighting over scarce resources lead to lack of 
trust among low-income residents. 
 Deprivation and urban crowding may be a source of insecurity to residents and a 
challenge to government officials to improve community relations. In order to prevent violence, 
crime, and disaffection, governments may then prioritize housing interventions.        
Environmental Sustainability 
 In the list of UN Millennium Development Goals, improving the lives of slum dwellers is 
situated within broader goals of environmental sustainability, clearly linking the two. 
Environmental problems resulting from informal housing conditions include poor air quality, 
water contamination, waste dumping, and negative impact on fragile ecosystems (UN Habitat 
2008). Improving the living conditions for slum dwellers should reduce pollution and overuse of 
natural resources. Constructing housing, but also providing slum dwellers with basic services and 
infrastructure, may improve environmental conditions within slums and in the region. As 
environmental degradation takes a greater toll on cities and rural areas, governments may be 
persuaded to act. Combined with the other benefits to economic growth and security, housing 
interventions and urbanization programs may generate large payoffs for minimal investments.  
Political Popularity 
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 Finally, the motivation for prioritizing housing policy comes back to the fact that housing 
interventions are generally politically popular. Politicians can easily point to physical 
improvements in slums and to new, brightly colored housing complexes as signs of progress. 
Both democratic and authoritarian regimes traditionally use housing to capture political support. 
For example, in both Chile and Peru, under authoritarian regimes, leaders used housing to 
maintain popularity (Gilbert 2002; Castells 1983). Fragile democracies, including South Africa, 
India, Thailand, Mexico, and Brazil have also adopted new housing schemes in recent years 
(Baumann 2007; Satyanarayana 2007, Boonyabancha 2005; World Bank 2004; Rodrigues and 
Rolnik 2007). Housing interventions to gain political support may be clientelistic in nature—
direct benefits to one community in exchange for loyalty—or they may more broadly respond to 
citizen demands, both rich and poor. Wealthier citizens often desire to improve the landscape of 
cities as much as the poor desire decent homes and communities in which to live. Both rich and 
poor voters, then, may make their electoral decisions based on policy expectations or on 
evidence of housing interventions.  
 In addition, as this dissertation argues, in Brazil and other developing countries, large 
civil societies oriented towards housing and other issues of urban planning and property rights 
play a direct role in policy making. Their influence is felt through voting in participatory 
mechanisms, including municipal housing councils, and indirectly through the transparency 
generated by a public space for discussing resource allocation. Armed with information 
regarding the government’s contributions, or lack thereof, CSOs can negotiate with government 
officials and publicize the shortfalls to their members and fellow citizens. Particularly in urban 
areas where large numbers of voters live in slums, what the government does for housing matters 
at election time. Though clientelism in terms of politicians securing votes through promises of 
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new housing construction for the poor or community upgrades still exists, with increased 
transparency of information from participatory governance institutions voters may also hold 
government officials accountable for addressing housing challenges more broadly.   
Past and Current Housing Policies in Developing Countries 
 Worldwide, the housing policy environment has changed in light of increasing 
democratization, a move towards decentralization in policy making, adoption of market-oriented 
economic approaches, and emerging housing finance systems (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005). 
More housing needs today are in urban areas, and in many cases families living in informal 
settlements or in need of housing options are second-generation migrants to cities (see for 
example, Perlman 2002 on Rio de Janeiro). Trends in housing policy have also coincided with 
theories regarding the role of the state in the economy. From the 1950s to the 1970s, state 
planning dictated the construction of large public housing complexes and destruction of slums 
(Buckley and Kalarickal 2005; Jenkins, Smith and Wang 2007). From the 1970s forward, the 
norm shifted towards market-based solutions, mainly involving subsidy or voucher programs and 
site-and-service programs to improve informal settlements and provide land titles. In the 1990s, 
reliance on market-based reforms increased while donors and scholars also began to promote the 
idea that community groups and NGOs should be consulted on poverty alleviation projects 
(Galasso and Ravallion 2000).  
 The trend away from state involvement in large public housing complexes from the 
1970s followed economists‘ warnings that state intervention in real estate can only be market 
distorting and managing public housing was an inefficient use of state resources. Traditionally, 
once slums had been cleared, residents were transferred to public housing units, most often in the 
peripheries of cities. Jenkins, Smith and Wang (2007) argue that public housing in the 
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developing world failed for much of the same reasons it failed elsewhere: “remote, un-serviced 
locations, inadequate dwelling space, lack of opportunities for income generation, high costs and 
lack of accessibility to the lowest income brackets” (p. 253). Public spending alone could neither 
meet the demand for housing nor respond to the needs of poor residents. Starting in the 1970s, 
therefore, many countries shied away from constructing large public housing complexes in favor 
of “site and service” programs and slum upgrading of informal settlements (Huchzermeyer 
2004). Site and service programs were developed in recognition that the single, modern housing 
unit was out of reach for most of the poor. Instead of emphasizing the illegality of informal 
settlements, governments aimed to provide some basic services and infrastructure to existing 
communities. As Mitlin (2007) argues, however, site and service programs alone have failed to 
significantly alter housing problems because of lack of supply, bad locations, unregulated 
buildings, and issues in targeting beneficiaries.  
 The Inter-American Development Bank labels market-based approaches the “enabling 
approach”, which includes removing regulations, improving land titling, and encouraging the 
private sector to produce low-income housing. Expanding the market for mortgage finance to 
low-income citizens has enabled the poor to purchase homes in a number of countries, including 
Indonesia, India and the Philippines (Mitlin 2007). In these countries, and in Brazil, fast-paced 
economic growth has increased available finance and raised incomes to allow residents the 
opportunity to purchase homes. Community investment funds, savings schemes and lending by 
microfinance institutions for incremental improvements, are also current interventions 
implemented around the world based on the enabling approach.  
 Most developing countries today appear to implement a mix of state construction, site-
and-service projects, and market-based approaches. In addition, increasing incorporation of the 
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poor and civil society representatives into policy making has been key to initiating settlement 
upgrading projects and self-build projects. According to Diana Mitlin (2007):           
“Neighborhood upgrading requires building a relationship between low-income 
communities and the state. The state has to engage with low-income communities through 
issues related to both the legalization of land tenure and the regularization of plots, so that 
they comply with regulations and other legislation. The provision of subsidies (for 
infrastructure improvements and, sometimes, other investments) also requires involvement 
with the state to establish beneficiary rights and entitlements. The growth of participatory 
planning mechanisms has helped to consolidate positive relationships between the 
residents of low-income settlements and their local government” (p. 165). 
Mitlin argues that improving informal settlements requires direct communication and negotiation 
between residents and the state. Neighborhood associations, often working under the umbrella of 
a larger social movement or in consultation with professional NGOs, need to be integrated into 
government planning processes in order for citizens’ needs to be met. Participatory mechanisms, 
including municipal housing councils in Brazil, directly respond to this need for a space where 
civil society and the state meet and generate guidelines for housing interventions.  
 In addition, in Brazil, and elsewhere, governments promote “self-build projects” as a 
means to capitalize on informal strategies the poor already use. The majority of the poor already 
live in housing they have built themselves (Jenkins, Smith and Wang 2007). By working in 
associations, in self-build projects the poor apply for resources from the state to carry out their 
own community improvement projects or construction of individual or collective dwellings. 
From Nigeria and Spain to Afghanistan, self-build projects are increasingly seen as “best 
practice” interventions because they promote community involvement and require far less 
resources than typical large-scale public housing complexes (UN Habitat). This type of 
intervention clearly involves close collaboration between association and the state to generate 
project proposals and to ensure that resources are used effectively.     
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 In sum, housing policy worldwide has evolved from large-scale state interventions to 
market-based approaches with civil society involvement. Though construction of individual 
housing units certainly still exists, private contractors and housing associations of residents are 
now more involved than in the past. Evidence from around the world suggests that the trend in 
housing policy is toward programs that are more pro-poor, in terms of collective finance 
solutions, inclusion of the poor in program design, and upgrading of slums rather than evictions 
(Mitlin 2007). Though problems certainly persist, as evidenced by the daunting statistics on 
housing challenges, innovations in housing interventions indicate promising improvements for 
the future.      
Policy History in Brazil 
To a large extent, housing policy in Brazil reflects the trends in policy throughout the 
developing world, evolving alongside trends in macroeconomic approaches. In the 1970s, city 
governments in Brazil were overwhelmed by the influx of migrants from the countryside. Under 
the authoritarian government, the norm was to clear informal settlements and relocate residents 
to large public housing complexes in the periphery. The National Bank for Housing (Banco 
Nacional de Habitação) also provided financing to low-income residents to purchase individual 
units. According to longtime activist Benedito Barbosa, owning an individual home rather than 
renting is the dream for most Brazilians. Financing through the BNH, however, was only 
available to families earning over 3 minimum salaries and did very little to limit growth of the 
housing deficit (Souza, personal interview). By 1990, the BNH collapsed due to corruption 
(Cavalcanti, Marques and Costa 2004). According to civil society leaders, the collapse of the 
BNH left a void in housing policy at the national level for over a decade.  
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Since democratization, housing policy has been heavily influenced by trends towards 
decentralization. As opposed to national or local political elites, in Brazil civil society has been 
the impetus for decentralization of policy making (Eaton 2004). Civil society has fought to 
ensure access to social rights through the implementation of decentralization reforms. For 
instance, the 1988 Constitution established universal access to health care through a consolidated 
national system (Sistema Única de Saude, SUS) Under the system, each municipality is required 
to have a council composed of providers, users, and government officials, which controls funds 
transferred from the federal level. The health councils must reach consensus on an annual budget 
in order for the municipality to receive federal funds. The SUS was the basis for the construction 
of a system for housing policy today (Barbosa, personal interview). In the late 1980s and early 
1990s housing movements began to call for a national fund for housing to dispense resources 
from the federal to the state and municipal levels. As Barbosa explains, “the fight began with the 
call for a national fund for popular housing, but ended with a discussion of the system.” In the 
meantime, the National Forum for Urban Reform (FNRU) achieved several victories, including 
creation of the national Ministry of Cities and passage of the Statute of the City in 2001. 
President Cardoso signed into law the Statute of the City (Estatuto da Cidade), which provides 
interpretation for the constitutional chapter on urban planning, including legal requirements for 
property rights based on land use for social purposes. It is used as an example worldwide for land 
use policies and city master planning.   
Housing movements collected over 1 million signatures for the original proposal for a 
national fund for housing, which leaders presented to the Brazilian Congress as proof of support 
for new legislation (Cardoso 2008). However, the final law to create the Fundo Nacional de 
Habitação de Interesse Social (National Fund for Housing in the Social Interest - FNHIS) was 
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not approved until 2005, during Lula’s first term. In the same year, federal law created the 
Sistema Nacional de Habitação de Interesse Social (National System for Housing in the Social 
Interest - SNHIS) with the aim of “implementing policies and programs that promote access to 
dignified housing for the low income population” (Ministerio das Cidades 2009). SNHIS is 
meant to centralize all housing programs, funding agencies and governmental departments 
involved in housing at the federal, state, and municipal levels. It also provides the structure for 
the federal, state, and municipal participatory councils for housing across the country. The 
FNHIS centralizes all funding sources for urbanization of subnormal settlements and social 
housing. Funding for the FNHIS comes from the federal budget as well as international and 
national donors and receipts from past loans. In 2009, the budget for FNHIS was R$1.5 billion, 
which sought to benefit approximately 90,000 families (Office of the President, 2009). 
According to Marta Arretche, a Brazilian decentralization scholar, the innovation of FNHIS is 
really the reach of the subsidy to the poor (personal interview). Prior to the creation of the Fund, 
people earning under 3 minimum salaries were essentially left out of the housing finance system.  
SNHIS provides some degree of civil society control over federal resources and policy 
planning. According to Brazilian scholar Patricia Cardoso, the objective is for diverse actors to 
work together to formulate housing interventions (Cardoso 2008). Municipal housing councils 
connect the state and federal levels to local program implementation. Though this dissertation 
analyzes municipal housing councils, it is also critical to view these institutions as part of a much 
larger national system of decentralized power and resources. Construction of the SNHIS has 
been the long-term strategy of civil society for housing and urban reform in Brazil. From the 
constitutional process, according to Raquel Rolnik, “the bet was that [the state] should radically 
democratize in order to have their voices heard in the decision-making of policies. This way the 
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policies would naturally open themselves towards the demands, the needs and the propositions of 
the poor, or the excluded” (personal interview). Though the system is still in construction, this 
dissertation attempts to identify whether at least part of this bet has paid off.  
Current Brazilian Government Programs 
Though the Brazilian Constitution specifies that the municipality is the entity responsible 
for housing program implementation, much of the program direction and resources flow from the 
federal level. President Lula’s administration has used a mix of grants and financing for 
production and acquisition of housing, urbanization of precarious settlements, provision of 
construction materials, improvement in housing units, urbanization of plots of land, and 
renovation of buildings for housing use (Ministerio das Cidades 2009a). Through these programs 
the government claims to have benefited approximately 2 million families, 75% of whom earn 
less than 5 minimum salaries. As a result, the percentage of families without housing fell from 
16.1% to 14.9% from 2000 to 2005.  
Two of the administration’s most popular programs are PAC (Programa de Aceleração do 
Crescimento) and Crédito Solidário. PAC began during the second Lula administration to 
improve basic infrastructure in the country (Ministerio das Cidades 2009a). It contains three 
areas for infrastructural projects: logistic (including roads and railways), energy, and “social and 
urban”. Within the “social and urban” category, the program provided R$8.2 billion for housing 
projects in 2008. According to the regulations, 12 metropolitan regions and capitals and 
municipalities with more than 150,000 get priority in funding decisions. To be considered, 
municipalities must submit a proposal to the Ministry of Cities. In 2008, the Ministry chose 192 
projects in 157 municipalities. One of these projects is the Abençoada por Deus housing complex 
in the city of Recife, in which residents were moved from precarious shacks on a riverbank to 
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apartment units constructed under the direction of the municipal government. Municipal housing 
councils often work with the municipal housing secretariat to develop and send forward 
proposals under PAC to the federal level. PAC, then, provides resources for both construction 
and urbanization projects. This type of program corresponds closely to housing interventions in 
many developing countries in which the federal government invests directly in constructing units 
or improving existing informal settlements to avoid relocating residents.  
The Crédito Solidário program includes the type of civil society collaboration promoted 
by international donors and scholars. The program provides financing for housing projects 
organized by “associations, cooperatives, unions, and other civil society entities” (Ministerio das 
Cidades 2009c). The Ministry of Cities manages the project, but the Caixa Econômica Federal 
operates the financing. Organizations are responsible for formulating their own proposals for 
projects and for securing technical assistance once they have received funding. Resources are 
generally used for land, construction materials, and labor to build new housing complexes. Many 
of the projects are built through the process of mutirão, in which residents themselves construct 
the units, while the majority is built through the process of auto-construção, in which laborers 
are hired by the association to do the work. According to Regina Ferreira from the FNRU, 
mutirão projects, which were the direct result of civil society pressure under São Paulo Mayor 
Luiza Erundina (PT) in the late 1980s, largely influenced the creation of the Crédito Solidário 
program. Since the project provides financing rather than direct grants to the associations, over 
the course of 20 years each family must then pay back their loan in monthly installments. The 
National Secretary for Housing under the Ministry of Cities selects final projects to fund based 
on the prioritization given by the state and municipal councils for the project and by their 
location in urban areas with sizable housing deficits.  
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In March 2009, the federal government announced a program called Minha Casa Minha 
Vida (My House My Life) to build 1 million housing units in the country by the end of 2010. 
Civil society groups, including the FNRU, praised the government for making an effort to reduce 
the enormous housing deficit in the country as long as “in practice it represented a response to 
the demands of the Brazilian urban reform movement” (FNRU 2009). To avoid further 
“peripheralization” of the poor they called on the government to utilize a combination of 
methods to make sure they attended to the needs of the poorest segments of society. In June 
2009, the Brazilian government announced that a portion of the funding for the program would 
go to cooperatives, associations, or non-profit organizations to provide subsidized credit towards 
low-income housing. CSOs worked with the Lula administration to formulate regulations for 
eligibility and projects. Funding goes toward purchasing lands, construction, and/or acquisition 
of existing buildings.  
Under the federal fund for housing, FNHIS, the federal government established the 
Program for the Production of Social Housing (Programa de Produção Social de Moradia). This 
program provides funding to associations or non-profit entities in urban or rural areas to assist 
families earning below 3 minimum salaries (R$1,125 a month). Regulations specify that entities 
may use the money for “construction or acquisition of housing units, construction or acquisition 
of urbanized plots of land, and renovation of buildings” (UNMP). In order to access this money 
and other funding from FNHIS, by the end of 2009, each municipality should have created a 
housing council to manage a fund for housing. Further, municipalities were required to create a 
master plan for housing, documenting the extent of the problems in their municipality and 
outlining programmatic solutions.    
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Since municipalities in Brazil control local land use, regularization programs, under 
which residents receive land titles, are by law municipal responsibilities. The Statute of the City 
provides legal categories for land titles, including land that is to be used for social housing 
production. Though the chapter in the Constitution for urban policy specified that unused land 
must be used for social purposes, the Statute of the City clarified under what circumstances land 
could be titled to individuals. Out of 5,564 municipalities, 1,133 had regularization programs in 
2008 (MUNIC 2008). 
The Government of Brazil and municipal governments increasingly reject the role of 
manager of public housing complexes. For example, in São Paulo, the municipal government 
under PT mayor Marta Suplicy constructed two public housing communities in 2004. The 
current government, led by DEM Mayor Gilberto Kassab, criticizes the project for near complete 
default by tenants and the need for the government to provide continuing maintenance in the 
community (Cymbalista and Santoro 2008). The Kassab administration has sworn that they will 
not undertake any more projects that make them managers. Instead, in São Paulo and other 
municipalities, governments prefer to assist housing associations with proposals for projects, 
which provide federal, state, and municipal resources. In addition, the Kassab administration and 
administrations throughout the country, increasingly rely on private contractors for construction 
and management of public housing projects. 
Brazil today has a diverse array of housing interventions, with financial resources and 
program direction flowing from the federal level. However, the municipality is still responsible 
for direct program implementation and for applying for funds from the federal level. In this way, 
municipalities control the types of programs within their jurisdiction. The implementation of 
programs is also still dependent on the motivation of the municipality to forward proposals to the 
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state and federal levels and to contribute their own resources of land and money towards 
projects. Municipal housing councils often coordinate proposals to the federal level and 
encourage municipal governments to seek federal resources.    
Conclusion 
  Housing policy in Brazil reflects the trends in developing countries throughout the 
world, but Brazil has also been a trendsetter with its decentralized system for housing and the 
inclusion of civil society in policy making. The challenges to provide safe, secure, and affordable 
housing for the poor in developing countries remain overwhelming. But the benefits to 
addressing these challenges lie beyond the provision of physical shelter. Governments prioritize 
housing policy to protect human rights, promote economic growth, prevent violence, and 
advance environmental sustainability. In addition, housing interventions continue to be 
politically popular, particularly in dense urban centers where both rich and poor residents 
demand that politicians address the problems of informal settlements and basic infrastructure. 
The diverse array of policies, legal instruments, and decentralized housing system in Brazil are 
models for other developing countries struggling with the same challenges. Before this model is 
exported to other countries, however, it is critical to assess whether inclusion of civil society in 
policy making as part of the larger housing policy environment matters in practice for producing 
pro-poor policy outcomes.    
  
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Chapter 3: The Effect of Municipal Housing Councils on Policy 
Outcomes  
 
“Our role is to manage the resources and put forward our priorities. It is very important for civil 
society to participate directly in this process. There is more transparency and legitimacy for the 
actions of the government, and the responses are more significant.”   
- Social movement leader in Salvador, Brazil regarding the role of civil society in the municipal 
council for housing  
 
 
Civil society organizations in Brazil and elsewhere call for the implementation of 
participatory governance institutions because they believe they can influence policy by having a 
seat at the table with government officials. As the leader above states, the role of CSOs is to 
present their demands and manage the resources governments make available to them. Through 
this process the government gains legitimacy and CSOs gain social benefits for the citizens they 
represent. The stronger the community of CSOs, the greater impact they expect to have on the 
outcomes of participatory governance institutions. But, does the participatory process live up to 
its promise? Are participatory governance mechanisms effective democratic institutions for 
creating accountability and responsiveness to the needs of the poor? 
In this chapter I examine the effect of participatory governance institutions on pro-poor 
policy outcomes. Toward that end I examine two questions: 1) Does incorporation of civil 
society through participatory governance institutions have an impact on the provision of social 
programs? 2) And if so, is the effectiveness of participatory governance institutions in bringing 
about program adoption contingent on a highly organized civil society? Past research suggests 
that civil society must be highly organized to influence policy and program decisions, and that a 
strong civil society increases the effectiveness of participatory governance institutions. Few 
researchers, however, have compared participatory governance institutions across contexts or 
concretely defined policy outcomes as a measure of effectiveness. In response to question one 
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above, I hypothesize that participatory governance institutions do have an independent effect on 
increasing program adoption. A public forum for communication and debate should encourage 
responsiveness and accountability of government officials. Officials are presented directly with 
information regarding the needs of the community and are more likely to act on CSO demands 
made in public, particularly if they are concerned with reelection. Regarding the second question, 
I hypothesize that a highly organized civil society increases the effectiveness of participatory 
governance institutions. Civil society needs the capacity to make proactive proposals while also 
presenting a united front to counteract the reticence of government officials to expend scarce 
resources on social programs.  
For this analysis I use Brazilian government data, supported by evidence from the field, 
to assess the impact of municipal housing councils and civil society on social housing programs. 
Across Brazilian municipalities, I find significant evidence to support the hypothesis that 
municipal housing councils lead to more resources dedicated to housing provision for the poor. 
Formal incorporation of civil society does appear to be important for redistribution of resources. 
Contrary to my second hypothesis, however, a highly organized civil society does not appear to 
have a consistent impact on the adoption of housing programs where municipal councils exist. A 
strong civil society does not necessarily influence government officials to expend resources any 
more than CSOs in a weaker civil society environment. This is good news in that it suggests that 
the effectiveness of participatory governance institutions is not contingent on a highly organized 
civil society: across contexts incorporation of existing civil society in participatory governance 
institutions may still lead to pro-poor policy change.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. I first review the background of municipal housing 
councils and the civil society environment for housing before turning to the theoretical reasons 
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for expecting that civil society and municipal councils will have substantial effects on whether 
programs are adopted. I then present the data and model used for the analysis, followed by the 
results and discussion of the findings.  
Municipal Councils for Housing in Brazil 
Municipal councils in Brazil, which incorporate elected members from civil society and 
appointed government officials to deliberate on policy direction, program implementation, and 
the allocation of resources, are one type of participatory governance institution.5 Brazil’s 1988 
Constitution established municipal level councils for healthcare, education, social assistance, and 
child/adolescent rights. Many other types of councils, including those for housing, emerged later, 
either through the demands of civil society or by ideologically driven municipal officials 
(Afonso and de Mello 2000). Municipal policy councils, such as those for health, are directly 
involved in the formation of national legislation. Programmatic municipal councils, such as 
housing, are directed more towards developing government programs for a well-defined 
population (Pessanha, Compagnac and Matos 2006). Different councils are given varying 
degrees of responsibility. For example, health councils have the power to veto the plans of the 
Health Secretariat, which leads to funding being withheld from the Health Ministry (Coelho, 
Pozzoni and Cifuentes 2005). Where municipalities have established a specific fund for housing, 
municipal housing councils are generally responsible for allocating those funds (Gomes 2007). 
Each policy, programmatic, and thematic council operates autonomously from the other, though 
overlapping membership is possible. 

5 The number of council members and the mix of civil society and government official membership varies by type of 
council and by the rules established by the municipal government. In general, civil society members may come from 
professional non-governmental organizations, local social movements, and neighborhood associations. They are 
elected either in an open public forum or by a formal public election. The majority of government members are 
appointed by the relevant municipal agency, though seats are also reserved for state and federal government 
representatives.  
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 According to the Brazilian Constitution, the municipality is the entity responsible for 
implementing housing policy (Cymbalista et al 2007). As such, municipal housing councils 
would seem well placed to make a large impact on policy and program decisions. In 2005, 
municipal housing councils existed in 18% of Brazilian municipalities while by 2008 the 
percentage had risen to 31 (IBGE 2008, 2005). Across years, councils are created either by 
legislation passed by the city council or by decree from the mayor. Both mechanisms generally 
establish rules for the composition of the council, how often the council will meet, and the scope 
of the council’s decision-making authority. The great majority of councils mandate that at least 
half of the council’s membership come from civil society, with municipal and state government 
officials making up the other half (IBGE 2008). During interviews in cities across Brazil, council 
members from various types of CSOs told me their role on the councils is both to propose new 
programs and policies as well as to respond to government proposals and information provided 
on current programs. In this way civil society plays both a proactive and reactive role in 
establishing social housing policy.    
As mentioned in the previous chapter, until 2005 when federal law created the National 
System for Housing in the Social Interest (SNHIS), Brazil had not had an established national 
housing policy since democratization (Cymbalista et al 2007; Draibe 2005). Even with the new 
federal agency, Cymbalista argues that resources have been slow in reaching municipalities. 
Municipal housing policies consist of the provision of new units, upgrading of favelas, 
distribution of titles of possession, allocation of construction materials, and intervention in slum 
disputes. Though these types of housing policies are common throughout the developing world, 
and to some extent in industrialized countries, scholars argue that Brazil has an especially 
diverse array of housing policies and programs as a result of the decentralized policy-making 
53
process (Huchzermeyer 2004). The tendency in Brazil has been toward recognition of informal 
settlements and improvement of settlements through technical, social and legal intervention. 
However, more traditional programs to construct new units for the poor – either through rental or 
ownership mechanisms – are still the most common types of programs across Brazil.  
Civil Society Organizations Oriented towards Housing in Brazil 
Civil society in Brazil includes a diverse collection of organizations, ranging from 
professionalized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to social movements and 
neighborhood associations. In this dissertation I use the term “civil society organizations” to 
encompass the diversity of actors within the Brazilian housing policy sector, in particular. Social 
movements, defined as broad groups of citizens organized to make specific demands of the state, 
make up a large part of this sector. In defining CSOs related to housing, I focus on those 
organizations acting in the interests of the poor. Municipal councils concentrate their efforts on 
policies directed towards improving slums and producing low-cost housing for the poor, which 
coincides with the primary goals of most CSOs elected to the councils.  
Many CSOs in Brazil grew out of the movement for democratization in the 1980s. As 
explained to me by Benedito Barbosa, a long-time activist and attorney, social movements in the 
1980s were linked through three major national agendas: 1) strengthening the PT, 2) re-
democratizing the unions, and 3) organizing rural workers into the Commissão Pastoral da Terra 
(CPT) and the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) and organizing urban 
movements around public policy issues, including health and housing. These three objectives 
shaped the transition to democracy alongside the organizations of the Catholic Church based on 
the ideals of liberation theology, strong across Latin America. These movements were then very 
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active in pressing for specific provisions for democratic rights and social benefits in the 1988 
Constitution.  
The goals of CSOs working on housing issues in Brazil and other developing countries 
revolve primarily around government provision of resources and land claims. CSOs dedicated to 
housing respond to the challenges in cities, peri-urban areas, and rural communities. The main 
housing CSOs, however, are oriented towards urban reform. The four main entities for housing 
are the União Nacional dos Movimentos de Moradia Popular (UNMP), the Central de 
Movimentos Populares (CMP), Confederação Nacional dos Associações da Moradia (CONAM), 
and the Movimento Nacional de Luta por Moradia (MNLM). These four organizations then work 
together under the network of the Fora Nacional de Reforma Urbana (FNRU).6 Of the four main 
organizations, the UNMP is most closely aligned with the PT and has been the most vocal in 
demanding participatory institutions for housing policy. The CMP is also strongly linked to the 
UNMP, though the CMP also addresses issues outside of housing policy. CONAM tends to 
concentrate their efforts at the community level while the MNLM adopts the most radical tactics 
of the four. All of the organizations have affiliates throughout the country, though the UNMP 
appears to have the broadest reach, with members in 21 out of 27 states.  
 Both nationally and locally, organizations in Brazil have been particularly vocal about the 
need for strong participatory institutions to which they can direct their demands.7 At the same 
time, many CSOs also continue to undertake a number of different strategies calling for policy 
change and increasing housing assistance. For instance, social movements concerned with 
housing in urban areas, such as the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Teto (Roofless Worker’s 

6 The FNRU also includes unions, architects, engineers, and other actors involved in urban policy and planning. In 
total there are about 20 organizations that work with the FNRU.  
7 For example, the União Nacional dos Movimentos da Moradia Popular and Rede Jubileu Sul Brasil. 
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Movement - MTST), which began in São Paulo and now operates around the country, carry out 
occupations of city buildings. CSOs also engage in direct lobbying, arranging personal meetings 
with municipal housing officials, or, if they cannot secure a meeting, protesting outside of the 
housing secretariat until their demands for negotiation are met. In rural areas, workers’ 
organizations and social movements, such as the MST, also struggle for benefits from the 
municipal, state and federal levels. While urban CSOs are concerned with improvement of 
favelas, rehabilitation of city centers, and construction of new units, in rural areas CSOs are more 
likely to petition for programs to provide construction materials, plots of land, and flexible 
financing options.  
CSOs of all kinds involved in housing developed strength in the 1980s under 
democratization, waned in the 1990s under structural reforms, and then reemerged in the late 
1990s under worsening economic conditions (Duquette et al. 2005). The four major social 
movements for housing in Brazil lead policy demands at the federal, state, and municipal levels. 
Though São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro remain the centers of activity for movement leaders, each 
of the four main movements has strong networks of members throughout the country. Their 
demands can be traced from federal legislation and spending priorities to municipal level 
housing councils and increasingly diverse programs at the local level. Alongside social 
movements, professional NGOs, such as the Instituto Pólis, are engaged in research, advocacy, 
and capacity building for smaller organizations, and often participate in the councils themselves.  
Theoretical Background 
Whether democratic institutions can be devised to remedy social challenges remains a 
critical question in political science. In addition, answers to when and how CSOs affect policy 
outcomes requires further research. Previous literature suggests that CSOs on their own and 
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working through participatory governance institutions influence policy outcomes based on the 
dynamics of responsiveness and accountability.8 CSOs present information to government 
officials regarding the depth and intricacies of the problem in an effort to provoke satisfactory 
responses. Once government officials make promises to act on this information, councils then 
offer transparency and a public forum to encourage accountability (Schneider 1999; Ackerman 
2004; Wampler 2007). This accountability should induce governments to implement programs 
that address diverse local needs. Rather than continue to ignore social problems, withhold 
investment, or provide selective benefits to a few groups of supporters, governments should 
respond by increasing the number of social programs within their jurisdiction. Contrary to this 
claim, other scholars argue that participatory governance institutions may perpetuate clientelistic 
relationships between CSO members and government officials where CSOs are primarily 
concerned with securing benefits for their members (Grindle 2007). In other words, CSOs may 
use their power in decision-making to make deals with government officials that benefit their 
own members without concern for wide-ranging problems. Municipal councils, then, would 
serve the needs of CSOs without generating an increase in social housing programs to benefit the 
population more broadly. I argue that contrary to these claims municipal councils will produce 
social housing programs to benefit the poor due to the existence of a formal space for airing 
demands and the public nature of deliberation.  

8 This argument draws on decentralization literature, in which scholars find that decentralization of responsibilities 
and resources to local officials often leads to improved responsiveness and accountability of local governments to 
citizens’ concerns. See for example: World Bank, The World Bank Participation Sourcebook (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 1996); Fiszbein, Ariel, “The Emergence of Local Capacity: Lessons from Colombia,” World 
Development 25 (June 1998), 1029-43; and Blair, H., “Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic 
Local Governance in Six Countries,” World Development, 28 (January 2000), 21-39. Participatory governance 
institutions formally involve civil society in the process of decentralization. 
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In addition, where civil society is more highly organized, their capacity to work 
collaboratively should help to counteract business interests and government reluctance to 
allocate scarce resources to social programs. Civil society needs the capacity to express demands 
within the council in order to be proactive and form alliances to prepare responses to government 
proposals. Working in coordinated networks within the councils is likely to dilute the strength of 
bilateral relationships between CSOs and government officials, resulting in adoption of a broad 
range of programs.  
Responsiveness and Accountability 
In municipal housing councils and other participatory governance institutions, 
government officials and civil society leaders meet in open forums to discuss ongoing problems 
and debate government responses (Avritzer 2002; Fung and Wright 2003). CSOs make their 
preferences known to government officials, who in turn present both the limitations and promises 
of potential interventions. With specific information about local problems, though, government 
officials can more effectively respond to the needs of the community (Bardhan and Mookerjee 
2006). Given the locally specific nature of housing policy and programs, municipal councils 
ensure attention is given to the precise needs of the community.  
As a public forum, participatory governance institutions also expose governments to 
scrutiny. Government officials may be required to present budgetary information or at the least 
they are challenged by CSOs to defend their actions or inaction in addressing what CSOs believe 
to be severe social problems. CSOs can then pass on this information to their members and to the 
public-at-large. When the public has access to greater information and CSOs communicate issues 
to their members, both appointed and directly-elected officials are persuaded to act out of self-
interest to maintain their positions. Without the councils there is not a formal space for civil 
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society to air grievances and for the government to transmit information about their activities to 
civil society. Armed with information about government actions, civil society should be better 
equipped to publicize shortfalls in the government’s response to housing needs, including to 
residents within favelas for whom housing weighs heavily in voting decisions. 
Participatory governance institutions may also reduce possibilities and incentives for 
corruption, the political use of funds, and the capture of state institutions by elites (Ackerman 
2004). The incentives of CSOs to hold governments accountable, however, should not be taken 
as given. For instance, Grindle finds that in municipal participatory institutions in Mexico, 
organizations wee more concerned with gaining benefits for their members than exposing 
governments corrupt or clientelistic behavior (Grindle 2007). In these cases CSO members of 
participatory governance institutions appear to be acting in their rational self-interest to provide 
selective benefits to their bases, along the lines suggested by Mancur Olson in his classic Logic 
of Collective Action (Olson 1965).  
In Brazilian municipal housing councils, the opportunity to promote self-interests 
certainly exists, but there are several reasons to expect that municipal councils still offer an 
opportunity for promoting broad benefits. First, as other scholars have argued, participatory 
governance institutions offer spaces for negotiating between groups, which leads to a breakdown 
in bilateral CSO-government ties (Nunes 1997; Hagopian 1996; Dagnino et al. 2006; Wampler 
2007b). As an activist in Recife, Brazil argues, municipal councils level the playing field in 
terms of CSO access to government officials, leading to negotiation among groups for benefits 
rather than local government officials selectively choosing which groups should receive access.9 
Second, not all CSOs elected to councils are social movements or neighborhood associations 

9 Personal interview, Recife, Brazil, November 2008. 
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responsible to their members. Professional NGOs without membership bases also participate in 
the councils and are likely to steer program decisions towards a broader pro-poor agenda. Third, 
particularly since municipal councils for housing in Brazil are increasingly adopted in response 
to the new federal system instead of by ideologically driven mayors, municipal officials and 
CSOs are often from different parties and lack strong ties. This may make the councils even 
more relevant as spaces for negotiation between sides not apt to cooperate otherwise.  
But does a particularly strong civil society have a different effect on the outcomes of 
participatory governance institutions? Most scholars studying participatory governance 
institutions, building on Putnam and others, argue specifically that high levels of social capital 
are necessary for participatory governance institutions to have any significant impact (Putnam 
1993; Houtzager and Moore 2003; Avritzer 2006). In a cross-municipal study of participatory 
budgeting councils in Brazil, Avritzer found that an existing community of organizations was 
necessary to create the intended forum for deliberation (Avritzer 2006). Without considerable 
mobilization of demands, participatory governance institutions may be easily co-opted by elites 
and have no effect on democratic deepening or policy outcomes (Cooke and Kothari 2002; 
Avritzer 2009). Without a strong civil society, scholars have argued, participatory governance 
institutions may be little more than rubber stamps for government proposals (Navarro 2003). In 
addition, Brazilian researchers find that “effective” councils are dependent on CSO’s technical 
capacity to formulate and analyze public policy and their ability to make strategic alliances (dos 
Santos et al. 2007; Carvalho 2002; Carneiro 2002). 
The counterargument is that a stronger civil society environment could also lead 
established CSOs accustomed to competition for scare resources to fight for selective benefits 
within the councils, thereby limiting the broad effectiveness of the councils for generating pro-
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poor benefits. Through fieldwork I witnessed professional CSOs, including NGOs and social 
movements dedicated to housing, using strategies developed over time to gain access to 
government officials in private or public meetings. In these meetings, most of the discussions 
center on specific housing projects—which families will be included, and the contributions from 
the municipal, state, and federal levels—rather than broader allocation of resources across 
diverse programs. As above, I argue that the introduction of participatory fora to debate 
programmatic decisions should mitigate the need for these types of bilateral strategies. Where 
civil society is particularly well established, the desire for CSOs to continue to seek 
particularistic benefits for their members and for governments to appease CSO members by 
responding to their demands in exchange for political loyalty, may remain strong. However, 
based on my observations in the field, particularly in the cities of São Paulo and Salvador, CSOs 
have learned the value of working in a coordinated network to confront government proposals 
and business interests. Civil society representatives are still accountable to their membership 
bases, but they also recognize there is strength in numbers. An organized civil society working 
through municipal councils should therefore increase rather than decrease governmental 
responsiveness and accountability.  
As developing countries move forward with decentralization and participatory democracy 
it is crucial to assess when participatory governance institutions and a strong civil society 
actually lead to policies and programs to reduce poverty and inequality. Municipal councils for 
housing in Brazil offer an opportunity for systematic comparison of the outputs of participatory 
governance institutions and the impact of civil society on policies benefiting the poor in 
developing countries. Here I evaluate whether municipal councils make a difference in policy 
decisions and how the depth of civil society matters for outcomes.  
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Data 
For this analysis, I use data collected by Brazilian government agencies. Currently in 
Brazil there are 5,564 municipalities, providing a high degree of variation. An annual survey of 
municipal governments conducted by the national statistical agency (IBGE Pesquisa de 
Informações Básicas Municipais: Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros, Gestão Publica (MUNIC)), 
yields considerable data on the structure of municipal governments, with thematic questions 
varying by year. The survey is sent to municipal officials annually and is mandatory to complete. 
In most years of the survey since it began in 1999, there are questions relating to housing needs, 
institutions and programs. For this analysis I use data from both 2005 and 2008 to increase the 
reliability of the findings.10  
Housing Programs as Dependent Variables 
The existence of various types of social housing programs indicates the commitment of 
the municipality to addressing housing needs. In the MUNIC survey, municipal government 
officials check “yes” or “no” to indicate whether each type of housing program exists in their 
municipality. Federal, state, or municipal governments may finance housing programs, though 
municipal governments are responsible for program implementation. Table 3.1 below illustrates 
the distribution of programs in Brazilian municipalities. These programs exist across 
municipalities of various size and region throughout Brazil (see Appendix A for details).  
Table 3.1: Percentage of Brazilian Municipalities with Each Type of Housing Program 
  2005 2008 
Construction of New Units 48% 61% 
Construction Materials 35% 36% 
Offering Plots of Land 19% 25% 
Regularizing Land Titles 9% 20% 

10 Instead of pooling the data across years, I use the two years as separate data points because the level of federal 
investment, flowing down to the municipal level, increased dramatically over these years. 
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Other Programs 25% N/A 
Acquisition of New Units N/A 16% 
Improvement of Units N/A 46% 
Urbanization of Settlements N/A 14% 
 
The construction of new units, provision of construction materials, regularization of land 
titles, and awarding of plots of land are all programs that address the demands of CSOs 
representing the needs of the poor. These needs include affordable, safe housing on land they can 
occupy without the threat of seizure by the state or private entities. In 2008, the survey included 
three additional types of programs: those to acquire housing units, improve units, and urbanize 
neighborhoods. These programs represent the shifting priorities in housing policy, influenced by 
national housing movements, trickling down from the federal to the municipal level, often 
through federal government funding. Though programs to construct new units have been the 
most common type of intervention, CSOs have also fought for programs that stop short of 
removing residents, frequently relocating them to distant peripheral areas lacking infrastructure 
and job opportunities. Improving favelas through street paving, supplying electricity, and 
rehabilitating houses, or acquiring units for renovation often in urban centers, provide 
alternatives for reducing the qualitative housing deficit. For this analysis I assess the 
determinants of individual types of programs as well as the number of programs in a 
municipality using a housing program index. Adopting multiple housing programs represents the 
government’s willingness to address diverse needs of citizens and demands of CSOs.  
Municipal Housing Councils  
The key independent variable of interest for this analysis is the existence of a municipal 
council for housing. Participation through a municipal housing council should put pressure on 
the municipality to enact housing programs and may also lead to a search for more resources 
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from the federal level. There is significant variation in the existence of councils by region and 
population levels in both 2005 and 2008 (see Table 3.2 below). The data show that these 
participatory institutions are not limited to one region or to urban areas.  
Hypothesis 1: Municipalities with housing councils are significantly more likely to adopt 
individual programs and a diverse array of programs as measured by a housing program index.  
Table 3.2: Municipal Housing Councils by Region and Population 
Region   2005 2008 
 
Number of 
Municipalities 
Housing 
Council 
Housing 
Council 
In Brazil 5563 18% 31% 
North  449 5% 18% 
Northeast 1793 8% 19% 
Center West 466 26% 34% 
South  1187 38% 51% 
Southeast 1668 14% 31% 
Population    
Under 20,000 3965 16% 25% 
20,001 to 50,000 1026 15% 36% 
50,001 to 100,000 313 24% 52% 
100,001 to 500,000 220 39% 67% 
500,001 and up 39 56% 74% 
 
Civil Society 
While broad data on CSOs at the municipal level is limited, the registry of businesses in 
Brazil coordinated by IBGE offers a section of data on non-profits and foundations from 2005 
(IBGE 2002). To measure the depth of civil society in the municipality I use the number of non-
profits and foundations per capita.11 Though non-profits and foundations do not comprise the 

11 The data follow the internationally recognized classifications of the Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the 
System of National Accounts distributed by the United Nations in collaboration with Johns Hopkins University. The 
non-profit sector is characterized by Johns Hopkins University collaborator Anheier as: “the social infrastructure of 
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entirety of civil society, they are an important part of the whole. It is important to note, however, 
that this measure accounts only for registered CSOs, which may not include less formalized 
housing movements and neighborhood associations. The average number of non-profits and 
foundations per 1,000 residents in a municipality is 2.6, with a standard deviation of 2.4 and a 
range from .043 to 32. A strong civil society environment may have an independent impact on 
the probability of municipalities adopting housing programs, though the key question here is 
whether a strong civil society makes a difference in the outcomes of municipal housing councils. 
I hypothesize that a strong civil society should increase the government’s willingness to adopt 
social housing programs, particularly where there is also a municipal council to enable 
collaboration among CSOs. 
Hypothesis 2: Where municipal councils exist, a higher number of CSOs per capita is associated 
with an increase in the probability of municipalities adopting all types of housing programs.  
Additional Factors Influencing Housing Program Adoption 
In general, local governments choose to adopt social programs of any type based on need, 
access to resources, and political will. Though housing councils and civil society are 
theoretically important to determining program adoption, here I also control for and assess the 
independent effects of other variables.   
Ideology of the administration: In both 2005 and 2008, the ideology of the administration is 
measured by the existence of a PT mayor. Since municipal elections were held in 2004 and 
October 2008, the mayor remained the same across these four years. Previous research from 
Europe and Latin America finds that leftist parties are associated with higher levels of social 

civil society, creating as well as facilitating a sense of trust and social inclusion that is seen as essential for the 
functioning of modern societies.” Anheier, Helmut K., Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy, (London: 
Earthscan Publishing, 2004). p. 5. 
65
spending (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001). In this study I expect that the PT 
may have a positive effect on housing programs as a party to the left. 
Availability of resources: Where there are more resources available there will likely be a greater 
number of housing programs. An established fund dedicated to housing programs illustrates the 
commitment of the municipality to expend resources on low-income housing programs.12 
Municipalities with housing funds should be more likely to adopt multiple housing programs. 
Also, in both years I include a measure of the municipal budget per capita. Municipalities with 
higher budgetary resources should be more willing and able to allocate funding for housing 
programs. Finally, I use state dummy variables to control for variation in state resource transfers 
for housing programs.  
Inequality: Within any setting inequality may lead to less governmental accountability by 
limiting participation of the poor (Bardhan and Mookerjee 2006). I use a municipal-level Gini 
coefficient from 2000 to measure inequality. Where inequality is highest, I expect that elites may 
be less inclined to implement social welfare programs for housing. The Gini coefficient among 
Brazilian municipalities ranges from low of .358 to a high of .819, with .56 as the average.  
Urbanization and Population Size: Urbanization is measured by the 2000 census, provided by 
IPEA, (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada) and population size is measured by the 2005 
estimate by IBGE. According to the data, as the population increases, municipalities are 
significantly more likely to adopt all types of housing programs, with the exception of programs 
to provide construction materials for which the marginal difference is small. I use both 
percentage of the population living in urban areas as well as population size, since theoretically, 

12 The existence of municipal housing councils and funds are correlated at .53 in 2005 and .69 in 2008. In 2005, 456 
municipalities out of 979 had a housing council but no fund. In 2008 there were 374 municipalities out of 1,709, 
which had housing councils but no fund.  
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population size represents the size of the municipality whereas the percentage urban represents 
clustering in the administrative center of the municipality. Perhaps surprisingly, these two 
measures are only correlated at .165. Since the federal government often uses population and 
urbanization as criteria for program eligibility, both of these measures should control for the 
federal impact on program adoption. 
Need: Income per capita is also provided by the 2000 census. In wealthier municipalities, there 
should be less need for housing programs. Therefore, I expect income per capita to have a 
negative relationship with housing programs. Income per capita varies widely among Brazilian 
municipalities: from a low of R$28 to a high of R$955, with R$171 as the average. In addition, a 
variable indicating the presence of favelas is available from the MUNIC survey. Clearly where 
there are favelas registered by the municipal government, there is a need for some type of 
housing program to address the quantitative and qualitative housing deficit.  
Addressing Endogeneity 
 Before proceeding with the statistical analysis, it is useful to clarify the role endogeneity 
may play in biasing the estimates. First, one might expect that housing councils were created in 
municipalities in which government officials were already more interested in addressing housing 
needs. These municipalities would also then be more likely to have previously adopted multiple 
housing programs, creating endogeneity between housing councils and housing programs. To 
address this concern, I evaluated whether municipalities with each type of housing program in 
2005 were more likely than average to create a housing council by 2008. About 21% of 
municipalities across Brazil adopted a housing council between 2005 and 2008. As Table 3.3 
illustrates, municipalities with existing programs in 2005 were only slightly more likely to adopt 
housing councils. The exception are municipalities with regularization programs, which were 
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about 16% more likely than average to adopt housing councils. I suspect this is because 
regularization programs and housing councils are both significantly more likely to be adopted in 
urban areas. In the full model, in which I include population and percentage of population in 
urban areas, this relationship should be mitigated. Correlations between programs in 2005 and 
housing councils in 2008, displayed in the last column of Table 3, further demonstrate a lack of 
strong association between existing programs and council creation. 
Table 3.3: Associations between Program Adoption and Creation of Municipal Housing 
Councils 
Program 
Percentage of Municipalities with 
each type of program in 2005 that 
created a housing council by 2008 
Correlation between 
program in 2005 and 
housing council in 2008 
Construction of Units 25% 0.09 
Materials 24% 0.04 
Plots of Land 22% 0.01 
Regularization 37% 0.11 
Other Programs 24% 0.03 
 
Second, there is a question of endogeneity between civil society and housing councils. 
Particularly prior to 2005, when the federal government enacted the new National System for 
Housing in the Social Interest, requiring municipalities receiving federal funds to create 
municipal housing councils by the end of 2009, housing councils were largely created in 
response to the demands of CSOs. Therefore, it might appear that the depth of civil society is 
endogenous to the creation of municipal councils for housing. However, the data show that the 
average number of non-profits and foundations per capita across municipalities (.0026) is not 
significantly different than the average in municipalities with housing councils (.0033 in 2005 
and .0031 in 2008). For this reason I do not believe that this measure of civil society is 
endogenous to the existence of municipal housing councils.  
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Further, as the political party emerging from the labor movements of the 1970s, the PT 
has been the party most strongly associated with participatory governance institutions (Jacobi 
1999). According to the data, however, municipalities with housing councils were approximately 
3.5% more likely to have a PT mayor in charge across years. Though this shows the odds are 
slightly higher that a municipality with a council has a PT mayor, the difference does not lead me 
to conclude that the PT is endogenous to the existence of a council.  
Model 
I estimate several probit models to assess the relationships between these independent 
variables and the adoption of individual housing programs. Probit is an appropriate regression 
model for dichotomous dependent variables and provides intuitive results regarding the 
probability of program adoption. I also use negative binomial regression models to measure the 
effects on the adoption of multiple housing programs using a housing program index.13 I begin 
with the first hypothesis that municipal councils lead to housing program adoption, before using 
interactive models to analyze the effect of civil society within and outside of municipalities with 
housing councils.  
Results 
Municipal Councils 
I find that the existence of municipal housing councils is associated with an increase in 
the adoption of all types of social housing programs across years (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5 

13 Though an ordered probit model would also seem appropriate to assess the probability of a municipality adopting 
multiple programs, after performing a Brant test of the parallel regression assumption, I discovered that the ordered 
probit model violated the assumption of equal proportional odds between categories. A negative binomial regression 
model is appropriate to use instead for extradispersed data. Rather than predicting probabilities the negative 
binomial model predicts expected counts.  
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below).14 This provides evidence to confirm the primary hypothesis that participatory 
governance institutions lead to programs benefitting the poor.  
Table 3.4: Probit Results for the Impact on Housing Programs 2005*  
 
Constructi
on of Units
Offer 
Materials
Offer 
Plots of 
Land 
Regularizati
on 
Other 
Programs
Municipal Housing Council 0.26*** 0.10 0.24*** 0.39*** 0.34***
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
Municipal Housing Fund 0.39*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.25*** 0.19***
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
Population (log) 0.27*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.44*** 0.27***
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Percent Urban Population (log) 0.16*** 0.12** 0.19*** 0.08 0.12* 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) 
Municipal Budget per capita (log) 0.61*** 0.46*** 0.43*** 0.36*** 0.40***
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) 
PT Mayor 0.05 -0.27*** -0.02 -0.11 0.20** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) 
Gini Coefficient 0.51 0.85** 0.08 0.87 0.77* 
  (0.42) (0.43) (0.49) (0.63) (0.46) 
Income per capita (log) -0.19** -0.306*** -0.12 0.23* -0.12 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) 
Non-profits & Foundations per 
cap (log) 0.07* 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.12***
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Existence of Favelas 0.07 -0.02 
-
0.20*** -0.01 0.08 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
Constant -5.66*** -4.06***
-
5.20*** -9.99*** -5.11***
  (0.81) (0.80) (0.88) (1.10) (0.84) 
       
Observations15 3869 3864 3878 3869 3878 
*State dummies also included in the model  
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   

14 The one exception is programs for offering construction materials in 2005, for which municipal housing councils 
are not statistically significant in the model.  
 
 
15 Though there are 5,564 municipalities in Brazil, the number of observations in the model is primarily limited by 
missing data for the municipal budget variable. The data include 4,117 observations for municipalities reporting 
budgetary totals for 2005.  
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Table 3.5: Probit Results for the Impact on Housing Programs 2008*  
  
Const. 
of Units 
Offer 
Mats. 
Offer 
Plots of 
Land 
Regular
-ization 
Acquire 
Units 
Imp 
Units Urban. 
Municipal 
Housing Council 0.29*** 0.14** 0.16** 0.24*** 0.16** 
0.28**
* 0.18** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Municipal 
Housing Fund 0.25*** 0.09 0.19*** 0.14** 0.09 0.03 0.16** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Population (log) 0.20*** 0.08** 0.10*** 0.35*** 0.13*** 0.06* 
0.43**
* 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Percent Urban 
Pop. (log) 0.14** 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.03 0.03 
0.18**
* 0.03 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Municipal Budget 
per capita (log) 0.49*** 0.37*** 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.18** 0.19** 
0.46**
* 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
PT Mayor 0.05 0.10 -0.10 0.25*** 0.07 0.12 0.06 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) 
Gini Coefficient 1.25*** 1.28*** 0.01 -0.03 0.24 
1.98**
* 0.98* 
  (0.42) (0.42) (0.45) (0.48) (0.49) (0.41) (0.53) 
Income per capita 
(log) 0.07 -0.17* 0.03 0.17* 0.10 -0.11 0.04 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) 
Non-profits and 
Foundations per 
cap (log) -0.04 -0.07* 0.03 -0.09** -0.01 
0.13**
* -0.11** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Existence of 
Favelas -0.00 -0.06 -0.00 0.30*** 0.06 -0.04 
0.38**
* 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Constant -6.43*** -4.36*** -4.10*** -8.27*** -4.33*** 
-
2.06**
* 
-
10.35*
** 
  (0.83) (0.77) (0.82) (0.88) (0.87) (0.76) (0.98) 
         
Observations 4093 4080 4093 4093 4093 4083 4083 
*State dummies also included in the model    
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6 illustrates the substantive effect of the municipal councils. Using the full probit 
model, the percentages reported below represent the marginal effect of the existence of a 
municipal council on adoption of each type of housing program, holding all other variables at 
their means. In other words, the percentage below indicates the change in the probability of each 
housing program (coded as 0-1) given a one-unit change in the dependent variable (the existence 
of a housing council coded as 0-1). In both years, the councils make a substantial difference in 
whether programs are adopted, holding all else constant. Councils have the greatest impact on 
programs to construct new units and improve existing units, such as in favelas or dilapidated 
buildings, while the councils only have a small effect on programs to acquire new units, often 
associated with renovating city centers, and urbanization of informal settlements or favelas.  
Table 3.6: Percentage change in the probability that a municipality has each type of 
program given the presence of a municipal council, holding all other variables constant 
Type of Program 2005 2008 
Construction of Units 10% 11% 
Construction Materials 4% 5% 
Offering Plots of Land 7% 5% 
Regularizing Land Titles 6% 6% 
Other Programs 11%  
Acquisition of New Units  4% 
Improvement of Units  11% 
Urbanization of Settlements  3% 
 
To assess the impact of municipal housing councils on the diversity of programs adopted 
by a municipality, I also created an index of programs for analysis in a negative binomial model 
(see Appendix B for results). Using the index of housing programs, Figures 1 and 2 below 
illustrate the predicted probabilities of municipalities adopting multiple housing programs given 
the presence of a municipal housing council in 2005 and 2008. All other independent variables 
were set 
higher in
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for civil society and housing councils to the original probit models (See Tables 3.7 and 3.8 
below). 
Table 3.7: Variables Associated with Housing Program Adoption, Including an Interaction 
Effect for Civil Society and Housing Councils, 2005 
 
Const. of 
Units 
Offer 
Materials 
Offer 
Plots of 
Land 
Regular
-ization 
Other 
Programs 
Municipal Housing Council 0.64 1.13*** 0.99** 0.04 0.71 
  (0.44) (0.43) (0.49) (0.64) (0.45) 
Municipal Housing Fund 0.39*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.25*** 0.19*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
Population (log) 0.27*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.44*** 0.27*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Percent Urban Population 
(log) 0.16*** 0.12* 0.19*** 0.08 0.12* 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) 
Municipal Budget per capita 
(log) 0.61*** 0.46*** 0.43*** 0.36*** 0.40*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) 
PT Mayor 0.05 -0.26*** -0.02 -0.12 0.20** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) 
Gini Coefficient 0.50 0.83* 0.06 0.87 0.76* 
  (0.42) (0.43) (0.49) (0.63) (0.46) 
Income per capita (log) -0.19** -0.31*** -0.12 0.23* -0.12 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) 
Non-profits & Founds. per 
cap (log) 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.11** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) 
Existence of Favelas 0.07 -0.02 -0.21*** -0.01 0.08 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
Housing Council x Non-
profits & Founds per 
capita (log) 0.06 0.17** 0.12 -0.06 0.06 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) 
Constant -5.76*** -4.35*** -5.41*** -9.85*** -5.22*** 
  (0.82) (0.81) (0.89) (1.12) (0.85) 
       
Observations 3869 3864 3878 3869 3878 
*Model includes state dummies      
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8: Variables Associated with Housing Program Adoption, Including an Interaction 
Effect for Civil Society and Housing Councils, 2008* 
 
Const. 
of Units 
Offer 
Mats. 
Offer 
Plots of 
Land Regular 
Acquire 
Units 
Imp. 
Units Urban. 
Municipal 
Housing 
Council 0.16 0.17 0.58 -0.07 -0.38 0.92** 0.20 
  (0.38) (0.37) (0.40) (0.43) (0.43) (0.37) (0.51) 
Municipal 
Housing Fund 0.25*** 0.09 0.19*** 0.14** 0.09 0.03 0.16** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Population (log) 0.20*** 0.08** 0.10*** 0.35*** 0.12*** 0.07** 0.43*** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Percent Urban 
Pop. (log) 0.14** 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.03 0.03 0.18*** 0.03 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Municipal 
Budget per 
capita (log) 0.49*** 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.34*** 0.18** 0.19*** 0.46*** 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
PT Mayor 0.05 0.11 -0.10 0.24*** 0.06 0.12 0.06 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) 
Gini Coefficient 1.25*** 1.28*** -0.02 -0.02 0.28 1.93*** 0.98* 
  (0.42) (0.41) (0.45) (0.48) (0.49) (0.41) (0.53) 
Income per 
capita (log) 0.07 -0.17* 0.03 0.17* 0.10 -0.11 0.04 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) 
Non-profits & 
Founds per cap 
(log) -0.03 -0.07* 0.00 -0.07 0.02 0.09** -0.11* 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
Existence of 
Favelas -0.00 -0.06 -0.00 0.30*** 0.06 -0.04 0.38*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Housing 
Council x Non-
profits & 
Founds per 
cap (log) -0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.05 -0.09 0.11* 0.00 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Constant -6.38*** -4.38*** -4.28*** -8.13*** -4.10*** -2.32*** -10.36*** 
  (0.84) (0.79) (0.84) (0.90) (0.89) (0.78) (0.99) 
         
Observations 4093 4080 4093 4093 4093 4083 4083 
*Model also includes state dummies      
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Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1    
 
The results show that the density of civil society is not consistently associated with 
adoption of housing programs across years, either where municipal councils do or do not exist. 
However, there are several exceptions depending on the type of program. In 2005, where 
municipal councils for housing exist, a strong civil society is positively associated with programs 
to offer families construction materials. This could indicate that CSOs, who often lobby for self-
build (auto-gestão) projects in which families receive government funding for materials to build 
their own homes, are more successful when they are able to make these demands within 
municipal councils. By 2008, however, a stronger civil society is negatively associated with 
programs to offer construction materials, and the relationship is unchanged by the presence of a 
municipal council.  
In 2005, civil society is positively associated with “other programs”, though the presence 
of a municipal council does not enhance the effect. In 2008, interesting associations emerge for 
two programs that likely fall under the catchall category of “other programs” in the 2005 survey: 
programs to improve units and urbanization programs. A strong civil society increases the 
probability of municipalities adopting programs to improve units, and the presence of a 
municipal council amplifies this effect. This may mean that housing associations, particularly 
those working with more professional NGOs, which are more likely to be included in this 
measure of civil society, are reaching government officials to improve housing units, allowing 
residents to stay within their communities. Again, the presence of a municipal housing council 
may provide the forum for CSOs to negotiate these demands. The relationship between 
urbanization programs and civil society, however, contradicts the result for programs to improve 
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units. Here a strong civil society is negatively associated with urbanization programs and the 
presence of a municipal housing council has no effect. Though speculative, this relationship 
could be a result of strong CSOs focusing on gaining selective benefits for their members in the 
form of improving individual units rather than demanding improvements in whole communities 
through urbanization programs. For instance, in Santo André, a large city outside of São Paulo, 
CSOs have fought for the improvement of individual run-down public housing units, rather than 
for infrastructural projects. Given limited resources, CSOs may focus on small victories rather 
than more expensive large-scale urbanization projects.  
In 2005, the depth of civil society appears to have a positive effect on the adoption of 
multiple programs where there is not a municipal council (see Appendix B for results).  When a 
municipal housing council is in place, the positive relationship becomes even stronger. 
Incorporation of a strong civil society into formal decision-making does seem to add to the 
impact of municipal councils. While these results are suggestive of a strong relationship between 
civil society, formal incorporation, and adoption of a broad array of housing programs, the 
pattern does not hold across years. In fact, these results lead to further questions about the 
differences in civil society influence and the effectiveness of municipal councils after 2005. The 
results suggest that the beginning implementation of the new federal system for housing between 
2005 and 2008 may affect the influence of civil society within and outside of municipal councils, 
a question which is in part addressed in Chapter 5.  
The statistical results confirm the main hypothesis that municipalities with housing 
councils are more likely to adopt all types of housing programs. However, the results regarding 
civil society do not provide consistent evidence to support hypothesis #2, that a strong civil 
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society working through municipal housing councils increases the adoption of social housing 
programs.  
Discussion 
According to the results, overall municipal councils are effective mechanisms for 
incorporating civil society into decision-making to bring about greater numbers of social 
programs and pro-poor policies. Municipal councils for housing do seem to be credible 
institutions for promoting accountability and responsiveness among governments at the 
municipal level. Municipal councils are associated with a greater probability of municipalities 
adopting each type of program and a broad range of programs, which may reflect the negotiation 
of CSOs and government officials to respond to calls for new units as well as renovation of 
existing favelas and renewal of city centers. But previous claims that a strong civil society is a 
necessary condition for effective councils – however that is defined – do not hold true in this 
analysis defining effectiveness through program outcomes. The analysis suggests that municipal 
housing councils level the playing field for civil society to access government officials. Contrary 
to previous research and my own hypothesis, the results show that the density of civil society, 
which may indicate increased capacity, is not a prerequisite for effectiveness of participatory 
governance institutions.    
Leaving aside the interaction of a strong civil society, municipal councils appear to alter 
the policy environment towards heterogeneous needs by increasing the probability of 
municipalities adopting each type of program. In large cities social movements have often 
criticized municipal governments for marginalizing the poor by building large public housing 
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complexes in the periphery of the city, cut off from essential services and employment.16 For 
example, in São Paulo, the União dos Movimentos da Moradia has fought against the continued 
construction of large public housing blocks on the periphery and instead calls for communally-
built projects and affordable housing in the city center. According to Raquel Rolnik, an urban 
policy expert in Brazil who is currently the Special Rapporteur on Housing Issues to the United 
Nations, in the 1970s and 1980s government officials were most concerned about removing 
residents from favelas and illegal occupations of land and placing them in public housing units. 
The participatory movement, including the councils, has changed the ways in which people view 
solutions to housing problems. Today, she says “the dissemination of the idea that favelas must 
be urbanized and integrated, and that they have rights to stay, is something that changed the 
administrative culture and housing policies in this country”.17 Rural-based movements have also 
argued that housing policy in Brazil has not addressed the needs of seasonal laborers and 
geographical variation in the country. People living in rural areas prefer more freedom to 
construct houses that meet their needs and to be able to pay back loans on a more flexible 
schedule.18 The MST encourages members to voice their demands for government support, 
including construction materials and mortgage subsidies.  
The call for acknowledging the diversity of needs in urban and rural areas is underscored 
by the increase in adoption of an array of programs between 2005 and 2008, which is strongly 
effected by the presence of a municipal council for housing. For instance, programs to regularize 

16 Scholars have long documented the effects of locating poor residents on the peripheries of cities. For example, see 
Perlman, Janice, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1976) and Roy, Ananya and Nezar Al Sayyad, eds. Urban Informality: Transnational 
Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia, (New York: Lexington Books, 2004). 
17 Interview with Raquel Rolnik, São Paulo, Brazil, December 2008. 
18 Interview with leader from the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), São Paulo, Brazil, June 
2008.  
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land titles, in essence to legalize the occupation and dwelling of favela or rural residents to 
provide them with land security, increased from 9% of municipalities in 2005 to 20% in 2008. 
Holding all other variables constant, Table 6 shows that the probability of a municipality 
adopting a regularization program is 6% higher where municipal housing councils exist. 
Municipalities with housing councils are also significantly more likely than municipalities 
without councils to adopt a number of different types of housing programs in both years, 
indicating that councils appear to have an effect on the government’s responsiveness to a 
diversity of demands. These results provide evidence to skeptics that municipal councils exist 
more than as institutions on paper.  
In the end, participatory governance institutions, as demonstrated by the case of 
municipal housing councils in Brazil, are able to positively affect policy outcomes for the poor 
by increasing the transfer of information between citizens and government officials regarding 
needs and improving transparency to allow CSOs to hold the government accountable for their 
actions. As a social movement leader from the Northeastern city of Salvador explained, the 
councils are important forums for them to direct resources, but more broadly they use the 
councils to solicit information, demand responses, and follow-up to make sure the government 
does what they say they will. Though the councils are not perfect mechanisms for accountability, 
they provide greater access to government and serve as a place for discussion that never existed 
before. Across Brazilian municipalities, incorporating civil society into decision-making does 
appear to induce local governments to invest in social housing programs, while perhaps breaking 
some of the clientelistic relationships of the past.   
Civil Society 
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The results do not confirm previous claims that a strong civil society is necessary for 
creating effective participatory governance institutions. Though the measure used here is an 
imperfect representation of all civil society, it provides a proxy for the density of civil society 
based on the number of registered organizations. One conclusion to be drawn from this result is 
that CSOs working through participatory governance institutions are able to collaborate and form 
alliances to make proactive proposals and counter government and business interests, regardless 
of the numbers of existing organizations. Municipal housing councils offer the space for 
cooperation against common “threats”, which unite CSOs of all types to make common 
demands.  
The results regarding programs to improve units and urbanization programs in 2008, 
however, insinuate that a strong civil society may have an opposing effect for different types of 
programs. A different process may be taking place in adoption of these two types of programs. 
Further case study research will serve to elucidate whether CSOs continue to pursue traditional 
bilateral relationships with government officials to gain selective benefits for their members as 
may be reflected in the finding that a stronger civil society tends to bring about programs to 
improve individual housing units rather than community-enhancing urbanization programs. 
Alternatively, the number of registered non-profits and foundations tends to be higher in cities 
where real estate interests are also likely to be strong. In urban areas the value of land is higher 
and it may be more difficult to convince municipal leaders to clean up the slums without any 
financial gain for construction companies. The councils may not be powerful enough 
mechanisms to overcome business interests, even where a strong civil society exists. The role of 
the private sector is further addressed in Chapter 4. 
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Finally, the finding that a strong civil society environment was associated with adoption 
of multiple housing programs where housing councils existed in 2005, but not 2008, implies 
there was a shift in the effect CSOs had on the policy process and municipal housing councils 
between these two years. As municipalities across Brazil adopted housing councils in response to 
the new federal system, the depth of civil society appeared to matter less than the act of formally 
incorporating voices from civil society in the decision-making process. Further examination of 
this relationship and the influence of funding from the federal level is needed to clarify the role 
of increasing resource transfers vs. civil society.  
Conclusions 
The findings in this chapter contribute to the debate about whether and when 
participatory governance institutions bring about pro-poor policy outcomes. According to this 
analysis incorporation of civil society through participatory governance institutions does lead 
local governments to adopt social programs to benefit the poor. These types of institutions may 
then be innovative mechanisms for welfare provision, particularly in developing countries 
without a strong history of broad participation. The findings also suggest the depth of civil 
society is less important than the formal incorporation of CSOs in decision-making institutions. 
Though past research suggests strong capacity of civil society is necessary within participatory 
governance institutions to counter elite proposals and avoid cooptation, this analysis implies 
collaboration among CSOs is possible regardless of the depth of formal organization.   
Answers regarding the effectiveness of civil society and participatory governance 
institutions hold important implications for developing countries seeking to address mounting 
social needs, particularly in urban areas where the poor seek housing solutions to overcome 
political, geographic, and economic marginalization. Though this analysis produced significant 
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results regarding the effect of municipal councils on pro-poor outcomes, additional analysis will 
demonstrate the internal struggles that go on within participatory governance institutions and to 
provide direct evidence of accountability. Research on the effect of institutional rules and the 
political environment on the process and outcomes of the councils will further clarify how and 
when participatory governance institutions make a difference for the poor.
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Chapter 4. Pathways to Participatory Governance: Policy-Making in Brazil’s Municipal 
Housing Councils 
 
“The councils are worth having because they force both sides to dialogue. The state has to 
consult civil society about the course of policies, though they are insufficient as spaces to decide 
all questions.” – Government official in São Paulo, Brazil 
“Brazil has very serious problems with our democracy, which is still very recent. Civil society is 
still dealing with how to have an impact on public policy given the problems of corruption. 
Therefore, the councils are very important for the influence movements are able to have on the 
allocation of resources for housing policies. The UMM needs to participate in the councils, 
ensure their consolidation, and guarantee the allocation of resources is more transparent.” – 
leader from the UMM in SƗo Paulo, Brazil 
 
Introduction 
Municipal councils for housing will never be the only deciding factor in policy outcomes, but 
as the movement leader above indicates, CSOs believe that the councils legitimize the policy 
process and affect change in the distribution of resources. In the previous chapter I find that the 
existence of municipal housing councils does significantly increase the probability of 
municipalities adopting all types of programs. This effect is not dependent on a strong civil 
society, suggesting that the existence of the participatory institution matters more than the actual 
density of CSOs. But what does lead to differences in the policy process and outcomes of 
participatory institutions? Though scholars have begun to name potential variables that influence 
the policy-making process and outcomes of participatory governance institutions, this chapter 
undertakes a comparative analysis of Brazilian cities to provide evidence for how and when 
context matters.  
In this chapter I seek to identify the factors that enhance both the policy-making process 
and outcomes in Brazil’s municipal housing councils and participatory governance institutions 
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more broadly. Though in the previous chapter I analyzed the statistical relationship between 
municipal housing councils and policy outcomes in the form of social housing programs, here I 
look more in depth at the policy process before turning again to the policy outcomes. Based on 
the work of previous scholars, Selee and Peruzzotti (2009) argue that participatory governance 
institutions should enhance representation in the policy process through three mechanisms: 1) by 
replacing clientelistic relationships with more transparent means of decision-making (Avritzer 
2002), 2) by leveling the playing field for previously unorganized or excluded sectors of society 
(Bebbington 2005), and 3) by providing spaces for deliberative decision-making to set public 
policy (Fung and Wright 2003; Avritzer 2002). Here I attempt to narrow down the variables that 
shape each of these mechanisms. Decisions about public goods, then, should rely on the process 
in which those decisions are made. As such, I seek to assess how variables that influence the 
policy process in turn shape outcomes of municipal housing councils.  
Previous research identifies two groups of variables, institutional rules and civil society-
state dynamics, which influence the effectiveness of participatory governance institutions. First, 
scholars find that institutional design must be taken into account in order to assess accountability 
and responsiveness of participatory governance institutions (Agrawal and Gupta 2005; Avritzer 
2009; Fagatto and Fung 2006; Ostrom 1996; Kumar 2002). This piece of the puzzle, however, 
has not been clearly defined or studied across contexts to a significant extent. Second, scholars 
argue that the dynamic between civil society and political society largely shapes participatory 
governance institutions (Wampler 2007, Avritzer 2009). Again, this dynamic needs further 
systematic study across contexts. 
In this chapter I assess the role of institutional rules and civil society-state dynamics in 
influencing the policy process and outcomes in municipal housing councils. First I use a 
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qualitative process-tracing method to analyze how transparency, a level playing field, and 
deliberative decision-making are shaped by institutional and civil society-state dynamics in three 
Brazilian cities, São Paulo, Santo André, and Salvador. Based on case study analysis, I find that 
in practice the party in power strongly influences the policy-making process within municipal 
housing councils. Where a mayor from the Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) 
holds power, the council’s agenda, membership, and alliances may shift to privilege civil society 
voices in the policy-making process. 
Across cases, I then test the role of institutional rules and civil society-state dynamics in 
increasing the probability that municipalities adopt social housing programs where housing 
councils exist. I hypothesize that across Brazil, where a PT administration is in charge the 
municipal council for housing will have a greater effect on bringing about housing programs and 
commitment of municipal resources. Contrary to expectations, however, I do not find a 
consistent effect for the presence of a PT mayor. Instead, the statistical results suggest the 
importance of institutional rules for determining outcomes of housing councils. What is true for 
the policy process does not appear to apply to the outcomes across cases. I conclude that the PT 
may display significant variation in commitment to participatory governance across the country, 
while institutional rules may be more generalizable in their effect. The importance of oversight 
responsibilities points to the need for transparency to engender responsiveness and accountability 
in participatory governance institutions.  
 Below I first begin with a review of the factors shaping the performance of participatory 
governance institutions. I then provide a background for the three case studies, including the 
creation and structure of each municipal housing council. Using the case studies I assess the 
impact the institutional rules and civil society-state dynamics on the policy process. Finally, I 
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turn to quantitative analysis to determine whether institutional rules and the party in power 
change the effect of municipal housing councils on adoption of social housing programs.  
What Affects the Performance of Participatory Governance Institutions? 
In this chapter I seek to assess potential variables that explain variance in the policy 
process and outcomes of participatory governance institutions. Based on these three case studies 
and existing literature, I propose the institutional rules of the housing councils and civil-society 
state dynamics as intervening variables determining the policy-making process in Brazilian 
municipal housing councils. 
Institutional Rules of Housing Councils 
Scholars argue that institutional rules matter for how civil society is incorporated into 
decision-making and the influence CSO members have on resource allocation (Agrawal and 
Gupta 2005; Avritzer 2009; Fagatto and Fung 2006; Kumar 2002). In Brazil, institutional rules 
for municipal housing councils are decided by individual municipalities and written into the law 
or decree establishing the council. Among other rules, these municipal laws or decrees state the 
responsibilities afforded to each council. In 2008, a Brazilian government survey of 
municipalities (MUNIC, IBGE) asked questions about whether the municipal housing council 
was consultative, deliberative, normative, or provided oversight, indicating the extent to which 
the council actually has power over housing planning decisions.  
In consultative councils the role of members is to study existing programs and suggest 
activities to be undertaken in the area of housing (IBGE). Deliberative councils then have the 
power to make decisions regarding the implementation of policies and the administration of 
resources. Though housing secretaries and mayors may still overrule the council’s decisions, the 
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council does at least have the authority to present final decisions for implementation. Normative 
councils are those in which members establish rules and direction for the administration of 
resources, and finally, oversight (fiscalização) councils oversee (fiscaliza) the implementation 
and functioning of policies and administration of resources. I expect that housing councils with 
designated oversight responsibilities will generate the most transparency in policy making 
because council members should be guaranteed access to financial documents and program 
reports on a regular basis. 
The rules governing the distribution of council seats by civil society, private sector 
associations, and government officials should also be associated with the performance of 
municipal housing councils. According to the MUNIC survey, in 2008, 86% of municipal 
housing councils had at least half civil society representation (IBGE). On the surface, then, there 
would appear to be very little variation in council make-up. In practice, however, councils vary 
in the definition of who is included in “civil society”. Some councils reserve seats for civil 
society, defined as NGOs, business associations, social movements, academics, and 
neighborhood associations, while other councils separate the category of “civil society” from that 
of “social movements”. Though the broad categorization from the MUNIC survey does not allow 
for comparison of the detailed make-up of councils across all cases, the three case studies 
discussed here present significant variation in council membership. Here I argue that distinctions 
made between civil society and social movement members and the inclusion of private sector 
associations increases conflict and may decrease the achievement of a level playing field.  
In addition, institutional rules governing the frequency of meetings contribute to the 
prospects for deliberative decision-making in municipal housing councils. Clearly, without 
scheduling meetings councils cannot be effective spaces for policy making. I argue, though, that 
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the rule for meeting frequency may only exist on paper without an active civil society to hold 
governments accountable for conducting meetings. Though the institutional rule for meeting 
frequency may be important for determining deliberative decision-making, it is not a sufficient 
condition to ensure meetings occur and are deliberative. 
Finally, the institutional rules governing responsibilities, council make-up, and meeting 
frequency should have a combined effect on council outcomes. Oversight responsibilities, rules 
of representation that limit conflict, and frequent meetings should enable the benefits of 
participatory governance to achieve the principle goal of redistributing public goods to benefit 
broad sectors of society. In the case of municipal housing councils, given available data I test 
whether the rules governing responsibilities increase the likelihood of governments adopting an 
increasing number and variety of social housing programs to respond to civil society demands.  
Civil Society-State Dynamics 
Several scholars suggest that the dynamic between civil society and the state is critical for 
determining the function and outcomes of participatory governance institutions (Wampler 2007, 
Avritzer 2009). Though Putnam (1993) argued that the density of CSOs matters for institutional 
accountability, in the previous chapter I do not find that the density of civil society in Brazilian 
municipalities significantly alters the effect of municipal housing councils. Perhaps, as several 
scholars have argued contrary to Putnam, the density of civil society is less important than the 
dynamic between civil society and political society. If so, in order to understand when 
participatory governance institutions have an effect on the policy process and outcomes, we need 
to identify the factors that influence the dynamic between civil society and the state. Though 
scholars have begun to name these variables, questions remain regarding whether patterns of 
interaction exist across contexts and various types of participatory governance institutions. Based 
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on the work of other scholars and through my own fieldwork I identify three variables, which 
appear to influence civil society-state dynamics in participatory governance institutions. Though 
not an exhaustive list, these three factors – the party in power (Avritzer 2009; Baiocchi 2005; 
Lavalle, Acharya and Houtzager 2005; Selee and Peruzzotti, 2009; Tatagiba and Teixeira, 2008; 
Cornwall and Coelho, 2007; Wampler, 2007) the role of the private sector, and the strategies of 
civil society (Mahmud, 2007; Wampler, 2007) – appear to make a difference across contexts in 
determining the policy-making process between civil society and government officials. 
Party in Power  
How does the party in power effect the relationships between civil society and state 
actors in participatory governance institutions? Participatory governance institutions in Brazil, 
including housing councils, are considered a hallmark of the PT.19 Therefore I expect that where 
the PT is in charge there is more cooperation between civil society and municipal government 
and less conflict, both within and outside of the housing council. Under PT administrations 
incorporation of civil society into the housing secretariat – often as full-time “liaisons” hired to 
promote communication between government and civil society – should promote transparency 
through an increase in information sharing. Second, the party in power may determine which 
CSOs participate in the municipal housing councils. Under a PT government, those CSOs allied 
with the PT may participate more, leading to questions as to whether the party in power biases 
the playing field. Lastly, the party in power influences the appointment of housing secretariat 
officials and their respective ideological predispositions. The commitment of officials to 
participatory governance and to certain housing policy solutions over others should influence 

19 The data do not show a significant correlation between the PT and the existence of municipal housing councils. 
Further, my previous statistical analysis does not show a significant relationship between the PT and the adoption of 
social housing programs (Donaghy 2011). Administration by a PT government does not appear to be endogenous 
either to the existence of participatory governance institutions or to social housing policies. 
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both the nature of deliberative decision-making within councils and the policy outcomes they 
produce.  
I argue that the PT’s strong influence on the three facets of the policy process in 
municipal housing councils should significantly alter the policy outcomes council’s produce. In 
other words, where a PT government is in power, I argue that municipal housing councils will be 
more strongly associated with adoption of social housing programs benefiting the poor. These 
councils should more directly respond to the demands of CSOs, corresponding to adoption of a 
variety of programs from new construction to urbanization of existing communities. 
Role of the Private Sector 
Private sector interests, including real estate and construction associations, often occupy 
seats on municipal housing councils. Because much of the research on participatory governance 
institutions in Brazil has focused on participatory budgeting initiatives, which do not generally 
formally involve private sector actors, identification of the role of the private sector in 
participatory governance institutions has been limited. In regards to housing policy, however, the 
role of the private sector cannot be ignored. Housing as a social good cannot be separated from 
the larger private sector market for real estate and construction. The private sector, defined by 
profit motive, has a stake in the value of land, the distribution of public sector contracts, and 
public financing available for potential homebuyers. How these interests influence the policy 
process of municipal housing councils is key to understanding civil society-state dynamics.  
The private sector influences the policy-making process in municipal councils based on 
their relative strength on the council to effect the agenda and voting outcomes and their 
relationship to government officials. Where the private sector plays a strong role on the council, 
government/private sector alliances may develop, stifling transparency of information provided 
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to CSOs. Whether these alliances develop, however, may be in part based on the ideology of the 
party in power in the municipal administration and its past relationship to the private sector. 
Where close alliances do exist, the private sector may have greater access to government 
officials, thereby limiting the playing field for the policy making process. In some cases, private 
sector interests may align with government officials to influence votes and the council’s agenda. 
When this occurs, the nature of deliberative decision-making shifts in favor of private sector 
interests.  
Because the role of the private sector in municipal housing councils is strongly tied to the 
party in power, I argue that across cases the party in power should dictate the influence of the 
private sector in policy decision-making. I expect the presence of a PT mayor to mitigate the role 
of the private sector, increasing the influence of other civil society actors. As stated above, 
therefore, the presence of a PT mayor where housing councils exist should be more strongly 
associated with an increase in housing program adoption.  
Strategies of Civil Society Organizations 
 The strategies of civil society may be more important than the density of CSOs in a 
municipality for determining the policy process in participatory governance institutions (Avritzer 
2002). While there might not be a perfect “type” of civil society for ensuring an efficient and 
effective policy process in the councils, as Wampler (2007) suggests, the combination of 
contestation and cooperation strategies by CSOs may avoid co-optation by government interests 
as well as contentiousness among actors to increase the relevance of participatory governance 
institutions.  
 In all participatory governance institutions, CSOs are largely responsible for pushing the 
government to ensure they function as representative institutions. To secure transparency in 
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policy making in municipal housing councils, CSOs most likely have to adopt a conscious 
strategy to demand documents be made available to them. In addition, CSOs need the capacity to 
analyze budgetary and other bureaucratic documents. CSOs may receive information to which 
they would otherwise not have access, but they have to adopt careful strategies to ensure the 
transfer of information occurs. Second, in order to guarantee that participatory governance 
institutions level the playing field in terms of access requires CSOs to adopt a strategy of 
participation in formal institutions vs. a repertoire of more radical tactics. Finally, to ensure 
effective deliberative decision-making, CSOs in municipal housing councils need to act as a 
cohesive unit, particularly when it comes to voting and negotiating with government officials for 
common demands.  
 In terms of policy outcomes resulting from the presence of a municipal housing council, 
the strategies of CSOs most likely influence the types of housing programs and willingness of 
government officials to direct resources to housing solutions. The shape of civil society strategies 
with regards to councils – whether they choose contestation or cooperation – may still be reliant 
on their traditional relationship with the party in power. Therefore, across cases, I argue that the 
party in power incorporates some of the effects of the strategies of CSOs. CSOs may be more 
likely to cooperate under the administration of their allies – traditionally from the PT. Based on a 
less combative policy-making process, where a PT mayor is in power the councils should be 
associated with a greater adoption of housing programs. 
 Below is a summary of the hypotheses suggested by this discussion: 
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Table 4.1. Hypotheses 
 Institutional 
Rules 
Party in Power Private Sector 
Role 
CSO Strategies 
Transparency Oversight powers 
should promote 
greatest level of 
transparency. 
Where the PT is in 
power, the 
administration 
should be more 
willing to provide 
information to 
CSOs. 
Private sector 
alliances with 
government 
officials may 
limit 
transparency. 
CSOs need to 
make demands 
in order to 
receive 
information 
from 
government 
officials. 
Leveling the 
Playing Field 
Greater 
segmentation of 
members leads to 
competition and 
stifles the playing 
field. 
Where the PT is in 
power, allied 
CSOs will have 
greater access and 
voice. 
Private sector 
alliances with 
government 
officials will bias 
the playing field 
CSOs must 
adopt a strategy 
of participation 
in order to 
ensure a level 
playing field. 
Deliberative 
Decision 
Making 
Where the rules 
indicate a greater 
frequency in 
meeting times, 
councils should 
engender greater 
deliberative 
decision-making. 
Under a PT 
government, the 
commitment of 
government 
officials should 
increase 
deliberative 
decision-making. 
Greater private 
sector influence 
may shift the 
agenda of the 
councils away 
from CSO 
demands. 
CSO cohesion 
increases 
deliberative 
decision-making 
in the councils. 
Distribution 
of Resources 
Oversight powers 
are associated 
with adoption of 
social housing 
programs. 
Where housing 
councils exist, a 
PT administration 
is associated with 
adoption of more 
social housing 
programs. 
The influence of 
the private sector 
on housing 
program 
adoption, where 
councils exist, is 
mediated by the 
party in power. 
The party in 
power mediates 
the impact of 
CSO strategies, 
where housing 
councils exist. 
 
Overview of the Cases 
The cities of São Paulo, Santo André, and Salvador differ based on a number of factors, 
including the independent variables of interest discussed above: the institutional rules of 
municipal housing councils, traditions of political leadership, private sector power, and CSO 
strategies. In terms of tradition of political leadership, São Paulo swings back and forth between 
the left and right, Santo André has a strong PT orientation, and Salvador remains under 
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conservative administration. Of the three, the real estate and construction sectors are the most 
dominant in São Paulo’s housing politics, though the private sector also maintains a combative 
relationship with civil society in Salvador. While São Paulo has a strong history of neighborhood 
associations, vocal social movements, and professional NGOs, Santo André is a smaller city with 
a less contentious civil society environment. As the largest city in the Northeast of Brazil, 
Salvador is known for weaker civil society, though demands for addressing the great housing 
needs in the city have grown increasingly loud in recent years.  
São Paulo 
São Paulo is the largest city in Brazil and is known for its concentration of wealth and 
economic power. Located in the Southeast region of the country, the city is representative of 
mega-cities around the world in terms of the scale and variation in housing problems. This city 
of 10.9 million residents includes 1,567 registered favelas, 1,060 irregular settlements, 523 
public housing buildings, and 1,698 cortiços (tenement houses) (Secretaria de Habitação, 2008). 
The government estimates that about 350,000 families live in favelas, though housing movement 
leaders estimate the number to be about twice as high. According to Benedito Barbosa, an 
attorney representing the CMP (Central dos Movimentos Populares), another 3 million people 
live in irregular settlements and areas of environmental risk, and nearly 1 million reside in 
overcrowded and unsafe tenement housing (personal interview).  
Though these numbers only estimate the problem, it is clear that the city is in great need 
of large-scale interventions to address the quantitative and qualitative housing deficits. The main 
message in the government’s promotional materials is that the scale of interventions must be in 
line with the size of the city. In fact, São Paulo has a diverse array of programs to provide 
housing units, improve infrastructure in the favelas, and provide land titles for residents of 
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informal settlements. The city’s two largest favelas, Heliopolis with an estimated 70,000 
residents and Paraisopolis with 60,000 residents, have received long-term attention from the 
government, though the problems of inadequate housing, lack of services, and land insecurity 
clearly persist. Paraisopolis sits next door to an upscale condominium complex and illustrates the 
classic problem of inequality in this city where rich and poor fight for prime real estate close to 
the center of the city and employment opportunities.  
Municipal Council for Housing 
Participatory governance institutions in the city of São Paulo, including the Municipal 
Council for Housing, have been strongly linked to the intermittent presence of PT 
administrations. PT Mayor Luiza Erundina (1989-1992) first proposed the law to create the 
Municipal Council for Housing (CMH) in São Paulo, but the law did not pass in the city council 
until 2002, when the PT had the added advantage of dominating the city council under the 
administration of PT Mayor Marta Suplicy. Social movements, especially the UMM-SP (União 
dos Movimentos da Moradia-São Paulo), expressed a strong desire for the council and were 
heavily involved in the process of negotiating its terms. Unlike the other two cases discussed 
here, in São Paulo the Company for Housing (COHAB), a public-private entity, manages the 
implementation of the municipal housing fund. Though the housing council approves the annual 
budget for the fund and receives a year-end accounting of how the money was spent, day-to-day 
operations of the budget are in the hands of COHAB. This sets up a further layer of tension 
between social movements, concerned with providing no- or low-cost housing solutions to the 
poor, and COHAB, which is concerned with recouping government-backed loans and enabling 
private-sector development.  
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Santo André 
The city of Santo André is best known for the strength of manufacturing unions and for 
its long-term administration by the PT. The city is part of the ABC region in metropolitan São 
Paulo, which also includes the municipalities of São Bernardo do Campo and São Caetano do 
Sul. Unions in Santo André and these other two cities grew along with the automobile and steel 
industry up until the 1980s when many of the manufacturers left the city, leading to an economic 
decline in the late 1980s and 1990s. The PT was born out of the union movements in the ABC 
region, of which President Lula was a strong leader and a force for the creation of the new 
Worker’s Party in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By 2008, the PT had been in power in the 
municipality for all but four years since democratization.20 Though a smaller city by Brazilian 
standards, with approximately 670,000 residents (IPEA 2000), about 115,000 citizens or 16% of 
the municipal population live in favelas. According to a survey conducted by the municipal 
government, the city maintains a housing deficit of about 24,300 units (Prefeitura de Santo 
André 2006). 
Despite its presence in the shadow of São Paulo, international donors and scholars have 
recognized Santo André for its innovations in development programs and participatory politics. 
The city has won several international prizes for best practices, including a prize in 2005 from 
the UNDP for taking action on each of the eight Millennium Development Goals. According to 
the municipal administration, housing policy focuses on both new construction and improving 
living conditions in favelas (Prefeitura do Santo André 2006). Like the majority of Brazilian 
cities, most of the growth of favelas has been in the periphery, which the government aims to 

20 Dr. Newton da Costa Brandão from the PSDB was mayor from 1993-1997.  
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address by increasing the legal residential housing market and promoting integration of favelas 
into the formal city through sanitation, mobility, and dignified housing (moradia digna). 
Municipal Council for Housing 
As in São Paulo, a PT government established the Municipal Council for Housing in 
Santo André. Mayor Celso Daniel created the Secretariat for Housing and proposed the creation 
of the housing council during his first administration from 1989-1992. The council did not begin 
to function until 2000, however, under Daniel’s second administration. The council consistently 
holds meetings the last Tuesday of every month in order to provide continuity in decision-
making, according to council members. In 2006, the municipality was also one of the first to 
create and pass a Municipal Master Plan for Housing, which includes specific mention of the 
importance of the housing council for institutionalizing civil society influence on policy making 
and administration of the housing fund. The municipality also has a general participatory 
budgeting process, which does fund some housing projects, but the housing council members 
state that their council is still necessary to provide the consistency needed to solve technical 
concerns for housing projects and as a space where housing associations can come on a regular 
basis to solicit funds and technical assistance for their projects.  
Salvador 
Salvador is often referred to as the Afro-Brazilian capital of the country, with a strong 
legacy of slavery and African cultural heritage. It is the largest city in the Northeast with nearly 3 
million residents, but is also the poorest of the cases reviewed here with an income per capita of 
R$341 (IPEA 2000). Table 4.2 below provides a comparison of basic indicators in the three case 
studies and shows that inequality is also quite high in Salvador with a Gini coefficient of .66. A 
2000 housing census in the city approximated the housing deficit, or number of inadequate 
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housing units, at 81,000 out of 651,000 housing units in the city (Secretaria Municipal de 
Habitação 2008). This number obscures the concentration of the population living in the 
“informal city”: approximately 60% of the city’s population lives in the irregular and clandestine 
settlements. The same study found 89,000 vacant units in the city in need of renovation and 
access to basic services. Many of these vacant units are located in the historic center of the city, 
designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The right to these properties represents a constant 
tension between movements that occupy the buildings and officials and developers who want to 
“clean up” the area for tourism.  
 
Table 4.2: Comparative Statistics for Case Studies 
São Paulo Santo André Salvador 
Civil Society Density: Non-profits 
and Foundations per capita (IBGE 
2002) 0.0019 0.0014 0.0010 
Population (IPEA 2000) 10,900,000 669,592 2,673,560 
PT Mayor (2004-2008) (MUNIC 
2008) No Yes No 
Percentage urban (IPEA 2000) 0.941 1 0.999 
Municipal Budget per capita 
(IBGE 2005) R$632 R$504 R$287 
Income per capita (IPEA 2000) R$610 R$513 R$341 
Gini Coefficient (IPEA 2000) 0.62 0.53 0.66 
 
Municipal Council for Housing 
The Municipal Council for Housing in Salvador began in 2007 under the administration 
of Mayor João Henrique Carneiros from the PDT (Partido Democrático Trabalhista).21 During 
his first election campaign in 2004, Carneiros brought the PT into his coalition, and once in 
office named a PT-friendly secretary for housing. Under the direction of this secretary, Dr. 
Angela Gordilho Souza, the Municipal Council for Housing was established by law in 2006. By 

21 Mayor João Henrique Carneiros left the PDT in 2007 to affiliate with the PMDB (O Partido do Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro), the largest political party in Brazil.  
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all accounts, though, by 2008 the council did not yet have a set pattern of meeting or 
responsibilities. By law the council is supposed to meet every four months, though in practice 
meetings are more irregular.   
The Policy Process in Municipal Housing Councils 
In this section I assess the role of institutional rules and civil society-state dynamics in 
promoting transparency, a level playing field and deliberative decision-making in each case. 
Transparency 
Transparency involves the reduction of clientelistic behavior and the transmission of 
greater information to citizens. Scholars argue that public channels for negotiation, which 
mitigate the use of traditional clientelistic bargaining, create transparency (Hagopian 1996; 
Avritzer 2002). Municipal housing councils create a public forum for discussion and a link to 
information between government officials and civil society that never existed before. Rather than 
relying on bilateral meetings with officials, policy and program decisions should be made in 
public with negotiation among multiple actors. 
As I argue above, the institutional responsibilities assigned to municipal housing councils 
should in part determine their transparency. Table 4.3 below provides a comparison of the 
official responsibilities granted to each of the case study housing councils.  
Table 4.3: Responsibilities of Municipal Councils for Housing, MUNIC Survey 2008 
Responsibilities São Paulo Santo André Salvador 
Consultative No No Yes 
Deliberative Yes Yes Yes 
Normative No Yes No 
Oversight No Yes Yes 
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According to the survey, Santo André and Salvador have oversight powers, which should be 
significant for transparency. In practice, however, I find that the legal responsibilities afforded to 
the councils may not be entirely representative of the duties of councils in reality. In fact, 
according to a researcher at the Instituto Pólis in São Paulo, laws often do not dictate how the 
councils function in practice (personal interview). For instance, the survey indicates that the São 
Paulo council does not have oversight responsibilities, though in practice I found that the council 
does have the power to approve or disapprove accounting statements for the municipal housing 
fund. In Salvador, on the other hand, the council does technically have oversight responsibilities, 
but the council is not presented with budgetary documents. Based on the case studies, then, I do 
not find that the written institutional rules for responsibilities are critical determinants in 
transparency.  
 I do find, however, that the party in power plays a large role in generating transparency. 
For example, in both São Paulo and Salvador, PT-affiliated housing secretaries initiated the 
position of “liaison” within the housing secretariat. The role of the liaison is to facilitate the 
transfer of information between the government and social movements and to negotiate conflicts. 
In São Paulo this position existed only under the Suplicy government (PT). The two liaisons 
were integral in negotiating the establishment of the council and in setting the early agenda for 
mutirões (self-build projects) and subsidized housing projects in the city center (personal 
interviews). When José Serra (PSDB) came in as mayor, his administration actively worked to 
limit the role of civil society within government and discontinued the incorporation of liaisons. 
In Salvador, the liaison position began under Dr. Souza from the PT, but has been retained so far 
under the more-conservative government. The liaison has played a particularly important role in 
negotiating meetings between CSOs and the housing secretary and delivering the demands of 
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protestors. In order to keep his job, however, this liaison must walk a fine line between offending 
the current government and appeasing CSOs. Movement leaders describe his role as “delicate”, 
and in the end his role is limited. He does not appear to play a significant role in reducing 
clientelistic relationships nor is he provided with significant information to transmit to CSOs. 
The party in power, then, matters for the level of transparency generated by this position. 
 I also find that the relationship between the private sector and government officials 
influences transparency in the councils, though as expected the party in power mitigates the 
dynamic. In all three cities studied, I find a close connection between the party in power and the 
nature of private sector involvement in the councils. Where a more conservative government is 
in power, housing secretariat officials tend to come from the private sector. For instance, under 
the current administration of DEM party Mayor Gilberto Kassab in São Paulo, many housing 
secretariat officials have close ties with the major real estate association in the city. CSOs 
criticize the closeness of these ties and the unlimited access the private sector has to housing 
officials. CSOs argue that this relationship reduces transparency because they are often cut out of 
negotiations between private sector associations and government officials. In Salvador, as well, 
the current PDT-affiliated Secretary for Housing came from the real estate sector and does not 
appear interested in working with the council. He does not schedule regular meetings and CSOs 
report they have not had access to any budgetary information or other internal documents. In 
contrast, in Santo André the private sector is not involved in the municipal housing council. This 
appears to contribute to the open and non-combative relationship between civil society and 
government officials in the council. 
 Lastly, in my review of the case studies I do find some evidence that the strategies of 
civil society contribute to the level of transparency achieved in the housing councils. In a 
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contentious environment like São Paulo, civil society must be willing and have the capacity to 
make demands of the government in order to force them to provide information. For instance, in 
council meetings I witnessed members from social movements asking numerous clarification 
questions on budget documents they were given by the housing secretariat—sometimes lasting 
for hours—until they were satisfied they had the full and correct information. Civil society in 
Salvador—more radical with less capacity for analyzing complex bureaucratic details—is not as 
able to hold the government accountable for providing full budgetary information. In Santo 
André, the neighborhood associations involved in the councils appear more concerned with 
receiving technical assistance for their individual projects and less concerned with the 
government’s overall spending patterns. Due to the non-combative relationship in Santo André, 
the government is more willing to share information without significant pressure, but access to 
full information is not a strategy of council members. 
 Based on these three case studies, the party in power seems to contribute the most to 
ensuring transparency within municipal housing councils. Both the role of the private sector and 
CSO strategies are based on relationships created by the party in charge of the municipal 
administration. Written institutional rules dictating responsibilities of the councils do not appear 
to determine council activities in practice.  
Level Playing Field 
 By definition, participatory governance institutions should increase the involvement of 
previously excluded segments of society, thereby leveling the playing field in terms of access to 
policy making. The rules for the composition of the councils should in part dictate who is 
provided with access through the council process. Across the three cases there is variation in the 
rules for membership. In São Paulo, there is a distinction in the housing council between social 
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movements and civil society: 16 seats are reserved for members from social movements and 16 
seats are reserved for civil society. Civil society includes members from unions, universities, 
NGOs and business associations. The remaining 16 seats in the 48-person council are reserved 
for government officials. This structure sets up a tripartite division between social movements, 
other CSOs (including business associations), and government officials. Members serve two-year 
terms, with representatives from civil society and government agencies selected within meetings 
of their own groups, i.e. unions select a representative within themselves. Members from social 
movements, however, are elected in citywide elections. In the 2007 election, approximately 
33,000 votes were cast for social movement representatives (SEHAB-SP 2008). 
The council in Santo André has 16 members with half from civil society, including social 
movements, and half from the government. By decree, the president of the council is from civil 
society and the president of the Municipal Fund for Housing is from the government. Though 
larger, the housing council in Salvador has a similar composition with 16 members from civil 
society and 16 members from government agencies. Like in São Paulo, civil society 
representation in Salvador is further divided between social movements and “other” groups such 
as NGOs. In 2007, social movements held one meeting in which they chose members amongst 
themselves and civil society organizations, including NGOs, trade associations, and unions, held 
their own meeting to select representatives. 
Does one form of council composition create a more level playing field than the others? 
All three include at least half representation from civil society. What differs across cases is the 
differentiation between “civil society” and “social movements” and the requirements for the 
inclusion of private sector representatives. In São Paulo, the separation of civil society and social 
movements sets up a division between members, strongly based on class differences. Social 
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movement members often come from housing occupations and are more radical in their 
demands. In Salvador, the contrast exists, though because professionalized NGOs are not as 
prevalent in Salvador as in São Paulo, the distinctions are not as strong. To some extent, in both 
cases the voices of social movement members are subordinated to those of NGO leaders who 
may be considered more educated or polished. By distinguishing membership, the institutional 
rules do bias the playing field.  
In addition, I find that the rules for membership matter for leveling the playing field 
inasmuch as they shape the participation of private sector associations. In São Paulo business 
interests occupy five or six seats on the council, forming a considerable voting block. In Santo 
André the council rules do not mandate the participation of a private sector representative and no 
one from the private sector has stepped up to be included. In fact, according to housing 
secretariat officials, the private sector is not involved in social housing policy-making in Santo 
André. In Salvador, as the city grows and business interests organize in the Northeast of Brazil, 
the role of the private sector becomes more important. Council regulations in Salvador mandate 
the participation of two members from private sector entities out of the 32-member council. 
Though the private sector in Salvador clearly has a voice in decision-making, social movements 
and NGOs also significantly outnumber them.  
Given that municipal housing councils decide issues related to housing construction, land 
use, and infrastructural development, the private sector has a legitimate role to play in the 
councils’ decision making. In the case studies, however, the inclusion of private sector 
representatives appears to lead to greater contestation among members, which may reduce the 
voice of previously marginalized voices from neighborhood associations, social movements, and 
NGOs.  
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In the case studies I find that the party in power largely determines which CSOs are 
involved in the housing council. This is most strikingly seen in São Paulo where council 
membership completely changed between the Suplicy (PT) and Serra (PSDB) governments. 
While mostly PT-affiliated movements occupied seats in the Suplicy administration, the Serra 
administration directly supported and “encouraged” the election of newer, weaker opposition 
groups to the council in 2005. According to one state government official who was a housing 
council member under Suplicy and Serra, the movements on the council under Serra were co-
opted by the government and the council barely operated. In the 2007 elections, then, the “first 
term” PT-affiliated representatives launched a coordinated campaign using a unified ticket to 
regain their seats in the third term. In Santo André, all of the neighborhood associations and 
unions represented on the housing council appeared to be affiliated with the PT government. In 
Salvador, when the housing secretary came from the PT, PT-affiliated social movements say 
they felt welcome in the housing secretariat and hoped that the municipal housing council would 
provide them with real voice. Since Dr. Souza left her position, the same social movements 
participate, but they report a feeling of prejudice against their members and a lack of interest in 
hearing their demands on the part of the new housing secretary.  
The party in power may encourage some civil society groups to participate while limiting 
the participation of others. In Santo André, while council members state they are receptive to all 
voices, the strength of the PT may in practice drive away non-PT affiliated groups from 
participating. In São Paulo, the party in power may also prevent certain groups from 
participating, though with experience the leftist social movements of São Paulo have learned to 
ensure their participation by collaborating at council election time. PT-alligned and more radical 
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CSOs in Salvador also displayed less enthusiasm for the participatory process under a non-PT 
government.   
Finally, how do the strategies of civil society influence the playing field in municipal 
housing councils? In the case studies, civil society strategies affect their interest in participating 
in formal government institutions and their willingness to negotiate with government officials 
rather than engaging in more radical tactics. On a continuum of contestation vs. cooperation, 
civil society in Salvador falls on the end of the spectrum towards contestation, while São Paulo 
falls in the middle and Santo André lies at the other end towards cooperation.  
In Salvador the largest social movement for housing is the Movimento Sem Teto do 
Salvador (MSTS, Roofless Movement of Salvador). The MSTS was founded in 2003 and their 
main strategy is the occupation of land and buildings they believe are not fulfilling their social 
function as required by the Brazilian constitution. By the fall of 2008 the MSTS had 22 
occupations, the majority of which were in abandoned buildings near the center of the city. 
Following occupations, members of the movement engage in protests to the housing secretariat, 
and leaders then negotiate with the municipal, state, and federal governments to solicit funding 
for construction projects to meet their member’s needs. All four of the primary national 
movements for housing also have affiliates in Salvador and membership on the housing 
council.22 Following the UNMP’s (União Nacional dos Movimentos da Moradia Popular) call to 
demand the creation of and participation in housing councils, the União da Moradia Popular-
Bahia (UMP-BA) was the primary force behind the creation of the housing council in Salvador. 
However, the self-build projects for which the UMP-BA secured federal and municipal 
contributions began with occupation of land, followed by protest and negotiation in much the 

22 The four main national movements for housing are the União Nacional dos Movimentos da Moradia Popular, the 
Central dos Movimentos Populares, CONAM, and the Frente da Luta de Moradia Popular. 
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same manner that the MSTS secures projects. Though a few small NGOs assist the movements 
in their advocacy and participate in the council, the main forces for securing housing programs 
and policies are these and other housing movements, which rely first and foremost on occupation 
and protest to ensure benefits for their members. Lack of commitment to the process among 
some social movements, therefore, does reduce the effectiveness of the housing council in 
leveling the playing field. 
 In contrast, civil society in Santo André adopts a largely non-confrontational strategy. 
The main participants on the housing council from civil society are the Housing Cooperative of 
Public Servants (ServiCoop) and neighborhood-based housing associations. As mentioned, 
housing associations bring their requests for assistance to the housing council. These requests 
generally involve urbanization rather than new construction. Direct action by civil society in 
Santo André is extremely rare, while cooperation with the government has become the strategic 
norm. 
 Finally, CSO strategies in São Paulo run the gamut, from occupations and large-scale 
protests to participation in housing councils and election to public office. The most organized 
movement is the UMM-SP, though the Movimento Sem Teto and several other groups regularly 
carry out occupations in the center and periphery of the city. The UMM-SP began in 1987 as an 
umbrella for 42 housing associations, which fight for participation at all levels of government, 
self-build projects, a mix of credit and subsidies, help for housing tenements, and assistance for 
people at the lowest income levels. Though their slogan officially calls for direct action through 
“occupation, resistance and construction”, the UMM-SP invests considerable time in the housing 
council and is the leader in holding the government accountable for its promises of participatory 
governance. In addition to social movements, São Paulo is the center of the country for NGOs 
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working on urban policy issues. The Instituto Pólis has a regular seat on the housing council and 
publishes and lectures widely on the importance of participatory governance institutions. In sum, 
CSOs in São Paulo have certainly not abandoned direct action in the form of occupations and 
protests, but rather rely on a mix of strategies, which includes making their demands within the 
formal, public forum of the municipal housing council. Their commitment to participate adds to 
the effectiveness of the council in leveling the playing field for policy making. 
 In sum, rules defining the make-up of council membership, the ideology of the party in 
power, alliances with the private sector, and the level of contentiousness in civil society all shape 
the playing field within municipal housing councils. In the end, however, I find that the party in 
power again largely controls the other three variables to influence the effectiveness of housing 
councils.  
Deliberative Decision-Making 
Deliberative decision-making as a goal of participatory governance institutions implies 
that civil society has a significant voice in policy-making, particularly in terms of agenda setting 
and final decisions of the institution. Across municipalities, civil society has varying degrees of 
influence over the housing council’s agenda. In addition, the mechanisms for final decision-
making – voting, verbal agreements, or no real powers – differ across cases. While the 
institutional rules should dictate how often housing councils meet, and therefore how relevant 
they are to policy making, the dynamics between civil society and the state also shape the agenda 
and means for decision making within housing councils. 
In the aggregate data on municipal housing councils from the MUNIC survey in 2008, 
government representatives only report whether the council met or not during the year. The data 
do not specify how often the councils met or the number of meetings per year required by the 
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law or decree establishing the council. The case studies, however, provide evidence to suggest 
that the frequency of meetings is a function of the pressure civil society places on government 
officials and the incentives of officials to please their constituencies by engaging in participatory 
processes.  
In the case studies I again find that the party in power strongly influences the council’s 
agenda and the ultimate power of civil society to affect decision-making. For instance, in São 
Paulo the agenda and decision-making power shifted significantly from the Suplicy (PT) 
administration to the current Kassab (DEM) administration. Officials from the Suplicy 
administration report that most of the influence on housing policy and programs in São Paulo 
came directly from the housing movements, stating that “the movements have too much 
influence” (“os movimentos tem influencia demais”). Government officials were motivated to 
respond to the demands of social movements and housing associations in order to maintain their 
electoral bases of support. Under the Suplicy administration the housing council was heavily 
involved in allocating resources and creating regulations for mutirão projects, communally built 
housing projects strongly favored by many of the social movements on the council. Movements 
report that they felt they were making progress in influencing policy decisions. Today, however, 
both government officials and social movement leaders assert that the council has become more 
a space for deciding programmatic regulations and bureaucratic details than defining policy 
priorities. Issues for discussion in the council include such topics as: eligibility criteria for 
housing programs, FMH budget details, year-end accounting reports, what to do about loan 
defaults, contracts with construction companies, acquisition of buildings in the city center, 
maintenance of public housing complexes, and land titling for specific communities.  
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According to housing secretariat officials in the current Kassab administration, 
movements “think” they have a great deal of power. However, officials state that their first 
priority is to deal with those on the formal housing registry waiting list rather than attending to 
the needs of protestors or movement representatives knocking on their doors (personal 
interviews). Superintendent for Social Housing, Elsabete França, argues that the council should 
decide issues such as how to improve the urbanization of favelas, how to make the mutirão 
projects more efficient, how to create more integrated programs, or where to find more 
resources. In other words, the council should decide regulations and search for resources to 
address the priorities established by government officials within the secretariat. She says this 
distinction must be very clear because the movements have a tendency to want to make their 
members and issues the priority. Social movement and NGO leaders fighting for a stronger voice 
argue that this attitude is precisely the reason behind the failure of the council to further pro-poor 
policy in the city. While the government pays some lip service to the need for participatory 
decision-making, they withhold “real decisions” from the council’s control. According to 
Evaniza Rodrigues, leader in the UMM-SP, the government decides what projects fall under the 
council’s jurisdiction, and if they are interested in pursuing specific programs they take them 
outside of council control (personal interview). 
The housing council in Santo André is remarkable for its congeniality and agreement on 
the agenda and programmatic issues. In monthly council meetings, housing associations, most of 
which have members on the council, make requests for money for construction materials and 
technical assistance to complete projects. The council’s role is then to approve the allocation of 
resources from the municipal housing fund. In addition to funding, the council decides conflicts 
within favelas over land claims and priorities for regularization of land. The council is not 
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deciding broad policy priorities, but civil society seems satisfied with the status quo policy 
direction. In interviews, civil society leaders and government officials alike stated that the main 
challenges to addressing housing needs were the rising price of land and a lack of capacity within 
the government to implement large-scale projects with money available from the federal level.  
I attribute this lack of conflict and ease of deliberative decision-making to the long-
running administration by the PT in Santo André. One long-term PT-affiliated government 
official on the council stated: “We don’t really have conflicts with each other because everyone 
is comfortable and we all have the same objective.” (personal interview). The municipal housing 
council is able to effectively engage in deliberative decision-making because both civil society 
and government officials have incentives to cooperate: civil society to voice their requests for 
assistance and officials to please their constituents.  
Finally, in Salvador the party in power also influences the nature of deliberative decision-
making. In Salvador civil society is still engaged in a cycle of protest and negotiation to ensure 
the government complies with the council’s mandate. From its creation in 2007 until the end of 
2008, the council met a total of five times at irregular intervals. During my visit to Salvador in 
November 2008, social movements took to the streets with a list of demands for the housing 
secretary, one of which was to schedule the next meeting of the housing council. Though it was 
not clear that the protest was necessary to ensure the next meeting of the council would occur, 
the process of public protest followed by negotiation and action is still firmly entrenched in the 
repertoire of Salvador’s housing movements.  
When the council did meet, members reported that the discussions centered on the 
municipal government’s role as the link to federal government resources. Housing movements 
presented proposals for local projects benefitting their members, and the council voted on which 
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proposals to send forward to the federal government for selection. Of the 20 projects forwarded 
to the federal level, the Ministry of Cities approved only one project for R$1 million. In the end, 
federal officials rather than the municipal government, civil society, or the council, decided on 
which project should receive priority.  
The tradition of conservative party administration in Salvador largely creates the lack of 
incentives for both civil society and government officials to ensure deliberative decision-making. 
The dynamic between civil society and municipal government officials in Salvador remains 
mired in traditions of patron-client relationships and disdain for the “other” side. Salvador has a 
history of conservative politics, administered by a single family for most of the last few decades. 
Social movements, NGOs, and construction associations view the municipal government as an 
unwilling partner in providing resources, including land and money, to complement federal 
government programs. They view the council as a future mechanism to hold the government 
accountable for resource contributions, but know that it will be a long process of maintaining 
pressure to ensure compliance with the council’s participatory mandate. In the meantime 
movements compete for scarce municipal resource contributions, while looking to the state and 
federal levels for primary funding of construction and urbanization projects. For their part, 
current municipal government officials appear completely uninterested in the participatory 
process of the council. The housing secretary had not attended a single meeting, and housing 
officials I spoke with either did not know about the council’s meetings or were reluctant to 
discuss details.  
While the council aims to reduce clientelism and serve as a space for deliberative policy-
making, the government does not appear to have the will to carry out the council’s mandate. The 
council increases the ability of diverse voices to reach the government agenda, but it is not clear 
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that the minimal incorporation of CSOs into the council will significantly change the policy-
making process in the near-term.       
 How does the private sector, then, influence deliberative decision-making in each of these 
cases? Of the case studies, only in São Paulo does the private sector exert a considerable 
influence on the agenda and voting outcomes of the housing council. The strongest private sector 
member is SECOVI, an association of real estate interests, which began in São Paulo but now 
operates chapters across the country. Representatives from SECOVI say they participate in the 
council because they have a stake in improving the city overall; however, they are candid in 
acknowledging their main objective must always be profit. According to one SECOVI 
representative, they are primarily concerned with 1) the federal government losing money from 
social housing programs because of borrower defaults, and 2) the impact of public investments 
on the price of real estate. These concerns translate into agenda setting for the council. For 
example, a SECOVI representative stated that “the goal of the private sector is to produce new 
housing and we do not have a direct interest in urbanizing the favelas” (personal interview). 
They are therefore more likely to push for construction programs over urbanization programs. 
Whether they get their way in agenda setting depends largely on who is in charge. As stated 
above, under non-PT governments in São Paulo, housing secretariat officials tend to be 
appointed from the private sector. SECOVI acknowledges that they have a much better 
relationship with the current secretary of housing who used to work with the association, than 
they ever had with officials under the Suplicy government. This close relationship allows them 
better access to government officials outside of the council, but also provides them with allies 
from the government on the council when the agenda is set and votes are held on specific issues. 
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SECOVI also works closely with SINDUSCON, an association of construction companies, to 
discuss issues before meetings and present a united front in the council.  
In the other two cases, where the private sector does not play a strong role on the council 
itself, business interests do still play a role in what the municipality is able to accomplish in 
terms of social housing policy. In Santo André, housing council members report that they are 
severely limited in developing new programs by the rising value of real estate in the city. Both 
civil society members and government officials on the council seem to accept the rise in prices as 
a legitimate reason why the government cannot do more to reduce the housing deficit. Though 
civil society reports they would like to see more zoning for social housing (ZEIS), they have not 
formed a protest movement to demand reform. Given the lack of private sector participation in 
the council, they do not have a natural enemy with whom to contest zoning rules and they are 
unlikely to directly challenge the allied-PT government’s current policies. The lack of private 
sector involvement, therefore, limits conflict and encourages cooperation.  
In Salvador, social movements strongly distrust the private sector, particularly since the 
government removed many poor residents in order for business interests to capitalize on the 
renovation of the historic city center in the 1990s. This distrust carries over to the current 
secretary of housing who was appointed from the private sector. Even without significant private 
sector participation in the council, civil society’s animosity towards business interests does affect 
the ways in which they approach government officials they associate with the private sector. 
Civil society’s expectations for cooperation remain low, which may in turn spur continued direct 
protest rather than negotiation in the council to make their voices heard. 
The relative strength of the private sector determines shifts in power relations, shapes the 
council’s agenda, and influences outcomes. In São Paulo the participation of a strong private 
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sector causes derisiveness in the council that does not affect the other two councils. Still, in the 
other two cases the traditional lack of involvement in Santo André and the animosity between 
sectors in Salvador influences cooperation or conflict even without the private sector’s direct 
participation in the councils. 
Finally, how do the strategies of CSOs affect deliberative decision-making? In São Paulo, 
movements have learned to work in coordinated networks to promote their collective interests. 
Before each meeting of the full council and meetings of the council’s executive commission, 
social movement leaders hold a private meeting to review the coming agenda and supporting 
documents provided by the housing secretariat. In these meetings, members reach consensus on 
their response to each agenda item in order to present a united front when the full council or 
executive commission meets. For instance, before the full council was to address the issue of 
payment defaults in public housing units, social movements decided they would press the 
government to understand why people are not paying and urge them to conduct a more detailed 
study of the problem. Movement leaders say these pre-meetings also offer an opportunity to 
discuss and debate the complex bureaucratic issues presented to the council, which they would 
not be able to respond to on the spot. The strategy to voice demands as a united front in council 
meetings, however, means that their opinions are added to the record, but they do not necessarily 
change the final outcomes when votes are cast. Private sector interests, government officials and 
unallied members may still have the votes to overrule other voting blocks. In Santo André the 
lack of conflict between groups leads to faster decision-making, though certainly less debate over 
the nuances of decisions. The tradition in Salvador of bargaining for benefits for members of 
individual movements following occupations leads to negotiations for these specific groups 
within the council rather than broader policy discussion and debate.  
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Conclusions from Case Studies 
In the case studies both the institutional rules and civil society-state dynamics strongly 
influence the activities of the municipal housing councils. None of the three cases exhibits the 
ideal model of participatory governance, if such a thing exists, but the variables presented here 
increase our understanding of the institutional rules and factors shaping civil society-state 
dynamics, resulting in an “imperfect” policy process in municipal housing councils.  
My analysis of the case studies closely aligns with my expectations of how the 
institutional rules and civil society dynamics shape the effectiveness of municipal housing 
councils. In terms of transparency, however, I do not find that the rules for council 
responsibilities match the activities of the councils in practice. This leads me to conclude that 
civil society-state dynamics must be more important for transparency than legal responsibilities. 
For a level playing field, the party in power largely determines the relationships among actors 
and the access and voice of civil society. In particular, the inclusion of private sector members 
aligned with more conservative governments may reduce the access and voice of CSOs, thereby 
limiting the ability of municipal housing councils to include previously marginalized groups in 
policy making. Finally, the councils vary significantly in their agendas and mechanisms for 
deliberative decision-making. In the end, however, the party in power strongly influences the 
agenda and the relative strength of civil society in negotiating their demands.   
Distribution of Public Goods: Outcomes of Municipal Housing Councils  
Based on the case studies, I seek to test the influence on outcomes of two primary 
variables: the party in power and the rules governing housing council responsibilities. The case 
studies indicate the centrality of the party in power to transparency, a level playing field, and 
deliberative decision-making. All of these factors from the policy process should coalesce to 
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shape the role of the housing council in encouraging adoption of social housing programs, in line 
with the demands of CSOs. Contrary to expectations, the rules for council responsibilities did not 
seem to largely impact the policy process, particularly in terms of transparency. Scholars argue, 
however, that increasing transparency is a primary function of participatory governance 
institutions and is central to generating accountability of government officials. Here I aim to test 
whether across cases the rules for council responsibilities are linked to greater accountability of 
the government as measured by adoption of social housing programs to benefit the poor.    
Using the dataset developed in Chapter 3, I run a series of probit regression models. My 
first hypothesis is that where the PT is in power, municipal councils for housing should be 
associated with the adoption of a greater number of municipal housing programs. In addition, the 
housing councils should be more highly correlated with municipally-funded housing programs, 
demonstrating a higher level of commitment to housing from the municipal administration. My 
second hypothesis is that where councils are given the power for governmental oversight, greater 
transparency and hence accountability should lead to a greater number of social housing 
programs. In the end, I aim to provide greater evidence to suggest when participatory governance 
institutions in the form of municipal housing councils do provide a more equitable distribution of 
public goods.   
Statistical Models 
Dependent Variables: I test the model against three groups of dependent variables: 1) an index of 
housing programs, which sums the total number of housing programs by type adopted in the 
municipality; 2) individual categories of housing programs; and 3) individual categories of 
municipally-funded housing programs.  
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Key Independent Variables: To test the relationship between the party in power, municipal 
housing councils and housing programs, I add an interaction term. On its own, the party in power 
may influence the adoption of social housing programs. Previous research suggests that left-
leaning governments, including the PT in Brazil, are associated with an increase in social 
programs (Baiocchi 2003; Abers 2000). By adding an interaction term for the party in power and 
the existence of a municipal housing council, I seek to measure whether the association between 
housing councils and programs changes when the mayor is from the PT. In addition, I include 
dummy variables for whether the councils have consultative, deliberative, normative and 
oversight responsibilities. Note that councils may have more than one type of responsibility.  
Additional Factors Influencing Housing Program Adoption:  
To the model I also add two categories of control variables, informed by case study 
analysis regarding the process in participatory governance institutions.  
Make-up of the legislature: I include a measure of the percentage of seats in the municipal 
legislature held by members of the PT. Since the number of seats in municipal legislatures 
(camaras municipais), akin to city councils in the United States, varies by the size of the 
municipality I use the percentage of seats occupied by PT members rather than simply the 
number of PT members. Theoretically, if the majority in the legislature is from the same party, 
there should be less legislative gridlock, including for policy and resource allocation decisions 
forwarded by the housing councils. Case studies suggest that legislation to create municipal 
housing councils may be easier to pass under PT administrations. Controlling for the make-up of 
the municipal legislature should further identify the role the party of the legislature plays in 
determining housing policy outcomes. 
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Regional variation: I include regional dummy variables in this analysis to control for possible 
effects of political tradition. The Northeast of Brazil is known for more conservative 
administration and a legacy of clientelism stemming from the sugar plantation economy and 
slavery (Dantas 2006). The development of civil society in the Northeast is thought to have been 
stifled in comparison to the South and Southeast where politics are traditionally more liberal, 
though business-oriented, in the major cities.23 I expect that as compared to the Southeast region, 
municipalities in the North and Northeast are particularly less likely to adopt social housing 
programs because of the lack of civil society influence and strength of conservative political 
traditions. The Southeast region is left out of the statistical models to provide comparison with 
the other four regions.  
Results: Party in Power 
Individual Programs: Here I test whether the presence of a PT mayor changes the relationship 
between municipal housing councils and adoption of social programs. Table 4.4 below first 
shows that where there is no PT mayor, the housing council is significantly related to the 
adoption of all types of programs. Where there is a PT mayor, the relationship is unchanged. The 
existence of the municipal housing council institution appears to have a greater effect on housing 
program adoption than the party in power.  
Table 4.4: The Relationship between the PT, Municipal Housing Councils and Individual 
Housing Programs 
VARIAB
LES 
Const. 
of Units 
Acquire 
Units 
Improve 
Units 
Offer 
Material
s 
Offer 
Plots of 
Land 
Regular-
ization 
Urban-
ization 
Housing 
Council 
Exists 0.26*** 0.18** 0.27*** 0.16** 0.17** 0.25*** 0.18** 

23 Avritzer (2007) acknowledges regional differences while arguing that participation is not homogenous within 
regions. For example, the city of Recife, Brazil in the Northeast is also known for civil society engagement.  
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 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Housing 
Council x 
PT Mayor 0.26 -0.23 0.20 -0.18 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20) 
PT Mayor -0.08 0.13 0.04 0.23* -0.08 0.26** -0.01 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) 
Fund for 
Housing 0.25*** 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.19*** 0.14** 0.15** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Population 
2005 (log) 0.19*** 0.12*** 0.06* 0.08** 0.10*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Percentage 
Population 
Urban 2000 
(log) 0.14** 0.04 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.03 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
Municipal 
Budget per 
capita 2005 
(log) 0.49*** 0.18** 0.19** 0.37*** 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.45*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Gini 2000 1.26*** 0.24 1.99*** 1.28*** 0.01 -0.03 0.99* 
 (0.42) (0.49) (0.41) (0.42) (0.45) (0.48) (0.53) 
Income per 
capita 2000 
(log) 0.07 0.11 -0.11 -0.17** 0.04 0.17* 0.05 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
Non-profits 
and 
Foundations 
per capita 
2005 -0.04 -0.02 0.13*** -0.07** 0.03 -0.09** -0.11** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Favelas Exist -0.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.00 0.30*** 0.38*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Percentage of 
Vereadores 
from the PT 0.12 0.33 -0.13 -0.22 0.11 0.17 0.50 
 (0.25) (0.28) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.28) (0.32) 
Northeast 0.37** 0.19 0.03 0.27 0.56*** -0.05 1.05*** 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) 
North  0.67* 0.78** 0.30 0.28 0.74* 1.06*** 1.05** 
 (0.38) (0.40) (0.37) (0.36) (0.44) (0.40) (0.46) 
Center West  0.19 -0.12 -0.01 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.60*** 0.67*** 
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 (0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) 
South  0.63*** 0.26** 0.08 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.11 0.30** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
Constant -6.39*** -4.39*** -2.01*** -4.40*** -4.12*** -8.29*** -10.35*** 
 (0.83) (0.87) (0.76) (0.78) (0.82) (0.88) (0.98) 
Observations 4093 4093 4083 4080 4093 4093 4083 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
State Dummies also included in model.    
 
Program Index: Again, contrary to my hypothesis from the case studies, across contexts the 
results do not provide evidence that the presence of a PT mayor in combination with a housing 
council increases the likelihood of municipalities adopting multiple social housing programs. 
Table 4.5 displays the results from a negative binomial regression including an interaction term 
for the presence of a PT mayor and housing council.24  
Table 4.5: The Relationship Between the PT in Power, Municipal Housing 
Councils and a Program Index (2008) 
VARIABLES Program Index 
  
Housing Council Exists 0.19*** 
 (0.03) 
Housing Council x PT Mayor -0.02 
 (0.08) 
PT Mayor 0.06 
 (0.06) 
Fund for Housing 0.13*** 
 (0.03) 
Population 2005 (log) 0.15*** 
 (0.02) 
Percentage Population Urban 2000 (log) 0.14*** 
 (0.03) 
Municipal Budget per capita 2005 (log) 0.28*** 
 (0.04) 
Gini 2000 0.83*** 
 (0.22) 

24 A negative binomial model is appropriate for this analysis because the proportional odds between categories 
cannot be assumed to be equal and the data is extra-dispersed. The negative binomial model predicts expected 
counts rather than probabilities.  
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Income per capita 2000 (log) -0.02 
 (0.04) 
Non-profits and Foundations per capita 
2005 -0.01 
 (0.02) 
Favelas Exist 0.06** 
 (0.03) 
Percentage of Vereadores from the PT 0.06 
 (0.13) 
Northeast 0.45*** 
 (0.10) 
North  0.49** 
 (0.21) 
Center West  0.27*** 
 (0.09) 
South  0.40*** 
 (0.06) 
Constant -3.31*** 
 (0.38) 
Observations 4093 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
State Dummies also included in model. 
 
The positive and significant coefficient for the housing council variable indicates that the 
housing council is positively associated with the adoption of multiple housing programs where 
there is not a PT mayor in municipalities across Brazil. The interaction term then shows that the 
effect is not significantly changed by the presence of a PT mayor: housing councils do influence 
program adoption, but the presence of a PT administration does not enhance the effect.  
Municipally-Funded Programs: The 2008 MUNIC survey also asks questions about the source 
of funding for housing programs. Particularly since President Lula assumed office in 2003 and 
the National System for Housing in the Social Interest was created in 2005, many municipalities 
have applied for and received federal funding for all types of programs. As the case study in 
Salvador showed directly, members often use housing councils as mechanisms to access federal 
funding. However, convincing municipal government officials to allocate municipal funds for 
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housing programs may indicate a further commitment by the municipal government to meeting 
civil society demands. The dependent variables in the models below are coded 0 or 1 based on 
whether the municipality has a program supported by the municipal government. The presence of 
a PT administration, which may be friendlier to CSOs, combined with a municipal council for 
housing should lead to increasing commitment of municipal resources to housing. 
Again, contrary to expectations, the results shown in Table 4.6 indicate that the housing 
council has no effect on municipally-funded programs regardless of whether or not a PT mayor 
is in charge. This is true controlling for the percentage of PT members on the city council and 
controlling for region. Interestingly, the results do indicate a negative correlation between several 
municipally-funded programs and the Northeast vs. the Southeast. Even controlling for the size 
of the municipal budget, region still appears to play a role in the commitment of the municipality 
to social housing policy.  
Table 4.6: The Relationship between Housing Councils, the PT, and Municipally-
Funded Housing Programs  
 
VARIABLE
S  
 Const. 
of Units 
by Muni  
 Acquire 
Units by 
Muni  
 
Improve 
Units by 
Muni  
 Offer 
Material
s by 
Muni  
 Offer 
Plots of 
Land by 
Muni  
 Regular. 
by Muni  
 Urban. 
by 
Muni  
PT Mayor -0.15 -0.61 0.15 -0.17 -0.39 -0.43* 0.04 
 -0.2 -0.42 -0.18 -0.25 -0.33 -0.25 -0.33 
Housing 
Council 0.07 -0.09 0 -0.08 -0.1 0.07 0.16 
 -0.09 -0.16 -0.09 -0.13 -0.17 -0.13 -0.16 
Council x 
PT Mayor 0.34 0.44 -0.18 0.11 0.14 0.03 -0.17 
 -0.23 -0.5 -0.23 -0.3 -0.39 -0.29 -0.38 
Housing 
Fund -0.12 -0.02 -0.04 -0.17 -0.01 -0.07 -0.13 
 -0.08 -0.16 -0.09 -0.12 -0.16 -0.13 -0.16 
Population 
2005 (log) 0.13*** 0.18** -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.13** 0.01 
 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
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Percent 
Urban Pop. 
2000 (log) 0.07 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.31** 0.18 
 -0.09 -0.18 -0.09 -0.14 -0.18 -0.15 -0.18 
Muni Budget 
per cap 2005 
(log) 0.55*** 0.43** 0.29*** 0.30* 0.11 0.53*** 0.42** 
 -0.10 -0.20 -0.12 -0.16 -0.20 -0.16 -0.17 
Gini 2000 1.72*** 0.19 0.35 0.83 2.65** 1.73* 0.27 
 -0.59 -1.16 -0.61 -0.92 -1.26 -1.00 -1.10 
Income per 
cap 2000 
(log) -0.13 -0.27 0.03 -0.27 -0.32 -0.24 -0.10 
 -0.12 -0.26 -0.13 -0.20 -0.26 -0.21 -0.22 
Non-profits 
& Founds per 
cap (log) -0.08 0.08 -0.20*** 0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.05 
 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 
Favelas Exist 0.14** -0.12 -0.02 -0.10 -0.14 0.06 -0.05 
 -0.07 -0.13 -0.07 -0.11 -0.14 -0.11 -0.13 
Percentage of 
PT 
Vereadores -0.85** -0.03 -0.17 -1.23** -0.54 -0.30 -1.11 
 -0.35 -0.69 -0.35 -0.50 -0.67 -0.55 -0.70 
Northeast -1.02** 0.13 -0.71** 0.55 -0.38 -0.21 -1.0** 
 -0.48 -0.51 -0.33 -0.41 -0.46 -0.47 -0.50 
North 0.45 2.24*** -0.43 -1.21* 0.18 -0.21 0.25 
 -0.75 -0.64 -0.69 -0.72 -0.54 -0.81 -0.69 
Center West 0.15 0.46 0.12 1.24*** 0.24 0.16 0.18 
 -0.23 -0.41 -0.29 -0.47 -0.41 -0.27 -0.43 
South 0.23 -0.03 0.60*** 0.36 0.91*** 0.76*** -0.55* 
 -0.14 -0.30 -0.18 -0.25 -0.34 -0.24 -0.29 
Constant -6.45*** -3.69* -2.97*** 0.28 0.42 -4.41*** -1.90 
 -1.04 -2.02 -1.15 -1.72 -2.18 -1.55 -1.74 
Observations 2511 640 1883 1457 867 855 578 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
State Dummies also included in model.   
Results: Council Responsibilities 
Though the case studies did not illustrate the importance of responsibilities afforded by 
law, theoretically they should in part influence the policy process and the resulting policy 
outcomes. The ability to approve accounting documents in oversight councils should increase the 
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likelihood that civil society will influence the process and create pressure to prioritize social 
housing. In order to test these claims I added dummy variables for each of the four 
responsibilities: consultative, deliberative, normative and oversight. Including the responsibilities 
in the same models as above necessarily reduces the sample to only municipalities where 
housing councils exist (i.e. an official first answers affirmatively on the survey that the 
municipality has a housing council before answering questions about the responsibilities of the 
council).  
The results indicate that across contexts councils with oversight responsibilities are 
positively related to the program index and four of the 7 types of programs (see Appendix A for 
complete results). None of the other responsibilities demonstrate a positive relationship with the 
program index, nor is there any clear relationship to individual programs. In addition, there is no 
clear pattern for the effect of any of the responsibilities on municipally-funded programs (see 
Appendix B for complete results). Leaving aside the mode for funding, councils reporting 
oversight responsibilities do appear to have the greatest impact on program outcomes compared 
to councils without the power to oversee accounting decisions.  
Findings 
Though the case studies provide strong evidence to suggest that the party in power 
influences the civil society-state dynamics in the policy process within municipal housing 
councils, quantitative results do not confirm the importance of the PT in power for program 
outcomes in the larger universe of cases. The institution of municipal housing councils, 
providing some level of transparency, inclusion of civil society, and deliberative decision-
making, appears to function across contexts to produce pro-poor outcomes, regardless of the 
party in power. Looking further into whether institutional rules are associated with redistribution 
 127
of public goods, the ability to oversee government finances seems to make the largest difference 
in program implementation. In the aggregate, institutional rules do make a considerable 
difference for program outcomes. Still, questions remain regarding the influence on municipal 
budget allocation for social housing programs and the effect municipal housing councils may 
have in shifting prioritization of municipal funding.  
The PT’s insignificant association with housing outcomes across contexts leads me to 
return to the case studies for answers. Though speculative, first I question whether the ideology 
and the commitment of the PT to participatory governance may in fact vary across the country. 
Though the PT is considered to be one of the most ideologically coherent parties in Brazil, in 
general party platforms in Brazil are weak and party switching among politicians is common. 
Across the country, from urban to rural areas the PT may not operate in the same manner. Even 
in São Paulo where the Suplicy (PT) government relied on the support of housing and urban 
reform movements, the relationship with civil society within the housing council was far more 
contentious than in the smaller city of Santo André. In addition, looking to PT-administered 
housing councils in São Paulo and Santo André in comparison to the council under a PT housing 
secretary in Salvador, I recognize the constraints in Salvador that may limit the effect of the 
party in power. Most significantly, Salvador suffers from severe resource constraints.  
This leads me to speculate that municipal resource constraints may limit government 
responsiveness regardless of party affiliation. Across statistical models, the municipal budget per 
capita is consistently positively associated with the adoption of housing programs. This suggests 
that the decisions of municipal administrators and housing councils are strongly conditioned by 
municipal budgets, regardless of which party is in power. As a result, municipal officials may 
choose to implement less costly programs or housing councils are used more to access federal 
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funds than to reprioritize municipal allocation of resources. Where there are strong alliances 
between a PT administration and civil society, the housing council may still have some effect in 
reprioritizing social housing needs. However, to save money housing secretaries may enact 
programs that don’t require large financial investments, such as regularization or providing plots 
of land, or they may view the role of the council as a link to the federal system rather than as 
administrator of municipal funds. Either way, the ideology of the party in power is unlikely to 
change the reality of local revenue scarcity at least in the short term.    
In Salvador, where the municipal budget per capita remains well below the other two 
cities, the only program the municipal government supports is regularization of land titles for 
people living on city-owned land. The previous secretary for housing explained to me that the 
municipal government invests in regularization of land titles because it is cheap. The cost for 
regularization is about R$200 per family, while building a new house costs R$25,000 and 
urbanization costs between R$5,000 – R$17,000 per household. According to an official in the 
municipal secretariat for housing, the only real projects underway in Salvador in 2008 were two 
self-build projects directed by housing associations, financed by the federal government. The 
municipality contributed only the land and construction of a community meeting area for one of 
the projects. In the coming year, officials state that any new projects would also have to be 
approved and financed by the federal government due to lack of municipal resources. Members 
of the housing council have not succeeded in pressing the municipal government to increase its 
contributions to housing programs through the municipal housing fund. According to the former 
Secretary for Housing, there are no municipal funds in the Fund: “They have a Fund without 
funds” (personal interview). In practice this means that the Municipal Council for Housing in 
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Salvador is completely unable to make any budget allocation decisions. Instead, the housing 
council is used as a pass through for federal funding proposals.  
In addition, the statistical models may suffer from omitted variable bias. Several of the 
contextual variables, which I find to matter in the qualitative analysis, cannot be measured 
directly in the statistical analysis. For instance, the capacity of civil society may matter across 
cases for generating accountability and responsiveness. Though I hypothesized that transparency, 
and hence accountability, resulting from municipal housing councils would be stronger under PT 
administrations where CSOs maintain strong alliances with government officials, the capacity of 
civil society may in fact be a stronger factor than alliances in ensuring transparency. A 
coordinated network of CSOs serving on a council may make requests for information, process 
complex accounting documents, and formulate coordinated responses within the confines of the 
councils and to their membership bases, which is not possible for civil society in other 
municipalities. The contrast in civil society capacity and outcomes in SƗo Paulo vs. Salvador 
does in fact provide evidence for this claim. Civil society in Salvador currently uses the council 
to formulate proposals to the federal level rather than demand review of municipal government 
finances and reprioritization of funds. In São Paulo the transparency afforded by the council as a 
result of the continued demand for information by CSOs may contribute to the government’s 
responsiveness to housing needs as a major priority in the city, regardless of the party in power. 
While the statistical model contains a measure for the depth of civil society, it may not capture 
the capacity of CSOs across municipalities.  
Finally, the importance of oversight responsibilities for program adoption may indicate 
the primacy of transparency for the effectiveness of participatory governance institutions in 
shifting the distribution of public goods. Though in the case studies I did not find a strong 
 130
connection between legal responsibilities afforded to the councils and duties in practice, across 
contexts the rules do appear to matter. Not all councils are created the same, nor do they produce 
the same outcomes. As municipalities increasingly adopt into law housing councils in order to 
comply with the new federal requirement to access funds, administrators and CSOs monitoring 
the process should be aware that the responsibilities afforded by law matter. Though in the case 
studies the responsibilities written in law did not correspond directly to activities in practice, in 
the aggregate the types of responsibilities granted to councils matter.   
Conclusions 
This paper yielded several conclusions regarding policy-making and outcomes of 
participatory governance institutions. First, I find evidence across the case studies that to some 
extent expectations regarding institutional rules and civil society-state dynamics do play out in 
practice for the policy-making process. Transparency, a level playing field, and deliberative 
decision-making in municipal housing councils are dependent on the rules that shape council 
responsibilities, membership, and meeting frequency. To a greater extent, however, I find that 
the policy process is shaped by civil society-state dynamics: though rules may exist on paper, 
civil society, government, and private sector actors determine the implementation of those rules. 
In the case studies, it is the party in power that appears to largely dictate the relationships among 
actors, and in turn creates transparency, participation, and the ultimate extent of deliberation 
within municipal housing councils. 
Using statistical analysis, I then sought to assess the variables that determine when 
participatory governance institutions lead to greater distribution of public goods. I find that the 
party in power is not significantly associated with greater housing program adoption where 
municipal housing councils exist. This is a surprising result, but in looking back to the case 
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studies I argue that the PT may vary in commitment to participatory governance across the 
country and municipal budgets may constrain the efforts of PT mayors and housing secretariats 
across the country. Therefore, though the party in power may matter in some cases, in the 
aggregate the party is a weak predictor of the effect of participatory governance institutions on 
program outcomes. 
Instead, I find that transparency created by institutional rules matters across contexts. 
Councils with specific oversight powers appear to have the greatest effect on the adoption of 
social housing programs across municipalities. These results suggest that institutional rules 
governing municipal housing councils may be more important than the political party in charge 
for determining outcomes. Access to budgetary numbers is critical for ensuring accountability. 
As more and more municipal housing councils are created in response to the federal mandate, it 
is critical, then, to assess whether these new institutions are created with enough responsibility to 
alter policy outcomes.   
Participatory governance institutions are not the magic bullet for incorporating diverse 
voices, promoting transparency, ensuring policy deliberation, and shifting resource distribution 
towards the poor, but neither are they ineffective institutions for creating social policy change, as 
skeptics would argue. The dynamic between civil society and the state does change when the two 
sides agree to meet at one table. While the policy process may never be ideal, across political 
contexts taking one’s seat at the table may be one small step towards policy change.  
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5. The Creation Effect: Evaluating Commitment in Participatory Governance Institutions 
 
“The council was created because it is necessary to define public policy. It doesn’t work for us to 
determine policies without the principal people involved. Public officials cannot think that they 
know everything about the necessities of the city. No, a government needs partners. A democratic 
government facilitates participation and transparency in its administration.” – Former Housing 
Secretariat Official from the Suplicy (PT) administration in São Paulo.  
 
This chapter continues the search to determine when and how participatory governance 
institutions make a difference in pro-poor policy adoption. Previous analysis suggests that 
municipal housing councils are strongly related to the adoption of housing programs, though 
neither the density of civil society nor the presence of a PT government enhances the effect of 
the councils. Through case study analysis and a look into the survey data, however, it is clear that 
not all councils function the same. In the previous chapter the case studies revealed important 
variation in council formation, responsibilities assigned to councils, and their interaction with 
civil society, private sector actors, and the state. Statistical analysis then confirmed that the 
responsibilities allocated to councils are significantly related to housing program adoption. This 
chapter examines another important dimension of variation: how the participatory councils were 
created. Whether the impetus for creation comes from civil society and/or local government 
officials (bottom-up) or in response to the federal mandate (top-down) could hold important 
implications for how municipal housing councils function, and ultimately in the resulting policy 
outcomes. Who initiates the creation of participatory governance institutions should matter for 
how seriously they are taken by government and civil society as mechanisms for deliberation. 
Consequently, the top-down/bottom-up distinction should also hold implications for policy 
outcomes.  
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The question for this chapter is motivated by previous research, which finds that the 
commitment of mayors is critical for ensuring the effectiveness of decentralization reforms, 
including participatory governance institutions (see for example, Abers 2003; Andersson et al. 
2009; Wampler 2008). Not only mayors, but also other relevant government officials must be 
willing to share control over decision-making regarding policy direction and resource 
distribution in order for participatory institutions to matter. Without a commitment to the 
participatory process, institutions may exist on paper, but have little say over policy-making. In 
addition, I argue that civil society must also be committed to the process in order for the 
mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness to work. In many contexts CSOs lobby for the 
creation of participatory institutions and their involvement is viewed as a foregone conclusion. 
However, where local participatory institutions are mandated from the federal level, local CSOs 
may not exhibit the same enthusiasm for the process. Instead they may continue to seek benefits 
for their members directly from government officials. Without the commitment of CSOs to 
engage in an open forum for debate, government officials lack incentives to prioritize civil 
society demands and to invest further in the participatory process. This chapter seeks to provide 
evidence as to how the commitment of local government officials and civil society actors varies 
depending on the creation of participatory governance institutions. In turn, I present evidence to 
suggest that variation in commitment alters the resulting impact of municipal housing councils.  
The Brazilian housing system offers an opportunity to assess how the motivation for 
creation of participatory governance institutions changes both the policy process and resulting 
outcomes. As stated previously, the Brazilian National System for Housing in the Social Interest 
(SNHIS), created in 2005, mandated that all municipalities must have a municipal council for 
housing by the end of 2009 in order to receive federal funds. To comply with the law in time, 
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many municipalities began creating municipal housing councils in 2005, accounting for much of 
the increase in councils across Brazil between 2005 and 2008. Before 2005, however, hundreds 
of housing councils already existed across Brazil: generally at the demand of CSOs or by 
ideologically motivated government officials. This provides a comparison by which to measure 
whether councils created before 2005 (bottom-up) function differently than those created after 
2005 (top-down). 
With the new system coming into place, answers to questions regarding the impact of 
creation are timely for ensuring useful participatory governance institutions in Brazil. Moreover, 
whether effective participatory governance institutions can be mandated from the federal level is 
particularly relevant to numerous other developing countries adopting similar systems to 
Brazil’s. In the end, whether participatory governance institutions legislated from above lead to 
the promotion of pro-poor outcomes has implications for Brazil and other developing countries. 
More broadly, this chapter provides evidence as to whether effective local participation can be 
legislated from above. 
This chapter asks three specific questions: 1) Do municipal governments demonstrate a 
greater commitment to the participatory process in terms of delegating power and resources 
where councils are created from the bottom-up? 2) Do CSOs in these municipalities display a 
commitment to the participatory process and a willingness to demand accountability of the 
government through the councils? 3) Are pro-poor policy outcomes more likely where councils 
are created in response to bottom-up vs. top-down pressures? For municipal officials, the concept 
of “commitment” can be defined by the official’s willingness to cede control over programs and 
resources to civil society. Commitment of local officials is then measured by perception of the 
council’s role as well as by whether the council is given deliberative powers and resources to 
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allocate. For civil society, commitment is defined by the enthusiasm of leaders to participate in 
the housing council process rather than continuing with status quo tactics. In addition, CSO 
commitment involves the drive to ensure that the local government implements the participatory 
process and housing programs as promised.    
I expect that municipal housing councils created between 2005 and 2008 are more likely 
a response to the federal mandate rather than local initiative, and therefore will not generate the 
type of participatory environment as councils created previously. To provide evidence for this 
claim, I compare the cities of São Paulo and Santo André, where councils were created by PT 
governments at the demand of CSOs, to the cases of Curitiba and Recife, where councils have 
only recently been created in response to the federal mandate. I also include the case of Salvador, 
where a PT-affiliated municipal housing secretary created a municipal council for housing in part 
because of ideology and in part as a reaction to the forthcoming requirement to access federal 
funding. I suspect that municipalities with councils created from the top-down will be less likely 
than municipalities with councils created from the bottom-up to adopt each type of housing 
program. In Salvador, Curitiba, and Recife, I expect less commitment from both civil society and 
government officials to participatory governance, resulting in fewer housing programs. For each 
case I assess differences in the commitment of local officials and civil society leaders before 
turning to statistical analysis of municipalities across Brazil. In the end I conclude that the 
commitment of actors varies along with the impetus for creation of municipal housing councils. 
In turn, commitment alters the probability that municipal housing councils make a difference in 
policy outcomes.  
Theory Regarding Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Initiation of Participatory Governance 
Institutions 
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 Literature regarding the effect of creation on participatory governance institutions is 
largely based on previous findings related to decentralization. For example, Montero and 
Samuels (2004) argue that the outcomes of decentralization fundamentally depend on the 
political origins of the reforms. Participatory governance institutions are similar to other 
decentralization reforms in that the federal government transfers resources and responsibilities to 
the local level. However, participatory governance institutions require a second process of 
devolving local control to civil society.  
In his study of several types of participatory governance institutions across Brazil, 
Avritzer (2009) finds that both political will and civil society willingness to join participatory 
institutions are key for their effectiveness. He argues that, “successful participatory 
institutions…need to be the result of a specific interaction between the political will to initiate a 
participatory process and civil society actors who can join these institutions” (Avritzer 2009; p. 
17). Avritzer reviews the cases of participatory budgeting systems, health councils, and city 
master planning processes in several Brazilian cities and concludes that the institutional design 
must match the context. What then happens when municipal councils are imposed by federal 
mandate across contexts? Avritzer’s work implies that variation in effectiveness should be 
expected. Here I seek to understand more completely how the mechanism of commitment of 
local officials and civil society actors varies where councils are imposed top-down vs. created 
from the bottom-up, changing the outcomes of these participatory governance institutions.  
 From the beginning, other scholars find that the incentives of local leaders to participate 
in municipal councils are important for generating real responsibilities and decision-making 
powers for the councils (Kauneckis and Andersson 2009; Wampler 2008). Participatory 
governance institutions need buy-in from mayors to facilitate information sharing between the 
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government and CSOs (Morrison and Singer 2007). The incentives of political society cannot be 
separated from the reason behind creation of participatory institutions. Without strong demand 
from civil society for the creation of participatory governance institutions with significant 
responsibilities, mayors may not have a compelling reason to give up power in the first place 
(Andersson and Laerhoven 2007). When municipal councils for housing are legislated by the 
federal government as a prerequisite for receiving federal funds, the incentive for the mayor to 
comply is to receive funding to deal with pressing social problems. The mayor’s incentive is to 
save municipal resources by creating the institution required to receive federal resources, not to 
generate dialogue, transparency and responsiveness to the demands of civil society. Without 
mayoral buy-in to the merits of participatory democracy, but rather incentives to create an 
institution on paper without real responsibilities, I argue that municipal councils created in 
response to a federal mandate will not significantly alter the process or outcomes of policy 
making. Though municipalities with councils may have more programs funded by federal 
resources, programs will not represent the diverse demands of civil society, the municipal budget 
for housing will not increase, and much of the resources for housing will actually remain outside 
of council control.  
 Civil society commitment to participatory democracy is also critical for the effectiveness 
of participatory governance institutions. Though in Chapter 3 I found that the density of civil 
society was not associated with an increase in the probability of program adoption where 
municipal housing councils were present, in order for participatory institutions to function, by 
definition existing civil society must be committed to the process for it to be “participatory”. 
According to the literature, previous existing civil society-state relationships may, in part, 
determine policy making in participatory governance institutions. Traditionally, CSOs related to 
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housing work bilaterally with local government officials to secure benefits for their members, 
often in the form of new construction or land rights. Municipal councils may bring CSOs 
together to negotiate for broader benefits, but cooperation is not guaranteed. In their study of 
participatory budgeting councils in 10 different Brazilian municipalities, Baiocchi, Heller, and 
Silva (2008) find that the democratizing of civil society through the participatory budgeting 
process is predicated on pre-existing state-civil society relationships. They find that adding a 
participatory governance institution to the municipality does not automatically generate cohesion 
among CSOs willing to deliberate with the state on broader housing policy. Cornwall (2007) also 
finds that the political culture, including a tradition of clientelism, prevented democratic 
governance from functioning in the cases of health councils she studied. As such, municipal 
councils may replicate the bilateral CSO-government relationships that previously existed. 
Though I argue in previous chapters that these bilateral relationships will be mitigated if CSOs 
see the benefits of collaboration within housing councils, if CSOs are not in favor of the councils 
from the start, they may not see the value in changing existing relationships. Without CSO buy-
in to the process, civil society will not press the municipal government to actually hold meetings, 
present budgetary numbers for accountability, or bring contentious issues up for a vote. If CSOs 
do not see the value in committing their time to the process or if they do not have the capacity to 
engage in meaningful debate, the institutions become little more than rubber stamps for the 
government’s agenda.            
 While existing literature offers evidence to suggest that political and civil society at the 
time of creation matter for the effectiveness of participatory governance institutions, few are 
specific about the mechanisms by which creation influences the way in which the councils 
function and their eventual outcomes. Using municipal housing councils, I attempt to define the 
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variation in government and civil society commitment, which in turn leads to differences in the 
outcomes of top-down vs. bottom-up generated participatory governance institutions.  
Municipal Housing Councils By Reason for Creation 
According to data from the MUNIC survey, 747 Brazilian municipalities had existing 
housing councils in 2005. Between 2005 and 2008, local governments created an additional 962 
municipal housing councils. Compared to municipalities with housing councils before 2005, 
these municipalities were smaller in population size, had fewer revenues to spend on a per capita 
basis, were poorer, and had slightly fewer non-profits and foundations per capita. The context in 
which these municipal housing councils function, therefore, is different from the start.  
Table 5.1: Average characteristics of municipalities with housing councils  
  
Councils Created 
before 2005 
Councils Created 
after 2005 
No. of Observations 747 962 
Housing Fund Exists 79% 78% 
Population 2005 88,509 46,528 
Percent Urban Pop. 64% 65% 
Municipal Budget per capita 2005 743.48 716.61 
PT Mayor 2004-2008 11.80% 10.30% 
Gini 2000 0.55 0.56 
Income per capita 2000 R$231.88 R$191.36 
Non-profits and Foundations per capita 2005 0.0035 0.0027 
Favelas Exist 42% 43% 
 
Table 5.2 below demonstrates the variation along these variables in the case studies 
presented in this chapter. Though all five of the cases are large cities, there is significant 
variation in the municipal budget per capita, income per capita, and non-profits and foundations 
per capita.   
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In both São Paulo and Santo André, PT governments linked to housing CSOs initiated the 
creation of the housing councils in the early 2000s. In Salvador, a PT-affiliated Secretary of 
Housing pushed to establish the housing council in 2007. Civil society in Salvador supported the 
creation of the council and has worked collaboratively to ensure its implementation. Curitiba and 
Recife both established municipal housing councils in direct response to the federal mandate, 
though the councils were not yet functioning when I visited in Fall 2008. These two cities 
present interesting cases for study because they differ in their approach to participatory politics, 
by income level, and by the make-up of civil society. Though I introduced the cases of São 
Paulo, Santo André, and Salvador in the previous chapter, here I present background information 
to provide context for participatory politics in Curitiba and Recife.   
Curitiba 
Curitiba is known worldwide for its early and innovative approaches to urban planning, 
though within Brazil it is also well known for its conservative politics. In the 1960’s, the 
government research agency led by Jaime Lerner created Curitiba’s first Master Plan, which 
called for a large-scale bus system and plans for environmental sustainability. Jaime Lerner 
became mayor in the 1970s under the dictatorship and then won election for two terms in the 
1980s-1990s. He was also governor of the state of Parana. The current mayor of Curitiba, Beto 
Table 5.2: Characteristics of Case Study Municipalities 
 São Paulo Santo André Salvador Curitiba Recife 
Population 2005 10,927,985 669,592 2,673,560 1,757,904 1,501,008 
Municipal Budget per cap R$ 632 R$ 504 R$ 287 R$ 549 R$ 533 
Income per capita R$ 610 R$ 513 R$ 341 R$ 620 R$ 392 
Non-profits & Founds per cap 0.0019 0.0014 0.0010 0.0024 0.0015 
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Richa from the same center-right PSDB party of Jaime Lerner, handily won re-election in 
October 2008 with 77% of the votes. Curitiba has never had a mayor from the PT, and the city 
council has only ever had between 10% and 15% representation from the PT. These two factors 
– a long-standing technocratic orientation to urban planning and the continuous administration 
by conservative governments – created the situation today in which the municipal government 
reluctantly implements participatory institutions mandated by the federal government, but 
maintains firm control over policy decision making.  
Curitiba has a strong community of NGOs, but relatively weak social movements for 
housing. The development of NGOs rather than social movements is most likely a result of the 
long tradition of urban studies in the city combined with a highly educated population. The city 
has a Company for Housing (COHAB), which is a mixed private-public company tasked with 
implementing housing projects, but the city does not have a secretariat for housing. COHAB 
manages the municipal housing fund, though there was not a council for housing to accompany 
that fund until it was created in 2008. As of October 2008, no elections had been held or planned 
to elect members to the housing council.  
NGOs and movements were not lobbying for the implementation of the housing council, 
though if created they hoped it would be a space for real consultation, deliberation and 
transparency (personal interviews). In the Fall of 2008, however, CSOs in Curitiba were 
concentrating their efforts on the Council for the City, which met for the first time in June 2008. 
The focus on the Council for the City matches the city’s focus on urban issues as a whole rather 
than housing as a separate issue, but NGOs and movements also complained that they were 
afraid housing issues would be overlooked in the council, with transportation and the 
environment receiving the majority of attention.     
 142
Recife 
Recife is known as the city in the Northeast most oriented towards the left. A PT 
government has administered the city for much of the past two decades. The mayor from 2001-
2008, João Paulo Lime e Silva, was a president of the Central Worker’s Union (CUT) who 
participated in housing associations and social movement activities. According to a social 
movement leader in Recife, João Paulo had a definite sense of commitment to participatory 
governance. The mayor elected in 2008, João da Costa, participated in student movements before 
leading the participatory budgeting agency under João Paulo. The participatory budgeting 
process attracted about 80,000 participants in 2008, and addressed housing issues based on 
demand, according to officials from the Secretariat for Housing. Recife is also well known as the 
first city in Brazil to create “Special Zones for Social Interest” (Zonas Especiais de Interesse 
Social, ZEIS). In 1983, the city created these zones to provide land titles and infrastructure to 
favelas within the city. There is a participatory council to allocate funds for the ZEIS for projects 
such as those to improve sidewalks, sanitation, sea barriers, and housing units.   
 Despite this tradition of participation, the creation of the municipal council for housing 
has not been a smooth process. The law to create the housing council passed in 2007, but as of 
November 2008, neither elections for members nor a first meeting was set. Members of civil 
society say they are concerned with how the housing council will be integrated into the 
Municipal Council for the City, also part of the national system for urban planning under which 
housing is a component. This is an issue that civil society throughout the country is concerned 
with: how to integrate housing into the broader institutional structure and urban planning 
process. Leaders from social movements in Recife understand that the municipality has to have 
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the housing council in order to receive funds from the federal level, and the council has to 
manage those funds, but they want to make sure it is also a real space for policy deliberation. 
The four major national movements are a significant presence in Recife, with numerous 
associations representing local issues, including the needs of residents living in palafitas – 
dwellings built on stilts above waterways. According to Leonardo Avritzer, one of the reasons 
Recife may not have had a housing council before the mandate is that they had the ZEIS council, 
which acts in very much the same way (personal interview). Avritzer argues that Recife is 
actually an exceptionally participatory city, but at a very localized level. With the growth of 
more professional NGOs in the city, however, this may change. For example, FASE, a policy-
oriented NGO, which coordinates the National Forum for Urban Reform (FNRU), operates in 
Recife and works alongside the social movements to provide capacity building and advice in 
negotiating with government officials.    
Curitiba and Recife present contrasting cases for study: Curitiba operates under a very 
technocratic orientation while Recife has already demonstrated commitment to other 
participatory institutions. Assessing these two case studies as examples of municipalities creating 
housing councils in response to the federal mandate should provide some control for variation in 
the administrations’ ideological leanings across contexts.   
Municipal Government Commitment to Participatory Governance Institutions 
 
Do municipal governments where councils are created from the bottom-up demonstrate a 
greater commitment to the participatory process in terms of delegating power and resources? 
While difficult to measure, I argue that commitment of municipal officials can be gauged 
by perception of the council’s role, decision-making powers given to the council, and resources 
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provided for council allocation. When participatory governance institutions are imposed by 
national legislation, local governments may respond by creating institutions that fulfill the 
requirement, but do little to incorporate civil society into decision-making. In addition, municipal 
governments may see the creation of participatory councils as a means towards attaining federal 
resources to address housing needs, thereby alleviating the need for municipalities to direct their 
own funds towards the problems. Reviewing the case studies and survey data, I argue that where 
municipalities created housing councils in response to bottom-up pressures, government officials 
do display a higher level of commitment to the participatory process than where they were 
created in response to the federal mandate. This commitment is clear in their willingness to 
engage civil society through the councils and several indicators related to the power of the 
council.  
In each of the five case study cities I interviewed officials from the main housing agency 
and asked them to describe the role of the housing council.25 Their responses demonstrate 
varying levels of commitment to the participatory process: 
São Paulo: Housing secretariat officials stated that the council is a space for social movements 
and associations to bring their concerns for debate and decide whether programs should continue. 
Though as evidenced in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, the PT government from 
2001-2004 directly supported the creation of the housing council, the current DEM government 
has maintained the participatory process. The more conservative DEM government appears wary 
of allowing civil society to dictate a substantial portion of the agency’s resources, but they 

25 The position of those I interviewed in each city varied. In Recife I interviewed the Secretary for Housing and 
several of her advisors. In Salvador, I interviewed the previous Secretary for Housing and several current officials in 
the secretariat. In Curitiba, which does not have a housing secretariat, I interviewed several managers from COHAB 
responsible for program decisions and the housing council. In São Paulo I interviewed the superintendent for social 
housing, managers from COHAB, and several other housing secretariat officials involved with the housing council. 
Finally, in Santo André I interviewed municipal government members of the housing council.  
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respect the participatory process and hold regular meetings with social movement and civil 
society members in which votes on issues are taken and respected.  
Santo André: Government officials reported that the role of the council is to make sure the 
government follows up on promises made during annual conferences. In this way they view the 
council as a mechanism for accountability.  
Salvador: A former secretary for housing stated that civil society is responsible for “keeping the 
councils and the system going across administrations” (personal interview). According to the 
current administration in Salvador, the council can provide a space for civil society to 
communicate needs, but the government was not sure if any municipal money would be 
available for council control. The current government does not appear to take the participatory 
process seriously as a means for policy change. 
Curitiba: The housing council is viewed as a government-directed process for which civil society 
needs to be trained to participate. In an interview, the manager of the nascent housing council 
from COHAB told me that they created the council “to manage the housing fund in order to 
comply with the law”. To them the council’s role is not to formulate policy or regulate programs, 
but simply to provide input into the distribution of the municipal housing fund to meet the 
minimal federal requirement. 
Recife: The secretary for housing speculated that the make-up of programs and policies probably 
wouldn’t change as a result of the council, but that the interaction of council members and their 
involvement in projects would be beneficial to the implementation of existing programs. The 
municipal government agreed to carry out the process, but did not expect many changes as a 
result. 
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Dividing the cases by impetus for council creation, from these interviews I find that 
government officials in São Paulo, Santo André, and Salvador do foresee a stronger role for civil 
society in holding the government accountable for meeting resident’s needs than in Curitiba and 
Recife. In Curitiba, in particular, the municipal government did not appear to welcome the 
direction of policy making by civil society. In Recife, as well, though the government respected 
the input of civil society, officials did not foresee any shifts in policy making as a result of their 
participation.  
Though the words of government officials are important, government commitment to the 
participatory process may also come out in the institutional rules of the councils and resource 
contributions for council control. To establish whether there are any clear patterns in the 
institutional rules of the councils and prioritization of spending depending on creation, I assess 
municipal level data from the MUNIC survey, separating municipalities with councils 
established prior to 2005 from those with councils created after 2005. The main variables of 
interest for this analysis are council responsibilities, whether the councils met during the year, 
and the source of funding for housing programs.  
Council Responsibilities:  
As reported in Chapter 4, in 2008 the MUNIC survey asked questions about whether the 
municipal housing council was consultative, deliberative, normative, or provided oversight, 
indicating the extent to which the council actually has power over housing planning decisions. 
Compared to councils created before 2005, I expect that councils created in response to the 
federal mandate would be more likely to have consultative powers, but less likely to have the 
other three types of decision-making responsibilities. In fact, this turns out not to be the case. 
Table 5.3 shows that though councils created after 2005 are more likely to have consultative 
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responsibilities, they are just as likely or more likely to also have deliberative, normative, and 
oversight responsibilities. The commitment of government officials, or lack thereof, is not 
reflected in the responsibilities assigned to councils as I expected.  
Table 5.3: Responsibilities of councils as stated in law or decree 
  
Where Councils existed 
before 2005  
(Prior to mandate) 
Where councils began after 
2005 (Post-mandate) 
Consultative 47% 51% 
Deliberative 78% 78% 
Normative 29% 35% 
Oversight 42% 46% 
 
Meetings:  
Whether or not municipal councils meet during the year provides another clue as to 
whether governments are making the councils a priority. Here there is a big difference between 
councils created before and after 2005. Fifty percent of councils created after 2005 met in the 
year 2007-2008, while 71% of councils created prior to 2005 met during the same time period. 
This indicates that there are a significant number of councils created in response to the federal 
mandate that may simply exist on paper without ever holding a meeting. The reason behind 
creation does appear to matter for whether councils meet. 
 
Funding Sources:  
The source of funding for housing programs is critical for understanding two variables: 1) 
the control the council has over resources and 2) whether municipalities with councils are 
actually more likely to contribute to housing programs using their own funds rather than relying 
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on the federal government. Both of these variables reflect the government’s commitment to the 
housing councils as institutions for decision making in allocating resources. For instance, in 
many municipalities the official fund for housing may be empty, leaving the housing council 
without any resources to control. The MUNIC survey asked whether the municipal housing fund 
actually funded programs. 
 Though councils established across time are almost equally likely to have a municipal 
housing fund, there is a significant difference in whether the fund actually funded projects. Table 
5.4 shows that in municipalities with councils created after 2005, the municipal fund for housing 
only financed projects in 35% of cases. For councils created before 2005, the fund financed 
projects in 45% of municipalities. Though the number is perhaps surprisingly low across cases 
and reflects a lack of commitment to the process among a large portion of municipalities, the fact 
that councils created in response to the mandate are even less likely to allocate funds to the 
housing fund suggests that the motivation for creation does have a depressing effect on 
municipal government commitment.  
Table 5.4: Project Funding  
  
Where Councils were 
created before 2005 
Where councils were 
created after 2005  
Housing Fund Exists 0.79 0.78 
Housing Fund Funded Projects 0.45 0.35 
All funds in the Fund 0.50 0.55 
 
Unfortunately the survey does not provide data on what portion of the municipal fund for 
housing comes from municipal resources vs. federal transfers. However, the survey does ask 
about the source of funding for programs within the municipality, regardless of whether the 
council controls them. If councils do encourage municipalities to take greater responsibility for 
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housing needs, I would expect that municipalities with councils created before 2005 would be 
more likely to allocate municipal resources to housing needs than municipalities with councils 
created after 2005. Table 5.5 below provides the percentage of programs funded either in 
partnership with the federal government or solely by the municipal government, split by council 
cohort. The data show that municipalities with councils created after 2005 are less likely to use 
municipal resources for programs to construct new units, provide regularization of land titles, 
improve units, and urbanize favelas.  
Table 5.5: Source of Funding for Municipal Level Housing Programs 
  
Where councils existed before 
2005 (Prior to mandate) 
Where councils began after 2005 
(Post-mandate) 
 Type of 
Program 
No. of 
Obs. 
In 
Partnership 
with the 
Federal Govt 
Solely 
Muni Govt 
Resources 
No. of 
Obs. 
In 
Partnership 
with the 
Federal Govt 
Solely Muni 
Govt 
Resources 
Construction 563 75% 31% 689 71% 22% 
Offer Materials 339 12% 85% 410 12% 85% 
Offer Land 229 9% 90% 278 12% 86% 
Regularization  247 30% 73% 298 29% 62% 
Acquire Units 146 73% 27% 204 68% 28% 
Improve Units 467 35% 63% 518 39% 56% 
Urbanization 172 63% 51% 195 63% 48% 
 
In sum, municipal government commitment to the housing councils does appear to vary 
according to the reason for creation, though not uniformly across variables. Table 5.6 provides a 
summary of the findings related to government commitment.  
Table 5.6: Summary of Variation in Municipal Government Commitment 
Government officials 
perceptions of the role of the 
housing council 
Where councils were created from the bottom-up, officials 
report a stronger role for civil society and a greater expectation 
that the council should hold the government accountable.  
Responsibilities Do not vary according to council creation. 
Meetings Bottom-up councils were more likely to actually hold 
meetings. 
Council controlled fund funded Bottom-up councils more likely to control a fund that funded 
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projects projects. 
Municipally funded programs Bottom-up councils more likely to have several types of 
municipally funded programs.  
 
In interviews, government officials in São Paulo, Santo André, and Salvador did indicate they 
expected civil society to use the councils to hold the government accountable for addressing 
housing needs. These perceptions by government officials coincide with several of the variables 
used here to measure commitment. Though the time of creation is not associated with the 
responsibilities afforded to the council, creation does matter for whether the council met and 
whether the fund for housing actually funded programs. In addition, councils created from the 
bottom-up appear to elicit resources more often from municipal governments than councils 
created from the top-down. This may indicate that these governments are more likely to use the 
housing councils to hear civil society demands and respond by increasing municipal resources. 
By these measures, then, municipal councils mandated by the federal level appear not to have the 
same level of support, particularly in terms of resources, as those councils created at the demand 
of civil society or by ideologically-driven mayors. This evidence suggests that the reason behind 
creation matters for whether housing councils have control over decision-making and for 
whether municipal governments increase their support for housing programs. 
Civil Society Commitment to Participatory Governance Institutions 
Where housing councils were created from the bottom-up, do CSOs display a greater 
commitment to the participatory process and a willingness to demand accountability of the 
government through the councils? 
In each of the case studies the majority of CSOs were pleased that municipal housing 
councils had been created in their cities and pledged varying levels of participation. However, 
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while the level of commitment of CSOs is difficult to measure, I do find a difference in how 
CSOs say they will use the housing councils to negotiate for housing interventions and in their 
drive to ensure government officials uphold the participatory process. In São Paulo and Santo 
André, CSOs reported that they brought concerns and requests for assistance to the housing 
councils. In Salvador, CSOs recognized the importance of using the council to access federal 
funding, though they did not expect it to automatically generate municipal resource commitment. 
In Curitiba and Recife, CSOs appeared more hesitant towards their role in ensuring that the 
councils would be used as mechanisms for responsiveness and accountability. Since the creation 
of the institutions was a foregone conclusion, CSOs hoped for their effectiveness. But not having 
fought for their creation, CSOs did not appear to have real strategies in mind for how they would 
advance their agendas within the councils.  
São Paulo – Strong civil society commitment to ensuring responsiveness and accountability 
through the housing council.  
 
Social movements in São Paulo view the creation of the housing council as a significant 
achievement. While they still have criticisms about the process and the amount of resources they 
have control over, they participate in the council with intense energy. In interviews, several 
movement leaders commented that one important victory had been to bring more attention to the 
needs of residents in the city center. Housing policy in the city traditionally focused on the 
periphery as the location for large public housing units, but advocates have fought hard to 
legitimize the idea of low-income housing in the city’s economically vibrant center. Though 
social movements worry that they should not abandon all direct action in favor of participation in 
the council, they recognize the benefits of collaboration, including participating as a voting block 
in the council. Professional NGOs in São Paulo have also been instrumental in providing 
capacity building to movement leaders, increasing their confidence in challenging government 
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and business interests in the council. CSOs use the housing council to negotiate changes in 
existing programs, the location of future programs, and the allocation of municipal resources.     
Santo André – Strong civil society commitment to using the housing council for project 
assistance. 
The housing council in Santo André was created mainly at the direction of PT mayor 
Celso Daniel. Housing associations and local union leaders participate in the council and report 
that although the participatory process could always be improved, they view the council as a 
crucial mechanism to access financial, technical, and legal assistance. Close ties between civil 
society and administration officials in Santo André facilitated the smooth functioning of the 
housing council. CSOs appeared relatively content with the process and were not inclined to 
participate in direct action as a means to reaching municipal officials.  
Salvador – Pragmatic civil society commitment where government does not provide dedicated 
resources for housing council control.  
Civil society in Salvador appears pragmatic in their commitment to the participatory 
process. As I reported in the previous chapter, though she resigned shortly thereafter, a PT-
affiliated housing secretary created the housing council in Salvador as response to the federal 
mandate and based on her own ideological convictions. The former secretary was committed to 
the process and involving civil society in setting up the institution, but CSO leaders knew that 
the mayoral administration and the subsequent secretary for housing were not genuinely 
interested in participatory governance. With the institution in place, however, CSOs recognize 
the practical opportunity to use the council to coordinate project proposals to send to the federal 
level. Leaders commented that the council could be a space for demanding transparency and 
accountability from the municipal government if civil society maintained constant pressure, but 
under the current government in the short term CSOs were focused on using the council to access 
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federal level resources. Protests, land occupations, and bilateral meetings were still a large 
component of CSO strategies for negotiating with municipal officials. For example, during my 
visit the MTST led a protest to the housing secretariat in the city center to demand that the 
municipal government contribute funds to build new public housing units. The mixed 
motivations behind creation of the housing council in Salvador seems to have opened the door 
for participation of civil society in a formal, public space, but without the continued commitment 
of the municipal administration, the council is more a conduit for federal funding than a 
mechanism to elicit municipal responsiveness and accountability. Civil society is committed to 
participating in the council, but continue to use other means to access municipal officials.  
Curitiba: Divided civil society exhibiting mixed commitment to challenging the government’s 
technocratic approach to governance.  
 Many CSOs in Curitiba appeared largely ambivalent regarding the creation of the new 
municipal council for housing. In Curitiba there is a strong divide between those CSOs allied 
with the conservative-leaning administration and those opposed to the administration. Among 
those CSOs opposed to the administration, leaders told me they welcomed the introduction of all 
participatory governance institutions, but that the real power remained with the government and 
private sector in the city. As such, they hoped to use the council as a space to change policies, 
but in reality they felt the need to retain other strategies, including occupations. The problem 
with the housing council and other participatory institutions in Curitiba, according to a leader 
from local NGO Terra dos Direitos, is that the government allows for consultation with civil 
society without providing any institutional mechanisms for accountability. Though the housing 
council had not begun functioning, the existing Council for the City was not deliberative and did 
not allow for voting on issues by members. On the other side, leaders of housing associations 
allied with the administration expressed their commitment to the council process and stated they 
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would participate alongside government officials. Given their close collaboration with the 
government, these CSOs are unlikely to challenge current municipal policy.   
The inability of opposing CSOs to work together in Curitiba will most likely reduce the 
likelihood that they present a united front in the council. In addition, even if the housing council 
encourages both sides of civil society to debate, without institutional mechanisms for 
accountability, the council may not change the distribution of resources or reorient the 
government’s current technocratic model of governance. In creating the council as a response to 
the federal mandate, the municipal government was not required to provide voting power to 
members. CSOs across sides want a space for discussion, but without real power to allocate 
resources or present policy reforms, unaligned CSOs, in particular, may reduce their 
commitment to the institution and rely on current occupation strategies instead. Never having 
formed a united front to demand the housing council, CSOs related to housing are unlikely to 
come together in the council to make demands for responsiveness and accountability. The 
council, then, may become a rubber stamp for government proposals.     
Recife: Skeptical civil society with some commitment to participate.   
Civil society in Recife appeared to maintain a fairly pessimistic view of the newly created 
housing council, which may limit their commitment to the council and their enthusiasm for 
holding the government accountable for implementing the participatory process. In interviews, 
CSOs expressed their skepticism regarding both the position of the housing council outside of 
the Council for the City and the likelihood that the housing council would have any real effect on 
the housing situation. According to a leader from the MTST (Roofless Worker’s Movement) in 
Recife, participatory councils in general “have the capacity to make decisions, but mostly 
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evaluate and propose policies without anything ever reaching the ground” (personal interview). 
The MTST also disagreed with the set-up of the housing council outside of the Council for the 
City because they were concerned about de-linking housing from other urban issues. Despite this 
skepticism, the MTST pledged to participate in the housing council, much to the relief of 
government officials who acknowledged that for the process to work they needed the support of 
the MTST as the most influential movement in Recife. Many of the other movements stated that 
they were pleased with their relationship with the secretary of housing and were able to secure 
meetings with her as needed. The housing council would perhaps save them time in arranging 
bilateral meetings and would be an open forum to debate policy issues. An advocate from the 
NGO FASE argued, “through the council civil society can reach the administration to define 
goals, allocate resources, and define priorities” (personal interview).  In sum, the majority of 
CSO leaders were interested in the transparency the council would provide and pledged to 
participate, though several leaders remained dubious that the housing council would improve 
outcomes for residents in the city. Rather than actively demanding the implementation of the 
council, many CSO leaders appeared to take a “wait and see” approach.     
Across cities, the commitment of civil society does appear to vary based on the 
motivation behind the creation of municipal housing councils. Civil society in the three case 
study cities where councils were created in response to CSO demands and ideologically-
motivated officials seem to be more united in their commitment to holding the government 
accountable for the implementation of the participatory process and to resident’s housing needs. 
In Curitiba and Recife, divided civil society and skepticism about the ability of the housing 
council to change policy may limit the effectiveness of the councils in the future.  
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Probability of Program Adoption 
Are pro-poor policy outcomes more likely where councils are created in response to bottom-up 
vs. top-down pressures?  
 Based on the case studies, I find that in municipalities where the housing councils were 
created in response to top-down pressures, both government officials and civil society leaders 
appear less committed to making the participatory process work. This leads me to look across 
contexts to assess whether issues of commitment to participatory governance based on the 
motivation for council creation affect housing program adoption. Does low government and civil 
society commitment to municipal councils translate into fewer housing programs within 
municipalities? Using the statistical model developed in Chapter 3, I evaluate whether the 
motivation behind the creation of participatory governance institutions influences policy 
outcomes.26 To compare the effects of creation on housing program adoption in 2008, I create 
two new variables, “council both years” and “2008 council only”. For “council both years”, 
0=never had a council and 1=reported having a council in both 2005 and 2008. For “2008 
council only”, 0=never had a council and 1=reported having a council in 2008 only. I 
hypothesize that regardless of time of creation, municipalities with housing councils are more 
likely than municipalities without housing councils to adopt all types of programs. Therefore, 
both variables should be significantly related to each type of housing program. In municipalities 
with housing councils created prior to 2005, however, housing councils should have the greatest 
effect on program adoption due to stronger municipal government and civil society commitment. 
Both government officials and civil society are likely to be more committed to the participatory 

26 Though time series analysis comparing 2005 to 2008 would seem appropriate to assess the differences in council 
effects, I believe the effect of federal level programs increasing between the 3 years may bias the estimates. 
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process in these municipalities, leading to greater responsiveness and accountability of the 
government to address housing needs.    
Findings 
 Based on probit analysis, Table 5.7 demonstrates that regardless of when they were 
created, municipal housing councils are significantly associated with the adoption of all types of 
housing programs. The exceptions to this are programs to offer plots of land and urbanization 
programs in municipalities with councils created after 2005. Based on this it appears that 
councils created in response to the mandate may have a smaller impact than those created before 
2005, but the difference in impact cannot be directly interpreted from these results. 
Table 5.7: The Effect of Housing Councils Created Before and After 2005 on Housing 
Programs 
  
Const. 
of Units 
Offer 
Mat. 
Offer 
Land Regular. 
Acquire 
Units 
Improve 
Units Urban. 
Council both 
years 0.43*** 0.18** 0.27*** 0.21** 0.15* 0.39*** 0.30*** 
 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.1 
Council in 2008 
only 0.21*** 0.12* 0.1 0.25*** 0.16** 0.23*** 0.12 
 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 
Municipal 
Housing Fund 0.25*** 0.09 0.19*** 0.14** 0.09 0.04 0.16** 
 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 
Population 2005 
(log) 0.19*** 0.07** 0.09*** 0.36*** 0.13*** 0.06* 0.42*** 
 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
Percent Urban 
Pop. (log) 0.14** 0.19*** 0.26*** 0.03 0.03 0.18*** 0.02 
 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 
Muni Budget 
per cap. (log) 0.49*** 0.37*** 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.18** 0.18** 0.45*** 
 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 
PT Mayor 0.05 0.1 -0.1 0.25*** 0.07 0.11 0.05 
 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.1 
Gini 1.22*** 1.27*** 0 -0.03 0.24 1.97*** 0.99* 
 -0.42 -0.42 -0.45 -0.48 -0.49 -0.41 -0.53 
Income per 0.08 -0.16* 0.04 0.17* 0.1 -0.11 0.04 
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capita (log) 
 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.1 -0.1 -0.08 -0.11 
Non-profs & 
Founds per cap. 
(log) -0.04 -0.07* 0.03 -0.09** -0.01 0.13*** -0.11** 
 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
Favelas 0 -0.06 0 0.30*** 0.06 -0.04 0.38*** 
 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 
Constant -6.40*** -4.34*** -4.01*** -8.29*** -4.33*** -1.99*** -10.25*** 
 -0.83 -0.78 -0.82 -0.88 -0.87 -0.76 -0.98 
Obs. 4,093 4,080 4,093 4,093 4,093 4,083 4,083 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Model includes state dummies 
 
To gauge the substantive effect, I use the CLARIFY program to simulate the probability 
of program adoption. Using the same probit models above, CLARIFY calculates the predicted 
values for program adoption. Setting all other independent variables to their means, I test the 
probability of program adoption where housing councils never existed, where they were created 
between 2005 and 2008, and where they existed prior to 2005. Table 5.8 below illustrates the 
predicted probabilities of program adoption across program type and existence of housing 
council. With notable exceptions, the numbers demonstrate the increasing likelihood of program 
adoption, moving from the probability of program adoption where no council existed, to the 
probability where councils were created after 2005 and then to the probability where councils 
were created prior to 2005. The exceptions to this finding are programs for regularization and to 
acquire units, where the associations are not significantly different. In Table 5.9, I then use the 
predicted probabilities to calculate the differences according to council creation. The center 
column demonstrates the substantive differences in likelihood of program adoption between 
municipalities where councils were created before and after 2005. Except for regularization 
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programs and programs to acquire units, the time of creation appears to alter the extent to which 
housing councils influence program adoption.  
 
Table 5.8: Probability of Program Adoption Based on Time of Council Creation 
  No Council Council created after 2005 Council created before 2005
Construction 0.61 0.69 0.76 
Offer Materials 0.35 0.39 0.41 
Offer Plots of Land 0.21 0.25 0.30 
Regularization 0.17 0.24 0.24 
Acquire Units 0.14 0.18 0.18 
Improve Units 0.44 0.53 0.59 
Urbanization 0.09 0.12 0.16 
    
Table 5.9: Difference in Probability of Program Adoption Based on Time of Council 
Creation 
 
From no council 
to council created 
after 2005 
From Council 
created after 
2005 to council 
created before 
2005 
From No Council to Council 
created before 2005 
Construction Materials 0.06 0.07 0.15 
Offer Materials 0.04 0.02 0.06 
Offer Plots of Land 0.04 0.05 0.09 
Regularization 0.07 0 0.07 
Acquire Units 0.04 0 0.04 
Improve Units 0.09 0.06 0.15 
Urbanization 0.03 0.04 0.07 
 
Discussion 
 The statistical results provide support for the hypothesis that participatory governance 
institutions created in response to bottom-up pressures produce stronger pro-poor outcomes than 
those created in response to top-down mandates. Compared to municipalities without housing 
councils, the probability for adoption of almost all the different types of housing programs is 
twice as high where a council existed since at least 2005. These findings do come with an 
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important caveat: the length of housing council operation may also account for the increased 
likelihood of program adoption. Unfortunately the survey does not specify in which year the 
councils were created. Therefore, I can only use the survey responses in two years, 2005 and 
2008, as cut-off points. Councils reported by officials to exist in 2005 could have been created in 
2005 or several years prior. The same is true for councils reported by officials to exist in 2008. I 
cannot distinguish whether the council was created in 2008 or in the years between 2005 and 
2008. The length of time in operation would logically seem to influence whether the housing 
councils had a chance to begin functioning and subsequently influence policy outcomes. Given 
data limitations, however, I am not able to control for the length of operation, which may in fact 
bias my findings.  
 Keeping this caveat in mind, I still draw several conclusions based on the available data 
and results. First, where councils were created prior to 2005 and the announcement of the federal 
mandate, it appears that government officials and civil society do maintain commitment to the 
participatory process over time. The housing councils still have an effect on policy outcomes at 
least 3 years after they were created. Second, councils created after the announcement of the 
mandate also have an effect on policy outcomes. Though the effect is not as large as in 
municipalities where councils existed prior to the mandate, the results provide evidence that 
there is a positive relationship between housing councils created after 2005 and the likelihood of 
program adoption. Councils created in response to top-down pressures are not merely institutions 
on paper set-up to receive federal funds. The effect, however, is clearly smaller than where 
housing councils existed prior to the federal mandate. Third, though the effect of the councils is 
not uniform across program type, the probability of program adoption where councils created 
prior to the mandate is generally higher than the probability where councils were created after 
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the mandate. Stronger commitment to the participatory process by government officials and civil 
society, who were likely involved in the creation of the housing councils, does appear to 
significantly alter the relationship between the councils and adoption of social housing programs.  
Conclusions 
This analysis provided evidence to confirm the claim that the manner in which 
participatory governance institutions are created makes a difference for how they function and 
the outcomes they produce. Case study interviews first demonstrated differences in how 
government officials view the role of the housing councils and civil society’s role in policy-
making. In São Paulo and Santo André where PT governments clearly created municipal housing 
councils in response to civil society demands and in line with the administration’s ideology, the 
institutions are viewed as spaces for negotiation and deliberation by civil society on 
programmatic decisions. In contrast, government officials in Curitiba and Recife did not appear 
to take the councils as seriously as a means for civil society to directly influence policy. Survey 
data across cases also reveals a lack of commitment by municipal governments to holding 
meetings and dedicating resources. The reason behind creation of municipal housing councils 
does matter for how governments both perceive of the council’s role and respond with time and 
money. 
Though civil society in all the case study cities demonstrated an interest in participating 
in the housing councils, subtle differences in the attitude of CSOs towards the councils exist. In 
São Paulo and Santo André, CSOs work collaboratively to solicit benefits through the housing 
councils, though of course they still argue the process could be improved. In Salvador, CSOs 
work together to make proposals and to demand that the government take the council seriously. 
In Curitiba and Recife, however, a lack of cohesion among CSOs may limit the effectiveness of 
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the housing councils. Without significant investment in the process from the beginning, CSOs 
may not come together to use the councils for making collective demands. The mode of creation 
does appear to affect the manner in which civil society engages with the participatory process. 
Statistical analysis then provides evidence that the variation in commitment of 
government and civil society actors matters for the influence of municipal housing councils. 
Councils created prior to the mandate are more strongly related to program adoption than 
councils created after the announcement of the mandate. Bottom-up councils are more likely to 
generate pro-poor policy outcomes than top-down councils, though top-down councils also have 
some effect.  
In the end, the findings in this chapter have implications for governments seeking to 
address social problems through increasing participation in policy making. While participatory 
governance institutions legislated by the federal government may have some effect on increasing 
pro-poor policy adoption, the commitment of local government officials and civil society 
members cannot be ignored. Both officials and CSOs must have incentives to cooperate. 
Government officials need to take the deliberative role of civil society seriously and respond by 
providing institutional support and resources. Civil society also needs to view the councils as a 
worthwhile use of their time where their demands will be heard. Local participation can be 
legislated from above, but the results may not be the same across contexts.    
Conclusion: Can Democracy Remedy Social Challenges? Findings on the Effect of 
Participatory Governance Institutions 
 
Participatory governance institutions do matter. I started this project with a healthy dose 
of skepticism that participatory governance institutions could be the panacea to marginalization 
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of the poor that many scholars, donors, and activists suggest. Could these forums really lead to 
policy change or were governments merely paying lip service to the idea of civil society 
incorporation in policy making? Though scholars had thoroughly documented the benefits of 
participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, I was not convinced that participatory 
institutions in other contexts would have similar effects. But, after several years of studying 
Brazil’s municipal housing councils, talking to numerous government officials and civil society 
leaders, and conducting quantitative analysis controlling for other effects, I can say with some 
certainty that participatory governance institutions do matter for policy outcomes. Like any 
blanket statement, however, this one comes with a number of caveats. Not all participatory 
governance institutions produce the same effects. Context, influenced by civil society-state 
dynamics, institutional rules, and commitment of actors, matters for the direction and strength of 
impact. In addition, housing policy is determined by factors outside of council control. Though 
municipal councils for housing have an effect on policy outcomes, they will never be the only 
determining factor of housing policy.  
Summary of Findings 
In this dissertation I sought to contribute to our understanding of whether a new type of 
democratic institution could generate greater responsiveness and accountability to the poor. 
Previous literature on democracy and development suggests that democratic institutions and civil 
society lead to responsiveness and accountability of government officials. But given continuing 
problems of poverty and inequality in the developing world, traditional institutions of democracy 
do not appear to be enough to remedy social challenges. This led me to test whether one type of 
participatory governance institution is associated with an increase in social program adoption 
across contexts. In addition, I sought to address when and how participatory governance 
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institutions led to policy change. By focusing on housing policy, I hoped to expand the social 
policy literature to an issue of great concern in developing countries. Here I review the evidence 
presented related to these objectives. 
Chapter 2 first addressed the importance of housing policy for democracy and 
development. The scale of housing needs, including physical shelter, property rights, and 
community improvements, is vast and growing along with urban populations. The benefits of 
tackling housing challenges, however, are also great. The provision of housing is an 
internationally recognized human right, and housing contributes to reducing poverty and 
inequality while improving security and environmental sustainability. Moreover, governments 
tend to prioritize housing programs because they are politically popular and relatively 
inexpensive, tangible symbols of progress. Large civil societies oriented towards housing in the 
developing world keep housing in the public’s eye. Housing policy in Brazil and in other 
developing countries has largely shifted from state-managed complexes to market-based 
mechanisms, including contracting out projects to private firms and mortgage financing and 
rental subsidies for citizens. The state, however, continues to play a large role in creating these 
market incentives and continuing to provide property rights and some direct program 
implementation. In addition, the state manages the decentralization of resources and the 
participatory process. The state, then, is not absent from housing policy. Despite the role of 
housing policy as a central component of social benefits or welfare policies, particularly in 
developing countries, political science scholars have shied away from including housing in their 
analysis of governmental provision of benefits. This analysis remedied that gap by providing 
evidence of policy influences for housing across Brazil.     
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  To address the main question of this dissertation regarding participatory governance 
institutions, I first sought to determine if municipal housing councils are associated with social 
housing program adoption. In Chapter 3 I conducted statistical analysis to assess whether 
participatory governance institutions increase the likelihood of provision of social benefits to the 
poor. More specifically, I developed several probit models to measure whether municipal 
housing councils are associated with a greater probability of social housing program adoption. I 
find that municipal housing councils are associated with adoption of each type of housing 
program and a housing index, measuring the number of programs adopted by the municipality. 
This provides evidence to suggest that in fact participatory governance institutions do promote 
adoption of social benefits to the poor. Though mainstream political science literature has tended 
to focus on the institutions of representative democracy as keys to accountability, this study 
provides confirmation that participatory institutions contribute to social policy, particularly in a 
relatively new democracy where social challenges persist even in the face of fast-paced 
economic growth. In addition, scholars of participatory governance institutions have generally 
relied on case studies and focused on the nature of deliberation within these institutions without 
systematically comparing policy outcomes across contexts. By conducting an analysis across 
municipalities within one country, I was able to control for a number of factors to discern the 
independent effect of municipal housing councils.         
Having established that participatory governance institutions do matter for policy 
outcomes I set out to assess when and how these institutions make a difference. In Chapter 3 I 
evaluated whether the depth of civil society matters for the effect of participatory governance 
institutions. Using Brazilian government data on the number of non-profits and foundations per 
capita as a proxy for the depth of civil society, I found that the density of civil society does not 
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matter on its own or for the effectiveness of municipal housing councils. This contradicts 
common expectations regarding the need for a strong civil society to hold governments 
accountable and existing literature citing the importance of civil society density for participatory 
governance impact. It appears that municipal housing councils may level the playing field for 
access to government officials. The depth of civil society is not critical for the functioning of the 
institution. Again, by reviewing evidence across municipalities instead of through single cases, I 
was able to evaluate the importance of the density of civil society across diverse municipalities. 
Though a strong civil society may still be key for the effectiveness of participatory governance 
institutions in many cases, across the universe of cases in Brazil, the depth of civil society does 
not significantly alter the impact of participatory governance. This finding is promising for new 
participatory governance institutions created in Brazil and in other countries without strong 
histories of associationalism. 
In Chapter 4, I looked further into case studies to determine how exactly participatory 
governance institutions do influence policy outcomes. Here I aimed to identify the factors 
shaping the relationship between civil society and the state, which may contribute to how civil 
society uses participatory governance institutions and the eventual impact they are able to have 
on policy. From case study research in São Paulo, Santo André, and Salvador, I argued that the 
party in power significantly determined whether alliances between civil society and the state 
facilitated the smooth functioning of the municipal housing council. I also found that because 
housing policy is largely connected to the real estate sector, the relationship between civil 
society, the municipal government, and the private sector also matters for the effect of municipal 
housing councils. The private sector is often left out of analysis of social policies and 
participatory governance, but I find through the case studies that the role of the private sector in 
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social housing policy made a significant difference in the policy process and outcomes. Finally, 
the extent to which civil society adopts more contentious or cooperative strategies influences 
how governments respond and use the council as a space for deliberation and decision-making. 
In the end, from the case studies I find that whether the PT or a more conservative party was in 
power, mattered for the most for the dynamics between civil society and the municipal 
government. These relationships, in turn, appeared to strongly determine whether and how the 
council was used for policy making.    
Across the larger universe of cases, I sought to understand how the party in power affects 
the outcomes of participatory governance institutions. Since the PT in Brazil traditionally 
champions participatory governance as part of its party platform and the presence of the PT 
appeared to affect the civil society-state dynamic in the case studies, I hypothesized that where a 
PT mayor held office, the municipal council for housing would be more likely to bring about 
adoption of social housing programs across cases. However, while in the case studies the party in 
power appeared to largely determine the nature of the policy process in municipal housing 
councils, across the larger universe of cases the party did not make a substantial difference.  
Contrary to the case studies, from the statistical analysis I find that the institutional rules 
actually make a significant difference for the effect of municipal housing councils. In particular, 
the type of responsibility afforded to the councils appears to shape whether they lead to 
increasing likelihood of housing program adoption. Specifically, those councils with oversight 
responsibilities written into the council’s mandate were the most strongly associated with 
housing program adoption across municipalities. This analysis is important for identifying 
institutional rules as key to outcomes, but it also contributes to our understanding of how case 
studies and quantitative methods complement one another. Though the case studies pointed to 
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the importance of the party in power, in the aggregate the institutional rules mattered more for 
policy outcomes.  
Chapter 5 then continued the search for determining when participatory governance 
institutions are effective mechanisms for promoting adoption of social benefits. Here I examined 
the effect of bottom-up vs. top-down creation of participatory governance institutions. The cases 
of Recife and Curitiba, where governments adopted municipal housing councils in response to 
the federal mandate, provide comparison to São Paulo, Santo André, and Salvador. When 
governments created municipal councils for housing in response to the federal mandate rather 
than in response to civil society demands or ideological conviction of the municipal 
administration, I find that both local government officials and civil society exhibit less 
commitment to the participatory process. Using statistical analysis, I confirm that commitment 
matters: municipalities with housing councils created before the federal mandate were more 
likely to adopt social housing programs than those that created housing councils after the 
mandate. These results imply that participatory governance institutions imposed from the federal 
to the municipal level may not have the same effects across municipalities.  
In sum, I find that participatory governance institutions do generate responsiveness and 
accountability of governments to provide social benefits to the poor. Municipal housing councils 
are innovative democratic mechanisms to involve civil society in decision-making and cement 
their role as “co-governors” with the state. But the effectiveness of participatory governance 
institutions is not guaranteed. Though a dense civil society may not be needed for these 
institutions to shift policy making, the dynamics between civil society and the state change over 
time and may shift the ways in which the councils are used for policy-making and respected as 
credible institutions. In addition, across cases the legal responsibilities afforded to councils 
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matter for the effect they have on policy outcomes. Actors concerned with the influence of 
participatory governance institutions should take institutional design into account during 
creation. In fact, the reason for creation may be critical for the influence of participatory 
governance institutions. Government officials and civil society leaders may not be committed to 
the process if these institutions are mandated from the federal level rather than initiated in 
response to local demand.  
This analysis demonstrated that participatory governance institutions, which complement 
representative democratic institutions and incorporate civil society into decision-making, should 
be taken seriously by political scientists as institutions to promote adoption of social benefits for 
the poor. Further, civil society can hold the government accountable for addressing social 
challenges when they are invited to the table to present their demands, solicit information from 
government officials, and maintain a dialogue with government officials over time.  
Limitations 
While the findings in this dissertation strongly contribute to our understanding of how 
participatory governance institutions affect policy outcomes, the study also comes with several 
limitations. First, though municipal housing councils are representative of one type of institution 
charged with deciding the distribution of resources and programmatic details, not all 
participatory governance institutions are given these responsibilities and I cannot generalize to 
all participatory approaches. Second, a longer time horizon for analysis would uncover how the 
effect of participatory governance changes over time, across political administrations, as these 
institutions age and become routine mechanisms for policy making. Third, though I believe 
Brazil to be representative of a developing country facing challenges to democracy and 
development, it is also unique in many ways. For instance, Brazil has had a leftist administration 
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for almost a decade, it is a fast-growing economy with some international prestige, and it is 
wealthier as a whole than most developing countries in the world. Moreover, Brazil now has 
over two decades of experience with participatory institutions. All of these factors may 
contribute both to a greater willingness to invest in social benefits and a recognition of the 
importance of participatory governance.   
Future Research 
The findings from this study lead me to several questions for future research. First, I 
would like to look into how the programs adopted through municipal housing councils contribute 
to reducing the quantitative and qualitative housing deficits. This would take the question of 
impact a step further to assess how participatory governance is actually transforming people’s 
lives. Second, I would like to extend the questions in this dissertation to other developing 
countries, including South Africa, India, and Peru. The institutions may be different in these 
countries, but I would like to know how participatory processes in other contexts produce similar 
or different results. The findings from this dissertation also lead to questions about what other 
strategies for governance exist in Brazilian cities and how municipal housing councils fit into the 
larger urban governance environment. For instance, many cities also have urban planning 
councils and participatory budgeting processes. A critical question, then, would be whether the 
multiplicity of participatory approaches produces greater benefits to residents. 
The findings from this study also lead me to a very timely future research question. As 
Brazil prepares to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, evictions of residents from 
the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and other cities are increasingly common. Civil society in Brazil is 
now coordinating a national network to respond to these evictions and formulate a strategy for 
negotiating with municipal governments and the federal government to protect the interests of 
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favela residents. Though I find here that municipal housing councils are associated with 
increasing adoption of social housing programs, I am interested in how these councils may 
respond to urgent needs such as those created by evictions associated with new infrastructure 
development for these sporting events. In addition, I am interested in studying which institutions, 
local, national, and international, CSOs and citizens access in the face of these new challenges.        
Final Conclusion 
As local and national governments struggle to confront social challenges on a grand 
scale, scholars, donors, policy makers, and activists need to understand what works in promoting 
adoption of social benefits for the poor. Severe inequalities, marginalization, and clientelism 
often limit the effectiveness of democratic institutions, leaving the poor without a voice in policy 
making. Civil society organizations that represent the poor aim to provide that voice by 
accessing government officials to make demands and elicit promises for action. Participatory 
governance institutions should ensure that CSOs have equal access to government officials to 
negotiate responses to citizen needs. Further, CSOs should gain information about government 
activities, which they can then pass along to their members and the community at large. By 
analyzing the effect of municipal housing councils on social housing program adoption, this 
study has contributed to the debate about whether participatory governance institutions actually 
achieve these goals. Creation of participatory governance institutions to encourage prioritization 
of social benefits is sound advice, but should also come with the caveats regarding civil society-
state dynamics, institutional design, and commitment of actors. As many developing countries 
enjoy increasing prosperity and deepening of democratic institutions, participatory governance 
may solidify the contribution of civil society to addressing key social challenges into the future. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Percentage of Municipalities with Existing Housing Programs by Region and Population 
Region  2005 2008 
 
No. of 
Munis 
Const. 
Units 
Const. 
Materials 
Plots 
of 
Land Regular 
Other 
Progs 
Const
Units 
Const 
Mats 
Plots 
of 
Land Regular
Acq. 
Units 
Imp. 
Units Urban
In all of 
Brazil 5563 48% 35% 19% 9% 25% 61% 36% 25% 20% 16% 46% 14% 
North 449 35% 30% 32% 11% 14% 53% 34% 43% 29% 14% 37% 22% 
Northeast 1793 50% 38% 20% 6% 27% 66% 36% 27% 15% 17% 51% 15% 
Center 
West 466 57% 42% 29% 12% 29% 70% 44% 36% 32% 14% 49% 17% 
South 1187 53% 33% 16% 12% 27% 65% 34% 21% 21% 17% 49% 11% 
Southeast 1668 45% 32% 13% 10% 22% 51% 35% 16% 20% 13% 42% 11% 
              
Population  2005 2008 
 
No. of 
Munis. 
Const. 
Units 
Const. 
Mats. 
Plots 
of 
Land Regular
Other 
Progs. 
Const
Units 
Const 
Mats 
Plots 
of 
Land Regular
Acq.
Units 
Imp. 
Units Urban
Under 
20,000 3965 45% 34% 18% 5% 21% 57% 35% 24% 14% 14% 46% 8% 
20,001 to 
50,000 1026 49% 36% 19% 12% 27% 66% 37% 25% 27% 17% 48% 18% 
50,001 to 
100,000 313 62% 35% 23% 25% 37% 75% 40% 31% 42% 25% 47% 32% 
100,001 to 
500,000 220 76% 36% 26% 43% 55% 80% 34% 30% 65% 26% 47% 50% 
500,001 
and up 39 74% 41% 38% 64% 67% 95% 38% 33% 85% 41% 64% 82% 
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Appendix B: Negative Binomial Results for Influences on the Housing Program Index, 
2005 and 2008* 
  2005 2008 
 
Program 
Index 
Program 
Index 
Program 
Index 
Program 
Index 
Municipal Housing Council 0.23*** 0.82*** 0.19*** 0.28 
  (0.04) (0.27) (0.03) (0.19) 
Municipal Housing Fund 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Population (log) 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Percent Urban Population (log) 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Municipal Budget per capita 
(log) 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
PT Mayor -0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.06 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Gini Coefficient 0.61** 0.59** 0.83*** 0.82*** 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.22) (0.22) 
Income per capita (log) -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Non-profits and Foundations 
per capita (log) 0.05** 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Existence of Favelas -0.01 -0.01 0.06** 0.06** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Housing Council x Non-profits 
and Founds per cap (log)   0.10**   0.01 
    (0.04)   (0.03) 
Constant -4.05*** -4.25*** -3.30*** -3.35*** 
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  (0.46) (0.47) (0.38) (0.39) 
          
Observations 3877 3877 4093 4093 
*State Dummies also included in models.   
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix C: The Relationship between Council Responsibilities and Housing Program Adoption 
 VARIABLES  
 Program 
Index  
 Const of 
Units  
 Acquire 
Units  
 Imp. 
Units  
 Offer 
Material 
Plot of 
Land   Regular  Urban 
         
PT Mayor 0.0489 0.209 -0.179 0.212 0.0606 -0.116 0.270* -0.0480 
 (0.0580) (0.147) (0.147) (0.129) (0.128) (0.139) (0.142) (0.155) 
Consultative 0.00143 -0.108 -0.0278 -0.102 -0.0406 0.0260 0.242*** 0.0299 
 (0.0374) (0.0886) (0.0919) (0.0808) (0.0810) (0.0853) (0.0897) (0.0969) 
Deliberative -0.0212 0.00359 -0.0456 -0.124 0.0131 -0.00416 0.0847 -0.0511 
 (0.0439) (0.102) (0.107) (0.0941) (0.0944) (0.0993) (0.105) (0.114) 
Normative -0.0663 0.0421 -0.219** 0.00976 -0.0153 -0.130 -0.207** -0.158 
 (0.0421) (0.100) (0.105) (0.0911) (0.0917) (0.0956) (0.101) (0.109) 
Oversight 0.127*** 0.158* 0.258*** 0.125 0.110 0.205** 0.172* 0.151 
 (0.0384) (0.0912) (0.0943) (0.0832) (0.0837) (0.0871) (0.0921) (0.100) 
Housing Fund -0.00878 0.0451 -0.0446 -0.0807 -0.101 0.0650 -0.0461 0.124 
 (0.0431) (0.0961) (0.104) (0.0909) (0.0909) (0.0967) (0.101) (0.116) 
Population 2005 (log) 0.115*** 0.168*** 0.118** 0.0374 0.0683 0.0723 0.364*** 0.379*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0603) (0.0556) (0.0506) (0.0509) (0.0532) (0.0586) (0.0617) 
Percentage Urban 
Population 2000 (log) 0.126** 0.0681 -0.0979 0.243** 0.240** 0.303** 0.0819 0.0504 
 (0.0519) (0.112) (0.121) (0.105) (0.106) (0.118) (0.125) (0.142) 
Municipal Budget per 
capita 2005 (log) 0.221*** 0.600*** 0.162 0.282** 0.248** 0.135 0.301** 0.473*** 
 (0.0545) (0.144) (0.136) (0.123) (0.123) (0.128) (0.136) (0.147) 
Gini 2000 0.540 2.005** 0.635 1.454** 0.516 0.0354 0.115 0.779 
 (0.329) (0.788) (0.803) (0.713) (0.709) (0.746) (0.795) (0.862) 
Income per capita 2000 
(log) 0.0281 0.375** 0.135 -0.133 -0.228 0.0411 0.144 0.136 
 (0.0666) (0.157) (0.164) (0.142) (0.143) (0.152) (0.162) (0.179) 
Non-profits and 
Foundations per capita -0.0307 -0.111 -0.148** 0.162*** -0.109* 0.0624 -0.101 -0.141* 
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(log) 
 (0.0300) (0.0688) (0.0722) (0.0629) (0.0632) (0.0676) (0.0723) (0.0794) 
Favelas Exist 0.0683* -0.0225 -0.0320 -0.0356 -0.103 0.0686 0.459*** 0.433*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0895) (0.0953) (0.0839) (0.0843) (0.0888) (0.0908) (0.0998) 
Percentage of PT 
Vereadores 0.0380 -0.124 1.022** 0.0563 -0.408 -0.193 -0.256 0.813* 
 (0.185) (0.432) (0.448) (0.401) (0.393) (0.425) (0.441) (0.480) 
Northeast -0.103 1.117* 0.503 -0.0313 -0.692 0.821* -0.481 0.179 
 (0.229) (0.631) (0.504) (0.474) (0.592) (0.485) (0.599) (0.571) 
North 0.360 -0.701 0.597 -0.934 0.335 0.974 0.433 0.348 
 (0.453) (0.594) (0.946) (0.641) (0.563) (0.896) (0.593) (0.583) 
Center West 0.336*** 0.449 0.0337 0.360 0.681** 1.047*** 0.370 0.320 
 (0.120) (0.312) (0.291) (0.273) (0.273) (0.278) (0.296) (0.327) 
South 0.153* 0.563** 0.293 -0.170 0.315 0.551*** 0.0884 0.237 
 (0.0852) (0.226) (0.196) (0.191) (0.198) (0.212) (0.198) (0.223) 
Constant -2.376*** -8.964*** -5.093*** -1.028 -2.426** -2.557** -7.914*** -10.27*** 
 (0.539) (1.494) (1.348) (1.227) (1.238) (1.298) (1.398) (1.500) 
         
Observations 1352 1349 1335 1349 1349 1351 1345 1349 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
State Dummies also included in model.  
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Appendix D: The Relationship between Municipal Housing Council Responsibilities and Municipally Funded Housing Programs 
 VARIABLES  
 
Construction 
of Units by 
Muni  
 Acquire 
Units by 
Muni  
 Improve 
Units by 
Muni  
 Offer 
Materials 
by Muni  
 Offer Plots 
of Land by 
Muni  
 
Regularization 
by Muni  
 
Urbanization 
by Muni  
        
PT Mayor 0.315* -0.128 0.113 -0.106 -0.515 -0.338 0.00134 
 (0.161) (0.353) (0.169) (0.230) (0.339) (0.214) (0.283) 
Consultative -0.0343 -0.234 -0.0200 0.141 -0.203 -0.00766 -0.310 
 (0.105) (0.224) (0.109) (0.157) (0.216) (0.156) (0.191) 
Deliberative 0.329** -0.101 0.182 0.220 0.292 0.143 -0.0898 
 (0.128) (0.268) (0.125) (0.185) (0.230) (0.184) (0.229) 
Normative -0.0282 0.0270 -0.190 -0.0792 0.324 -0.0740 0.383* 
 (0.118) (0.262) (0.124) (0.185) (0.232) (0.176) (0.210) 
Oversight 0.0482 0.189 0.303*** -0.133 -0.139 -0.0134 -0.317* 
 (0.109) (0.213) (0.117) (0.164) (0.201) (0.162) (0.191) 
Housing Fund -0.0536 0.0748 -0.111 -0.0791 -0.0430 -0.195 -0.113 
 (0.122) (0.256) (0.124) (0.182) (0.250) (0.195) (0.257) 
Population 2005 (log) 0.140** 0.192* -0.0900 -0.00388 -0.0450 0.103 -0.167 
 (0.0630) (0.114) (0.0691) (0.0978) (0.129) (0.0924) (0.103) 
Percentage Urban Population 2000 
(log) 0.307** 0.537* 0.312** 0.339 0.624* 0.445* 0.294 
 (0.144) (0.309) (0.147) (0.223) (0.339) (0.262) (0.323) 
Municipal Budget per capita 2005 
(log) 0.755*** 0.612** 0.381** 0.369 0.262 0.464** 0.191 
 (0.153) (0.301) (0.167) (0.254) (0.323) (0.222) (0.259) 
Gini 2000 1.689* 1.126 0.0794 0.297 3.787* 3.539** 1.992 
 (0.915) (1.901) (0.949) (1.442) (1.937) (1.500) (1.721) 
Income per capita 2000 (log) -0.301 -0.666 0.0605 -0.507 -0.532 -0.297 0.212 
 (0.196) (0.415) (0.206) (0.321) (0.439) (0.324) (0.347) 
Non-profits and Foundations per 
capita (log) -0.0838 -0.0733 -0.206** 0.168 0.0803 -0.122 0.0493 
 (0.0810) (0.173) (0.0866) (0.125) (0.176) (0.140) (0.174) 
 189
Favelas Exist 0.179* -0.00617 0.0737 -0.0773 -0.279 0.0219 0.300 
 (0.109) (0.212) (0.111) (0.170) (0.212) (0.165) (0.217) 
Percentage of PT City Council 
Members (Vereadors) -1.241** 0.144 -0.884* -1.322* 0.364 -0.830 -1.359 
 (0.524) (1.002) (0.518) (0.745) (1.143) (0.791) (1.029) 
Northeast 0.0434 0.893 0.221 -1.276 -0.294 -0.200 1.082 
 (0.487) (1.042) (0.953) (1.010) (0.934) (0.929) (0.879) 
North 0.130  -0.734**   -1.429* 0.119 
 (0.651)  (0.363)   (0.842) (0.618) 
Center West 0.248 0.421 -0.158 0.566 0.382 0.539 -0.109 
 (0.316) (0.630) (0.379) (0.567) (0.663) (0.438) (0.590) 
South 0.362 0.303 0.326 -0.132 0.403 0.893*** 0.376 
 (0.247) (0.481) (0.284) (0.363) (0.472) (0.340) (0.407) 
Constant -7.368*** -4.472 -3.220* 2.298 0.996 -4.657** -0.933 
 (1.535) (2.901) (1.714) (2.526) (3.445) (2.222) (2.591) 
        
Observations 974 255 769 561 350 428 280 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
State Dummies also included in model.  
 
